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PREFACE 
 
Pursuing human security through Developmental Peace Missions: Ambitious 
construct or feasible ideal? appears at a time when the continent of Africa is 
wrought by conflict, internal unrest and not-so-civil war, compelling African leaders 
to grapple with the theory and reality of peacekeeping and conflict resolution in 
extremely difficult and challenging environments.  Notions of Developmental Peace 
Missions (DPMs) emanated from both the political debate and the study of African 
peace missions by university-based and NGO-employed researchers.  This volume 
examines DPMs and assesses the utility of the concept itself as a means to pursue 
sustainable levels of human security through a combination of peacekeeping 
interventions. DPMs, which envisage a model of concurrent developmental efforts 
and security actions to turn back destructive internal African conflicts, is a 
noteworthy South African contribution to this debate. The editorial staff of Scientia 
Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies are pleased to publish this third 
Supplementa, which is probably the most comprehensive work on DPMs to date and 
of immediate interest to the defence community.  
 
Pursuing human security developed under the supervision of Prof Theo Neethling 
and Maj Benjamin Mokoena and was submitted by Lt Col Laetitia Olivier as a 
thesis, presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of 
Military Science (MMil) in Security and Africa Studies at the Faculty of Military 
Science, Stellenbosch University. It has been editorially altered and revised for this 
publication. The valuable inputs made by Prof DJ Kotze of Unisa as external 
examiner, as well as those proffered by the lecturing staff of the School for Security 
and Africa Studies during the initial research colloquium are acknowledged. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This study explores the feasibility of the concept Developmental Peace Missions 
(DPMs).  It seeks to answer the question whether DPMs is an ambitious construct or 
a feasible ideal and whether DPMs could be effectively applied during peace 
missions.  The study takes the form of a descriptive analysis of the theoretical 
underpinnings and philosophical points of departure of the concept of DPMs, and 
includes the analysis of various relevant case studies with a view to studying the 
application of the concept of DPMs. 
 
The study explores the evolution that has taken place in terms of United Nations 
(UN) peace missions in that most modern peace missions include both peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding initiatives.  The study also illustrates the modern approach to 
peace missions, based on an integrated systems-thinking approach by means of 
which the activities of all relevant role-players are integrated and fused towards a 
common end state: that of sustained security and development.  In order to analyse 
the concept of DPMs, the underpinnings of the concept human security, the security-
development nexus and peacebuilding were researched in depth.  These concepts 
were then coupled to the concept of DPMs in terms of their utility during recent and 
current complex peace missions, both internationally and on the African continent.  
In view of this, the concept of DPMs was studied in the context of contemporary 
peacekeeping in terms of three case studies, namely the peace missions in Kosovo, 
Sierra Leone and the DRC.  Thus DPMs was applied to these case studies and 
analysed in terms of the extent to which the peace interventions in these countries 
were conducted in accordance with the theoretical underpinnings and philosophical 
points of departure of the concept. 
 
The study concludes that DPMs is indeed a feasible ideal for peace missions, as it is 
based on and in line with the approved current UN and AU integrated planning 
processes.  However, in terms of its practical utility in Africa, it currently remains an 
ambitious construct, given the limited capacity and resources of the AU and regional 
organisations.  Therefore, DPMs should not be viewed as a short-term solution to, or 
panacea for, all intra-state wars.  The study proposes that the UN, the AU, as well as 
relevant regional organisations will have to adjust and make changes in terms of 
their institutions, structures, funding and the provision of resources in order to 
operationalise the concept of DPMs successfully.  This is especially true as far as the 
AU is concerned, as the AU currently experiences severe limitations in both logistics 
and human resources.  However, the fact that both the UN and the AU have adopted 
the Integrated Mission Planning Process concept as planning tool for their respective 
missions is an indication that progress is being made towards the achievement of 
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establishing a more holistic and integrated approach to finding sustainable solutions 
to global conflict.  Ultimately, the success of DPMs will be determined by the will 
and commitment of all the relevant role-players involved in finding a lasting 
solution to intra-state conflicts.  The concept itself cannot provide sustainable peace 
and development. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Orientation 
 
For a large part of the international community, the name „Africa‟, conjures up two 
very distinct and different images.  On the one hand, the name is reminiscent of an 
age-old „mother continent‟, imbued with vast animal and mineral resources and a 
rich and multi-faceted cultural heritage.  On the other hand, there is the Africa of 
intra-state wars, protracted conflict, poverty, famine, disease and infinite suffering – 
the potential abundance in stark juxtaposition to the severe shortages and limitations 
experienced by the majority of inhabitants of the African continent. 
 
The consequences of the protracted conflict have seriously undermined Africa‟s 
efforts to ensure long-term stability, prosperity and peace for its peoples (Annan, 
1998:2).  Although diverse reasons for ongoing conflicts have been noted and 
analysed, the conflicts have primarily been of an intra-state nature.  Such conflicts 
have had considerable peacekeeping consequences for regional, as well as 
international role-players. 
Human security 
The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable 
development in Africa was the primary point of discussion during a meeting of the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on 25 September 1997 (UNSC, 1997).  
Under the leadership of the then United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG), Mr 
Kofi Annan, the promotion of peace on the African continent was considered, as 
African conflicts have been among the United Nation‟s (UN) most important 
initiatives in peacekeeping and conflict resolution since the end of the Cold War.  
Mr Annan stressed the fact that, for the UN, there is no higher goal, no deeper 
commitment, and no greater ambition, than preventing armed conflict (Annan, 
1998:1).  Importantly, it was emphasised that the prevention of conflict begins and 
ends with the promotion of human security and human development, and that 
ensuring human security is, in the broadest sense, the cardinal mission of the UN.  In 
this regard, the African continent has had a critical impact on defining the limits and 
possibilities of the post-Cold War order and the place of the UN in this framework 
(Neethling, 2003:87).  In order to ensure human security on the continent, several 
initiatives have been initialised on the continent – most prominently the initiatives 
pertaining to the New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD), a continental 
economic recovery plan for Africa. 
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In addition to the UN Human Development Report of 1994, which refers to human 
security in Africa, the African Union‟s (AU) Peace and Security Policy is premised 
on the viewpoint that the causes of intra-state conflict necessitate an emphasis on 
human security, based not only on political values, but also on social and economic 
imperatives (Neethling, 2004:78).  This implies an embracing of 
 
human rights; the right to participate fully in the process of governance; 
the right to equal development as well as the right to have access to 
resources and the basic necessities to life; the right to protection against 
poverty; the right to conducive education and health conditions; the right 
to protection against marginalisation on the basis of gender; protection 
against natural disasters, as well as ecological and environmental 
degradation (AU, 2004:1). 
 
The security-development nexus 
The link between security and development is highlighted by the continued violent 
conflict in many of the world‟s poorest states – many on the continent of Africa.  It 
has become widely accepted that contemporary armed conflicts require sustained 
efforts that address not only the military dimensions of conflicts, but also the 
political, humanitarian, economic and social dimensions of conflict.  For some years, 
there has been a growing concern amongst scholars and relevant functionaries with a 
specific emphasis on the necessity of linking security and development to achieve 
meaningful peace, and pursuing this by means of special peacebuilding measures.  It 
is to this end, that a range of reforms has been implemented throughout the 
international system to facilitate peacebuilding endeavours.  These reforms have, 
inter alia, been encapsulated in the UN Development Reports of 1999, in which it 
was reported that, whilst underdevelopment may not directly cause violent conflict, 
poor social, economic and environmental conditions and weak or ineffective 
political institutions, certainly diminish a society‟s capacity to manage social 
tensions in a non-violent manner.  For this reason, the UN has become involved in 
development assistance, which is geared towards building or rebuilding that 
capacity. 
 
Developmental Peace Missions 
The concept of Developmental Peace Missions (DPMs) was presented to the South 
African Parliament as a practical or functional South African concept to effectively 
address human security and development in Africa (Madlala-Routledge, 2004b).  
The concept has been developed since 2004, based on several initiatives and 
research conducted by the former South African Deputy-Minister of Defence, Ms 
Nosizwe Madlala-Routledge in conjunction with members of the Council for 
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Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR).  While the principle of bringing 
peacekeeping closer to peacebuilding is hardly new, there is still much to learn 
institutionally and operationally about how the two activities can best be applied in 
practice. 
 
The concept of DPMs seems to be in line with the contemporary approach to UN 
Complex Peace Missions, which are in effect peacebuilding operations, in that they 
have mandates that combine security, political, humanitarian, development and 
human rights dimensions in the post-conflict phase.  In this regard, the concept of 
DPMs was presented as a „home-grown‟ South African concept that is based on the 
premise that security can only achieve permanent benefit if its vital peacebuilding 
activities are rolled out within a reasonable time.  Under „reasonable‟ is understood 
the process of providing critical humanitarian assistance and reconstruction 
capabilities immediately after military operations so that security can dynamically 
reinforce and influence the effectiveness of development (i.e., the one activity must 
be applied without loosing sight of the other) (Gueli et al, 2006a:8).  Gueli, a leading 
voice on the concept of DPMs, argues that the functional gap between military 
peacekeeping and civilian peacebuilding (or post-conflict reconstruction) “has 
received a lot of attention, because it remains a weakness in the policy framework of 
the UN conflict resolution repertoire, particularly in peace missions” (Gueli, 
2007:29).  To this effect, the South African concept of DPMs offers a practical 
approach to effecting peacebuilding and to ultimately set the stage for nation-
building and sustainable security and development.  DPMs call for a more timely 
effort to “bring security nearer to development – the two veritable pillars of all UN 
peace missions – in order to minimise the return of conflict and to facilitate a 
transition to international and local actors responsible for conducting longer-term 
state-building efforts” (Gueli et al, 2006a:3). 
 
The concept of DPMs proposes ways for policy-makers to plan and organise for 
civil-military operations that bridge the traditional gap between peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding and to mainstream developmental principles into conflict prevention 
and resolution.  After a military intervention, a peace support operation‟s host nation 
typically finds itself in a precarious position: not only must it reconstitute its 
governmental and administrative apparatus, but it must also rebuild much of its basic 
infrastructure that was destroyed during the conflict. This includes the rebuilding of 
roads, restoration of public utilities and removal of land mines. If these challenges 
are not effectively resolved, the chaotic situation could easily sustain the conditions 
and increase resentments that led to the conflict in the first place.  In addition, 
military forces are often repeatedly deployed in peace operations, usually with a UN 
mandate, to put an end to hostilities, but are then retained in the theatre of operations 
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for an indeterminate period of time without a clear exit strategy and without a clear 
mandate to execute peace-operation tasks, other than that of providing security and 
stability (Williams, 2005:15).  There is usually no well-established strategy for a 
quick transition from the military‟s peacemaking and peacekeeping mission to the 
longer-term peacebuilding mission of intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs).  
 
According to Gueli et al (2006c:6), peacebuilding efforts usually start during the 
post-conflict phase of a peace-mission that follows the signing of a cease-fire or 
comprehensive peace agreement.  Moreover, many policy makers still insist that 
distinguishing between military and civilian activities in peace missions provides 
them with a clear distinction that delineates the specific roles and responsibilities 
during the respective stages of conflicts (Gueli and Liebenberg, 2006a:1).  This 
distinction in effect, emphasises a linear or sequential approach to solving conflict 
situations and is in accordance with traditional approaches to solving military 
problems.  However, the UN‟s record over the past few decades has largely 
dispelled such traditional ideas and practices.  Two enduring lessons that the UN has 
learnt through years of experience in responding to conflict is that speed and 
momentum do matter in peace missions, and that effective missions require 
integrated efforts rather than separate tracks that do not converge.  Peacekeeping 
efforts in Africa, such as those in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the DRC and Côte d‟Ivoire, 
have shown that military activities can be rendered ineffective if continued for too 
long, and if not complemented with real economic growth and social upliftment.  
Such lessons are especially relevant if one considers that a recent UN report 
estimated that roughly half of all peace missions have a chance at success after the 
signing of peace agreements, and that the chances appear to be even lower when 
warring parties fight for control over valuable resources (Gueli et al, 2006c:6).  The 
former UNSG, Kofi Annan, noted in 1998 already that peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding should be simultaneous activities used in combination, and as 
complements to one another.  This is why it is essential to have a multi-lateral 
systems-approach towards solving conflict, which will contribute to more integrated 
and co-ordinated actions in establishing peace. 
 
1.2. Problem statement 
 
The concept of DPMs is premised on the problem statement that many (traditional) 
peacekeeping interventions in the past were unable to work towards sustainable 
political and economic development.  To this end, DPMs are aimed at providing a 
practical and feasible alternative that could be successfully implemented in the 
African context. 
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As far as this study is concerned, the problem statement is demarcated conceptually, 
geographically and temporally.  
 
Conceptual demarcation: The analysis is confined to the inter-relationship between 
DPMs and the security-development nexus in terms of sustainable political and 
economic development.     
 
Geographic demarcation:  The research focuses on the intervention in Kosovo as an 
international case study, and the case studies of Sierra Leone and the DRC, 
respectively, in terms of peace intervention missions in Africa.  The choice of the 
three case studies was based on the fact they represented the first few cases in which 
the notion of bringing peacekeeping closer to peacebuilding formed the basis of the 
approach to the deployment of peacekeepers.    
 
Temporal demarcation:  The analysis focuses primarily on current international and 
African peace missions, although previous peace missions and military interventions 
since 1990 are also taken into account to trace recent developments and trends.  
Historical factors are thus considered when these factors have a direct bearing on the 
concepts and the research problem. 
 
1.3. Research question 
 
The research question that this study intends to answer, is: Is the concept of DPMs 
practical and feasible in the African context?  This problem generates three 
subsidiary questions: 
 
 how appropriate is the concept of DPMs specifically to the African 
context? 
 are there generic or common elements that will be applicable to all peace 
missions in the international community in general and Africa in 
particular? 
 can the implementation of DPMs provide innovative solutions to the 
challenges of human security, the security-development nexus and the 
need for peacebuilding on the continent? 
 
In view of the above, the appropriateness of the concept of DPMs in the African 
context is addressed in this study and generic or common elements or prerequisites 
are identified in order to construct a synthesised framework. 
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1.4. Aim of the study 
 
The concept of DPMs and the implementation of such missions have increasingly 
been in the centre of military and semi-military discussions pertaining to the failures 
and successes of peace missions in Africa.  However, the concept has not yet been 
academically scrutinised and examined.  In other words, the aim of this study will be 
to assess whether the concept of DPMs is indeed a useful construct to pursue 
sustainable levels of human security through a combination of intervention action, 
reconstruction and development initiatives, aimed at addressing armed conflicts 
constructively. 
 
1.5. Purpose and significance of the study 
 
Having realised the significance of and need for peace missions aimed at the 
achievement of sustainable levels of human security through a combination of 
interventions, the CSIR, in partnership with the Conflict and Governance Facility 
(CAGE) (a partnership project between the European Commission and the South 
African Department of National Treasury), have been involved in research with 
regard to the concept of Developmental Peace Missions since 2004 (Madlala-
Routledge and Liebenberg, 2004:125–131).  The intention was to determine and 
define a solution to the development gap between peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
in an attempt to prevent conflict-ridden countries from sliding back into a state of 
civil war and strife.   
 
Lt Gen Solly Shoke, Chief of the SA Army, commissioned the SA Army Vision 
2020 Team in 2004 to ensure that current and future army projects are aligned with 
the SA Army‟s long-term outcomes (Shoke, 2006:18).  The concept of the SA 
Army‟s Vision was expounded in Jane’s Defence Weekly in October 2006.  Vision 
2020 focuses on the SA Army‟s plans for preparation for current and future military 
challenges in its quest firstly, to fulfil its constitutional mandate with other South 
African National Defence Force (SANDF) arms of the services to defend and protect 
the territorial integrity of the Republic of South Africa and its people, and secondly 
to support the government‟s diplomatic initiatives to help eradicate conflicts in 
Africa.  The South African Army Vision 2020 team subsequently requested post-
graduate students at the Military Academy to embark on, inter alia, research 
pertaining to DPMs, as the concept is receiving increased attention in military 
circles, but has not yet been academically researched and examined in terms of its 
utility.  This implies that, although the concept of DPMs has increasingly been 
promoted as a feasible paradigm to addressing conflict in Africa, the concept has not 
been subjected to rigorous academic scrutiny and analysis. 
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It should also be noted that the concept of DPMs is increasingly being addressed in 
training and doctrine of the SANDF.  The background to this study is based on 
research that has been conducted for the development of the Joint Warfare and 
Military Operations Other then War (MOOTW) Modules as part of the Joint Senior 
Command and Staff Programme (JSCSP) that is presented at the South African 
National War College to Operational Level Commanders and Staff Officers.  The 
JSCSP is a yearlong course that is presented to senior officers (South African as well 
as international fellows) and is focused on military-strategic leadership across the 
diplomatic, military and economic sectors of national power. The proposed 
framework for DPMs is thus directly relevant to the curriculum of the course. 
 
The findings of this research could assist government officials and military decision-
makers to determine whether implementation of DPMs will indeed improve the 
chances of success with peace missions, as well as to explore the likelihood and 
feasibility of successfully implementing DPMs in Africa. 
 
Furthermore, the research findings may highlight the critical success factors that 
need to be established in order to facilitate the successful implementation of DPMs.  
The research will also reflect upon the specific role of the military component in 
DPMs, with specific reference to, for instance, the African Standby Force (ASF), as 
well as highlight areas that require specific capacity development in terms of 
effectively implementing DPMs. 
 
1.6. Research methodology 
 
This study is a historical-descriptive undertaking, based on a literature study and 
analysis of factual data sources.  The concept and principles of DPM‟s, as presented 
by Gueli et al (2006c), are applied as departure points for the research.  The 
components of the analytical framework are deductively linked and the information 
is dealt with in an inductive manner as a basis for the analysis.  Peace missions in 
Africa that are relevant to the topic are analysed as part of the assessment.  The 
primary unit of analysis relates to countries where peace missions have been 
conducted since 1990 and in which the mandates of the peace missions combined 
peacekeeping and peacbuilding initiatives.  The level of analysis is thus 
predominantly state-centric, although other relevant international, continental and 
regional factors are also considered where applicable.  The emphasis is on the 
analysis of secondary sources, although primary sources are utilised where 
applicable.  Primary sources include official UN and AU documents, as well as 
relevant documents on the concept of DPMs as developed by the CSIR.  The study 
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is not based on fieldwork or questionnaires.  However, unstructured and informal 
interviews were conducted with the proponents of the concept of DPMs, as well as 
relevant military functionaries.  This study furthermore consists of qualitative 
research and analysis, although quantitative data supports the analysis in some 
instances. 
 
The study is aimed at providing possible answers to address the complex issues 
pertaining to peace missions in Africa.  The research is also intended to be utilised to 
analyse the void between the political needs/demands and the military role and 
supply capacity, and to make recommendations and conclusions as to how DPMs 
can be utilised during peace missions to achieve desired objectives and end states in 
order to facilitate sustained development and security on the African continent.  The 
peace interventions in recent years in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and the DRC have been 
selected as case studies to determine whether the concept of DPMs could be 
successfully implemented during peace missions to improve the chances of 
establishing lasting peace and development.  These interventions are manifestations 
of peace missions where the „new‟ approach of combining peacebuilding and 
peacekeeping mandates was followed.   
 
It could be argued that the fact that the study is based on only three case studies 
poses some problems with regard to the making of generalised conclusions 
concerning the application of the concept of DPMs.  However, this does not 
disqualify the merit of a study of this kind as the three case studies are indeed 
representative of some of the major multinational peacekeeping undertakings in 
recent years. 
 
In the final analysis a proposed synthesised DPMs framework is applied to the 
security situation in Africa which includes a brief analysis of the feasibility of AU 
policies, as well as the role and function of the ASF in implementing these policies. 
 
The research conducted incorporates the period January 1990 until May 2008. 
 
1.7. Literature review 
 
The literature and data sources consulted for this research can be divided into five 
categories.  The first deals with the background information on the concept of 
human security in general and in terms of its applicability to the African context in 
particular. 
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The second category refers to literature that addresses the security-development 
nexus in terms of its nature and applicability to peace missions internationally, as 
well as to its specific applicability to Africa. 
 
The third category comprises of literature that deals with the development of the 
concept of DPMs and information and data on the South African model of DPMs 
and its component parts.  The newly adopted UN Integrated Mission Planning 
Process (IMPP) is also analysed in terms of its interface with DMPs.  
 
The fourth category consists of sources regarding international peace missions since 
the 1990s during which peacekeeping and peacebuilding mandates have been 
combined.  Literature on the North Atlantic treaty Organisation‟s (NATO) 
intervention in Kosovo is analysed in terms of the approach to the mission, as well 
as to identify some practical experiences in conflict management as it pertains to 
international programmes and organisations.  The analysis also includes an 
investigation of new developments pertaining to the UN, NATO and the European 
Union (EU) and the relevance/applicability of the concept of DPMs in terms of the 
UN‟s contemporary approach to multi-functional peace missions.    
 
The fifth category relates to literature on multi-functional peace missions in the 
African context since 1990, with specific reference to the peace missions in Sierra 
Leone and the DRC.  The analysis seeks to uncover the underlying factors that link 
these interventions to the UN‟s current approach to multi-functional peace missions 
in which peacekeeping and peacebuilding mandates are combined, as well as to 
analyse these case studies in terms of the applicability/relevance of the concept of 
DPMs to the African continent.  
 
The literature and data sources consulted for this study include the following: 
 
Literature regarding human security.  Several reports from the UN (Human 
Development Plan, 1994) and the AU (Draft Framework for a Common African 
Defence and Security Policy, 2004), as well as various articles and reports published 
by the Institute for Security Studies, including those by Solomon (1998), Hendricks 
(2006) and Lewis (2006) are of significance. 
 
Literature regarding the security–development nexus.  There are various sources 
relating to the security-development nexus, including works by Annan (1998), 
Boutros-Ghali (1992), McGowan and Nel (eds.) (2002), Tschirgi (2003) and 
Neethling (2005). 
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Literature regarding Developmental Peace Missions.  The leading authors in this 
regard are Richard Gueli and Sybert Liebenberg.  At the centre of these authors‟ 
work, are studies that were commissioned by the CSIR, in partnership with CAGE.  
See Gueli et al (2006a-c). 
 
Data sources regarding international peace missions since 1990, with specific 
reference to Kosovo.  Works by the following authors are especially relevant: 
Llamazares and Levy (2003), Mertus and Sajat (2005), Williams (2005) and Gourlay 
(2006).  
 
Data sources regarding African peace missions since 1990, with specific reference 
to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sierra Leone.  Works by 
Cilliers and Mills (1999), Berman and Sams (2000), Maqueen (2002), as well as De 
Coning (2004, 2006) are of significance.  UN reports on the UN missions in Sierra 
Leone and the DRC are furthermore significant in terms of the successes and lessons 
learned, and these include inter alia UNSC reports and resolutions.  Various 
publications by the Institute for Security Studies are also useful, including works by 
Cilliers (1999b), Malan (2000), Malan et al (2002) and Hendricks (2006). 
 
1.8. Structure of the research 
 
The study is structured in the conventional way, being divided into a theoretical 
framework, a main body and a concluding section containing an evaluation. 
 
Chapter One is of a methodological nature and provides an introduction, 
identification and formulation of the research theme and problem statement.  This 
chapter demarcates the study and provides the methodology adopted in the research.  
The literature review that forms part of this chapter provides an overview of some of 
the sources consulted to undertake the study.    
 
Chapter Two provides definitions of all the key concepts that are relevant to an 
understanding of DPMs, such as the relation between the concepts of human 
security, the security-development nexus, peacebuilding, multi-dimensional 
peacekeeping and international conflict management. 
 
Chapter Three focuses upon the concepts and principles of DPMs, i.e., the 
development of the concept and some practical applications. 
 
Chapter Four addresses multi-functional peace missions in the international context, 
specifically the case of Kosovo.  The content of this chapter focuses on an analysis 
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of the NATO intervention in Kosovo, as well as on obtaining an international 
perspective on peace missions.  Specific attention is paid to contemporary 
developments pertaining to UN peace missions and the respective roles of the UN 
and regional organisations in complex peace operations.  The research findings 
include an analysis of the relevance/applicability of the concept of DPMs in the case 
of Kosovo.  
 
Chapter Five focuses on multi-functional peace missions in the African context.  
The focus of this chapter is on the deployments to Sierra Leone, as the interventions 
embodied the contemporary approach to UN complex peace missions that are in 
effect peacebuilding operations.  The Sierra Leone case study is analysed to 
determine the applicability/relevance of the concept of DPMs to the African 
continent. 
 
Chapter Six focuses on the peace mission to the DRC, and the feasibility and/or 
relevance of the concept of DPMs to such interventions, as the UN mandate to its 
mission in the DRC addressed and combined security, political, humanitarian, as 
well as development and human rights issues.  The DRC case study is also analysed 
to determine the applicability/relevance of the concept of DPMs to the African 
continent. 
 
Chapter Seven provides an evaluation and summary of key findings that addresses 
the research question posed in Chapter One.  This includes an assessment of the 
utility of the concept of DPMs that will advance proposals for its future use, and 
culminates in a final conclusion.  
 
1.9 Conclusions 
 
Peacekeeping on the African continent remains one of the greatest challenges to 
international, regional and local role-players.  Many changes have taken place in 
terms of the global security environment since the end of the Cold War, and 
subsequently there have been significant changes to the ways in which conflict 
resolution strategies and methodologies have been applied.  Furthermore, it has 
generally been accepted that human security cannot be improved and sustainable 
development cannot be achieved in an environment where there is no peace and 
security, and this realisation forms the basis of most new developments in terms of 
conflict resolution and peacebuilding strategies.  The quest for establishing lasting 
peace and finding workable solutions to improve on the current success rate of peace 
missions in Africa, resulted in the conceptualisation of DPMs as a framework that 
could possibly be successfully applied to ensure sustainable peace and development 
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in Africa.  This study is an effort to determine whether the concept of DPMs does 
indeed offer a feasible solution or paradigm to effective peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding on the continent, or whether the concept essentially remains an 
ambitious scholarly construct. 
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CHAPTER 2: KEY CONCEPTS UNDERLYING 
DEVELOPMENTAL PEACE MISSIONS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Concepts, perspectives, paradigms and theories do not emerge from a vacuum.  They 
gain currency because they are better able to account for existent realities and they 
enjoy legitimacy because they resonate with the dominant ideology.  In terms of the 
current international security environment, concepts such as peace, democracy and 
development have emerged as the key pillars of the post-Cold War security 
framework.  It is within this framework that concepts such as human security, the 
security-development nexus, and peacebuilding are currently being explored and 
defined.  The evolving theory regarding DPMs should also be understood in terms of 
its inter-relationship with current security perspectives, theories and paradigms.  
From an analytical point of view, it is thus essential to have a clear understanding of 
the related and underpinning theories and concepts of DPMs, before any attempt 
should be made to determine whether the construct could effectively be applied to 
increase the potential of establishing lasting peace and sustainable development. 
 
The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall raised expectations for 
global peace, but these expectations were soon thwarted as inter- and intra-state 
conflicts proliferated during the establishment of „a new world order‟.  Following 
the collapse of empires in the former USSR and Yugoslavia and post-colonial 
Africa, violent ethnic divisions and nationalist claims for self-determination made a 
mockery of the liberal policies underpinning the „new world order‟ (Spence, 
2007:42).  The result was social and economic dislocation on a massive scale.  This, 
in turn, coincided with the emergence of a renewed and sustained emphasis on the 
need to assert, protect and enhance human rights wherever and whenever they were 
threatened (Spence, 2007:42).  In answer to this dilemma, the UN and other IGOs 
were expected to intervene in these conflicts with the intention of finding lasting 
solutions to the causes of the respective conflicts (Neethling, 2005:34).  However, 
due to the socio-economic decline that resulted from the protracted nature of these 
conflicts, the prospects of economic development were limited and progress in 
general was delayed.  As a result, “scarce foreign assistance that could have 
supported sustainable (economic) development, was diverted to communities that 
were in urgent need, thus primarily addressing the humanitarian processes and short 
term needs, instead of focusing on long-term sustainable development” (Stremlau, 
2002:1).  The limited successes that were subsequently achieved with many of these 
interventions resulted in the re-evaluation of the fundamental peacekeeping 
principles that were adhered to during the time of the Cold War.  This introspection 
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also prompted the expansion of what had traditionally been understood in terms of 
the concepts of human security and peacebuilding. 
 
UN-mandated interventions, as well as interventions by regional organisations in 
intra-state wars clearly indicate that contemporary armed conflicts require sustained 
efforts that address not only the military dimensions of conflicts, but also the 
political, humanitarian, economic and social dimensions of conflicts – thus linking 
the concepts security and development.    
 
This chapter encloses an exploration of the various concepts that were used to 
develop and construct the framework of DPMs.  To this effect, the underlying 
concepts and principles underpinning DPMs, specifically the expansion and broader 
understanding of the concepts human security, the security-development nexus and 
peacebuilding, will be explored in order to provide sufficient background to the 
concepts and principles of DPMs.  
 
2.2. Human security 
 
The term human security was initially focused on development, but recent history 
has prompted a broader, more holistic understanding of the concept.  Protracted 
intra-state conflicts that have plagued many countries in the developing world 
resulted in a shift in the focus in terms of human security.  The current 
understanding of human security has shifted virtually exclusively to the human costs 
of violent conflict (Oche, 2000:43).  The fact that violent conflicts make up the 
principal threat to human security means that issues relating to the management and 
resolution of conflicts will continue to be the primary focus of developmental and 
peacebuilding initiatives.     
 
2.2.1. Theoretical analysis of the concept of human security 
 
The end of the Cold War witnessed an escalation of internal or intra-state conflicts 
that in the past were subsumed in terms of the East-West ideological overlay 
(Mutesa and Nchito, 2005:7).  This phenomenon of protracted internal conflict that 
erupted globally after the end of the Cold War was utilised to serve as a 
confirmation of the lack of good governance and democracy as primary explanatory 
variable for conflict.  Since the late 1980s, development perspectives had, therefore 
primarily blamed the lack of development on domestic governance policies and 
issues.  Thus, the state was posited as instrumental in creating conflict and insecurity 
(Hendricks, 2006:1).  For many people, the state has long since ceased to be the 
provider of security, whether physical or social.  The global environment has also 
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been reconfigured in a number of ways in the past 20 years, and the whole landscape 
in which politics play out, has changed radically.  “With globalisation, the 
concentration and centralisation of power has grown, and with it, the geographic 
spread and degree of insecurity” (Barnett, 2001:122).  
 
The term human security can be traced to the 1994 United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report (Oche, 2000:39).  The report was 
based on the contents of the UN‟s Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and employed the 
phrase; „freedom from want and freedom from fear‟.  This phrase was intended to 
advocate a people-centred, rather than state-centred, approach to security, to link 
development to security, and to broaden both the identification of possible threats 
and the actors responsible for producing and resolving insecurity (Hendricks, 
2006:1).  In the report, it was stated that 
 
(t)he concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as 
security of territory from external aggression … For most people, a feeling 
of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread 
of a cataclysmic world event.  Will they and their families have enough to 
eat? Will they lose their jobs?  Will their streets and neighbourhoods be 
safe from crime? Will they be tortured by a repressive state? (UN, 
2004b:22). 
 
The initial conception of human security was primarily focused on development, and 
covered seven aspects of security, namely economic, food, health, environmental, 
personal, community and political security (UN, 2004b:22).  However, as a result of 
its omnibus nature, this initial conception of human security failed to gain currency.  
Against this background, the general focus of human security has shifted and the 
current focus centres virtually exclusively on the human costs of violent conflict 
(Oche, 2000:40).  Security of the individual is therefore no longer defined 
exclusively within the realms of states and national security and individuals, and 
communities are considered not only as bystanders and collateral victims of conflict, 
but as core participants in protection strategies and post-conflict peacebuilding 
(Aning et al, 2004:5). 
 
The concept of human security encapsulates the intricate links that bind issues of 
development, cooperation and peace.  In essence, human security implies safety for 
people from both violent, as well as non-violent threats.  Human security is a 
condition or state of being that is characterised by freedom from pervasive threats to 
people‟s rights, their safety or even their lives.  It is an alternative way of seeing the 
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world, taking people as its point of reference, rather than focusing exclusively on the 
security of territory or governments.  Oche argues that national security, just as other 
security concepts such as economic security and food security, is ultimately about 
protection.  As a result, human security essentially entails taking preventive 
measures to reduce vulnerability and minimise risk, as well as taking remedial action 
where prevention fails (Oche, 2000:44).  The Millennium Declaration by the world 
leaders in September 2000 and the subsequent establishment of the UN Security 
Commission are testimony that, indeed, a broader concept of security is imperative 
(Oche, 2000:44).  According to Mutesa and Nchito (2005:7), the same spirit is 
currently evident in the thrust of the thinking of African leaders in security as 
embodied in the founding documents of the AU, NEPAD and other regional 
organisations. 
 
The UNDP (UN, 2004b:23) asserts that human security can comprise two main 
aspects.  Firstly, it means safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and 
repression.  Secondly, it implies protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in 
the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities (UN, 
2004b:23).  This characterisation clearly implies that the traditional state-centric 
views of security that are based on territorial interests and foreign aggression, fall 
short of what is currently understood under the concept human security.  “The 
concept of human security equates security with people, rather than territories – with 
development rather than arms” (UN, 2004b:24).  The former UNSG, Kofi Annan 
poignantly stated that 
 
… the impact of wars on civilians has worsened because internal wars, 
now the most frequent type of armed conflict, typically take a heavier toll 
on civilians than inter-state wars, and because combatants increasingly 
have made targeting civilians a strategic objective (Annan, 1999c:3). 
 
This resulted in a situation where most of the international community is in 
agreement that the time has come to move beyond the state-centric view that has 
informed much of the contemporary discourse on security and that, in some 
instances, intervention might be required to protect the liberties of individuals – even 
if such intervention would impede on the sovereignty of an individual state or states.  
Many scholars are of the opinion that the current understanding of the word 
intervention includes various forms of non-consensual action that are often thought 
to challenge the principle of state sovereignty directly.  In this regard, the broader 
concept of human security is applied in order to root out the causes of many 
conflicts, but it also possesses the potential to serve as an early warning mechanism 
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when it is used to influence policy actions and as basis for the development of 
constructs to address conflict effectively.   
 
However, the focus on the security of individuals does not diminish the importance 
of national security, as expounded in the state-centric approaches.  In fact, national 
security and human security are, in essence, mutually supportive.  Despite the new 
approaches to the conception of the nation-state, the capacity to promote and protect 
the welfare of its people, remains a precondition for strengthening the legitimacy, 
stability and security of such a state‟s own existence.  Therefore, security of the state 
is not an end in itself, but a means of security for its people.  At the same time, 
Duffield (2001:7) warns against the notion of over-emphasising the role of the 
nation-state in providing security and simply blaming security problems on incipient 
and imperfect democratisation.  Duffield goes further and relates the securitisation 
of development to the disappearance of the bi-polar world and to reconfigurations in 
global capitalism.  Whilst violence and conflict were previously seen as occasionally 
justified indicators of social transformation in many developing countries, today‟s 
policy-makers and observers view violence as indicators of danger, social 
dysfunction and anomie.  However, Duffield (2001:7) argues that inequality is no 
longer a sufficient reason for conflict.  Rather, Duffield contends that inequality and 
the ensuing violence are dangers from which the wealthy part of the world must 
protect itself through increased surveillance and security intervention.   
 
The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report noted that human security is an 
integrative concept that stresses the security of people.  It stresses the issue that the 
concept of security needs to be changed from one that exclusively focuses on 
national security to a concept that emphasises people‟s security instead – a shift 
from security through armament to that of security through sustainable human 
development (UN, 2004b:24).  In essence, the human security approach seeks to 
fundamentally question and alter whom we protect and how that protection is 
afforded. According to Hendricks (2006:3), this approach that takes individuals, 
rather than states, as its referent, emphasises the need for a holistic, long-term view 
of security that includes the redress of structural inequities.  It identifies different 
levels of security, including personal, community, national and international security 
and argues that interdependence of these securities implies that insecurity in one 
sphere has ramifications for other spheres.  According to Hendricks (2006:3), the 
primary role of the state is to protect its citizens, but given past experiences, this 
cannot be left as the sole domain of the state.  International and regional 
organisations have the responsibility to intervene and protect when human lives are 
imperilled, and any sustainable transformation has to involve civil society in the 
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formulation and execution of conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction 
agendas. 
 
The Commission for Human Security (2003:74) defines human security as 
 
protecting the vital core of all human lives in the ways that enhance human 
freedom and human fulfilment.  Human security means protecting the 
fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life.  It means 
protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats 
and situations.  It means creating political, social, environmental, 
economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the 
building blocks for survival, livelihood and dignity. 
 
The Commission has identified four priorities for policy action to promote human 
security, namely  
 
 encouraging growth that reaches the extreme poor; 
 supporting sustainable livelihoods and decent work; 
 preventing and containing the effects of economic crises and natural 
disasters; and 
 providing social protection for all situations. 
 
In order to address the challenges that are related to human security effectively, an 
integrated approach, based on effective co-operation between various states, 
government departments and civil society organisations is required.  The majority of 
new policy frameworks on the African continent recognise that this type of approach 
is essential, but in reality, the priorities of various agencies often differ, resulting in 
competing interests and ultimately in ineffective delivery.  There is thus a growing 
appreciation of the linkages between security, co-operation and development as 
suggested by the human security paradigm.  In this context, Mutesa and Nchito 
(2005:13) contend that the declaration to combat poverty by the members of the UN 
Millennium Summit in 2000 is one of the best-known shifts in the conception of 
security by a collective body of international leaders, which resulted in the drafting 
of the UN Millennium Declaration of 2000.  It has become evident that policy-
makers and non-state actors will be required to transcend the traditional state-centric 
approach to security with its narrow focus on territory and foreign policy interests as 
its main units of analysis.  The challenge for most countries is to translate global 
views of human security into national programmes.  It will take time and effort to 
alter this modus operandi as vested interests have already taken root.  The next step 
is to identify the stumbling blocks that hinder co-operation.  Hendricks (2006:4) 
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points out that methods of enhancing co-operation between relevant government 
departments will specifically have to be identified, and that effective facilitation of 
meaningful interaction between governments and civil society must be ensured. 
 
The expansion of the concept of human security – by placing the emphasis on 
individual security and development, rather than myopically focusing on a state-
centric approach – has had a profound influence on policy directions taken by 
regional and international organisations, not only in terms of their involvement in 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding, but also in terms of their foreign policy, national 
security and development programmes.  In this regard, it is thus prudent to 
investigate the influence that the current expanded understanding of the conception 
of human security has had on International Relations as a field of scholarly enquiry 
and on the respective foreign policies of states. 
 
2.2.2. Human security and International Relations 
 
Many scholars have proposed solutions to and reflected on appropriate human 
security definitions and conceptualisations with regard to the new millennium and 
contemporary developments in the international political arena.  The concept of 
human security should also be understood in terms of current approaches pertaining 
to International Relations.  International Relations theorists, strategic studies 
scholars and peace researchers alike have had to come to terms with a global 
paradigm shift in how security, peace, conflict, war and politics are viewed in the 
post-Cold War era. 
 
Realists and Neo-Realists have been criticised for their fragmented and 
narrow preoccupation with the sovereign state, state power and national 
security as the primary referents of security; and Idealists, though claiming 
to have taken a far more holistic view of the subject, have yet to come up 
with a widely acceptable alternative to the state-centric international 
system (Hudson, 1998:2). 
 
According to Naidoo (2001:2), there are two main contemporary theoretical points 
of departure in the field of International Relations.  At the one end of the continuum 
is an approach that is based on a neo-realist theoretical framework, which maintains 
a continued emphasis on the primacy of the state within a broadened 
conceptualisation of (human) security.  This approach is often referred to as the 
„new security thinking‟ (Naidoo, 2001:2).  On the other end of the continuum is the 
post-modernist or critical human security approach that is vested in the pluralist 
theory of international politics.  This approach is based on a set of assumptions that 
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essentially attempts to dislodge the state as the primary referent of security, while 
placing greater emphasis on the interdependency and trans-nationalisation of non-
state actors (Naidoo, 2001:2). 
 
The neo-realist approach to human security has been advocated by scholars such as 
Barry Buzan in his seminal work People, States and Fear (Buzan, 1992:431–451).  
Buzan argues that the militaristic approach to security that dominated the discourse 
during the Cold War was simple-minded and that it had resulted in the 
underdevelopment of the concept.  He broadened the concept to include political, 
economic, social and environmental threats, in addition to those that are purely 
militaristic (Buzan, 1992:451).  Although Buzan examines security from the 
perspective of the international system, the state and the individual, he concludes 
that the most important and effective provider of security should remain the 
sovereign state.  This analysis thus essentially provides a contemporary examination 
of human security from a state-centric perspective.   
 
Buzan (1992:106) introduces the concepts of strong and weak states to show that the 
creation of strong states is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for improved 
individual and national security.  He argues that the existence of a strong state would 
not, by itself, guarantee security, but weakness in states would certainly encourage 
and sustain insecurity for their citizens.  Buzan expands on this argument by stating 
that the strength of a state is determined by the degree of its socio-political cohesion, 
while the strength of its powers refers to the traditional distinction among states in 
respect of their comparative military and economic capabilities.  Almost all weak 
states are found in the developing world where they find themselves trapped by 
historical patterns of economic development and political power that leaves them 
underdeveloped and unable to muster the economic and political resources that are 
required to build a stronger state.   
 
Tickner (1995:185) points out that, although Buzan differentiates between strong 
and weak states, he (Buzan) does not offer suggestions as to how weak powers and 
states can become strong or how they can strengthen their individual economies.  
Tickner purports that the integration of states into an increasingly interdependent 
international market economy would contribute to a mature anarchy with its promise 
of greater overall international security (Tickner, 1995:185).  He does, however, 
acknowledge the fact that this would be problematic for peripheral states, such as 
those in Africa and other developing states that are not only trapped by historical 
patterns of underdevelopment, but more crucially, are weak, rendering their 
economic security vulnerable to market forces in an integrated global world 
economy.  In addition to the arguments pertaining to the increased globalisation of 
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economies which exacerbates the uneven development fostered by a hierarchical 
international system of states and global capitalist economies, there are other new 
threats to security, such as international terrorism which defies boundaries and 
which cannot be solved by one state alone.  Ultimately, the security of the rich 
seems to be increasingly diminishing the security of the poor (Tickner, 1995:185).  
In this regard, Naidoo (2001:5) concludes that it is clear that Buzan‟s theory is based 
on the assumption that an integrated world economy would offer mutual gains for 
weak and strong states and powers alike – an assumption that might not prove to be 
a true representation of the current global economy.  
 
The critical or post-modernist approach to human security, reflected in some of the 
works of Ken Booth, also advocates a broadened conceptualisation of security that 
goes beyond a military determination of threats (Booth, 1994:3).  However, most 
proponents of the post-modernist approach stress quite explicitly that the state must 
be dislodged as the primary referent of (human) security, and that it should 
encompass instead a wide range of non-state actors, such as individual, ethnic and 
cultural groups, regional economic blocs, multi-national corporations (MNCs) and 
NGOs (Naidoo, 2001:2).  In expanding the concept of human security horizontally 
and vertically, Booth (1994:4) argues that human security is ultimately more 
important than state security.  Thus, the post-modernistic conceptualisation of 
security does not equate state security with human security.  Much of Booth‟s 
argument is based on the premise that governments that are supposed to be the 
guardians of their peoples‟ security have instead become the primary source of 
insecurity for many people who live under their sovereignty, rather than the armed 
forces of a neighbouring country (Booth, 1994:5).  This approach challenges the 
idea of a state as an effective and adequate provider of security to its people 
(Naidoo, 2001:2). 
 
The post-modernist approach regarding the pluralist theoretical framework of 
International Relations asserts that national sovereignty is unravelling and that states 
are proving less and less capable of performing their traditional tasks.  Many 
International Relations scholars argue that global factors are increasingly impinging 
on government decisions and that such factors undermine states‟ capacity to control 
external and internal politics.  These post-modernists offer poignant arguments to 
support their views on interdependence, the diminished importance of the institution 
of the state, and the view that concepts such as nationalism and sovereignty have 
become outdated.  According to the post-modernists, traditional concepts pertaining 
to national security have thus also become by extension, similarly outdated.   
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According to Hendricks (2006:2), these arguments have dovetailed with the 
emergent neo-liberal discourse on structural adjustment measures and the need to 
limit the role of the state in favour of that of the market.  The discourse on human 
security emerged within this structural and ideological framework and as a result, 
the elements contained within it reflect these theoretical preoccupations.  However, 
Hendricks (2006:2) stresses the viewpoint that the human security paradigm holds 
currency primarily because of its expanded definition of security, its focus on the 
root causes of conflict, the integrative, multi-actor nature of conflict prevention, as 
well as its emphasis on well-defined post-conflict resolution requirements and 
premises. 
 
Other scholars, such as Carim (1995:53), are convinced that the logical alternative to 
the modern state as the unit of analysis is the diffusion of power from states to local 
or regional communities so as to cater more effectively for cultural diversity.  The 
wider problems of economics could thus be dealt with effectively at the regional 
level – hence the support for what is often referred to as the „new regionalism‟, and 
they agree that regional integration and cooperation as a current trend within the 
international system, aims not only to address the political and economic interests of 
member states, but also the security needs of their people (Carim, 1995:53–71).  
Therefore, regional mechanisms created to address such threats are ultimately the 
building blocks for greater regional, national and individual security.   
 
It is clear that the conception of human security is to a great extent dependent on the 
respective approaches to International Relations and that the concept holds different 
meanings for different people.  However, although a commonly accepted definition 
does not seem to exist, Werthes and Boshold (2004:2) argue that there are some 
basic premises all definitions of human security have in common, namely that it 
comprises a liberty/rights and rule of law dimension, a freedom from fear/safety of 
peoples dimension, and a freedom from want/equity as well as a social justice 
dimension. 
 
2.2.3. Expanding the concept of human security 
 
In addition to the UN Human Development Report of 1994 that refers to human 
security in Africa, the AU‟s Common African Defence and Security Policy is also 
premised on the viewpoint that the causes of intra-state conflict necessitate an 
emphasis on human security, based not only on political values, but also on social 
and economic imperatives (Neethling, 2004:78).  This implies embracing the 
broader concept of respect for human rights, the right to participate fully in the 
process of governance, the right to equal development, as well as the right to have 
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access to resources and the basic necessities to life.  In addition, the concept also 
includes the right to protection against poverty, the right to conducive education and 
health conditions, the right to protection against marginalisation on the basis of 
gender, protection against natural disasters, as well as ecological and environmental 
degradation (AU, 2004:1). 
 
Some middle powers, such as Canada, base their approach on a strong human rights 
and an extended arms control nexus.  In this regard, Canada, as an advocate of „soft 
power‟ has often been recognised as leading the non-militaristic and progressive 
human security approach (Lewis, 2006:12).  On the other hand, the Asian (Japanese) 
approach seems to be more related to a conceptualisation that stresses the connection 
between security and economic and social development (Werthes and Boshold 
2004:2-3).  Former Japanese Minister Keizo Obuchi expresses this approach in the 
following statement: 
 
Human security is a concept that takes a comprehensive view of all threats 
to human survival, life and dignity and stresses the need to respond to such 
threats.  The economic crises confronting the Asian countries today has 
been a direct blow to the socially vulnerable – the poor, women and 
children, and the elderly – threatening their survival and dignity (as quoted 
by Werthes and Boshold 2004:3). 
 
The important point is that human security discourses have multiple origins and they 
manifest in many political and ideological ambivalences.  “As a field of policy-
making and research, human security agendas have been very vulnerable to state and 
multilateral policymaking that sets limits on which freedoms are important to human 
security” (Lewis, 2006:12). 
 
One of the primary challenges in terms of effective capacity-building is to link 
conflict prevention to the promotion of human security on the basis of common 
priorities already identified and on the widely shared concern for meeting the needs 
of the most vulnerable populations.  This concern is dependent on the following 
(Goucha and Cilliers, 2001:vi): 
 
 major dimensions of human security must be taken into account in 
regional, sub-regional and national policies as part of the shift from the 
resolution of conflicts to the building of democratic and stable societies 
that are respectful of human rights; 
 all the priorities that require long-term action must be adequately 
identified and addressed; 
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 the building of the most significant capacities that are required for the 
promotion of human security, in particular those pertaining to education 
and training; and 
 the formulation of strategies that can best contribute to the mobilisation of 
the most vulnerable populations which must ultimately emerge as 
stakeholders in the democratic process by means of participation and 
dialogue. 
 
Naidoo (2001:7) concludes that an adequate conceptualisation of human security for 
African states would establish a link between human security and human 
development.  According to Mandaza (1995:29–31), economic development will 
have to be at the top of the institutional agenda, since “development and security are 
two sides of the same coin”.  In order to address the challenges pertaining to security 
and development effectively, it is essential to build the institutional capacity to 
manage non-traditional security threats.  Clover (2005:104) argues that this calls for 
a critical review of current security structures, institutions and processes where these 
are seen to threaten or undermine people‟s security, as well as for the development 
and construction of a more holistic concept of human security. 
 
The fact that the AU has initiated steps to integrate human security doctrines into 
AU binding agreements and other documents is significant.  It is significant because 
legalisation is one of the most important aspects of the institutionalisation of ideas 
and also because legislation provides a basis for the incorporation of human security 
doctrines into national laws and policies.  The legalisation of human security 
doctrines has also strengthened the hands and the work of human rights advocates 
operating in the African region.  It has provided the human rights advocates and 
their organisations with regional-wide legal instruments and resources they could 
use to influence African governments to pursue human security-oriented policies 
(Tieku, 2007:35).   
 
Hendricks (2006:3) argues that part of the difficulty in implementing human security 
perspective can be attributed to the fact that 
 
 it requires operationalisation (measures for knowing when it is deemed to 
exist and mechanisms for its achievement); 
 it necessitated an interrogation of power relationships (where power is 
located and how it is exercised); 
 it forces us to reconstruct the ways in which governments, inter-
governmental organisations, civil society organisations, and researchers 
function (forming partnerships rather than functioning in silos); 
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 it requires that citizens change their perception of their own 
responsibilities; and in addition  
 implements a human security perspective that necessitates flexibility to 
deal with, and accommodate, changing and often competing needs. 
 
Recognition that security threats cover a far broader spectrum – among them 
resource scarcity, diseases, global warming or religious fundamentalism – has 
increasingly gained credibility.  Clover (2005:104) argues that the traditional 
security institutions have begun to respond to the validity of this shift in security 
thinking – a paradigm shift that requires answers to central questions such as: whose 
security? security from what? and security how?  The current understanding of the 
relationship between development and security in this regard has increasingly gained 
support for the development of the conception of DPMs as a construct to address the 
challenges associated with the security-development nexus effectively. 
 
2.3 The security-development nexus 
 
Mutisi and Maregere (2006:16) emphasise that the relationship between the concepts 
security and development is becoming increasingly significant in developing 
countries, such as those on the continent of Africa.  The concept of security has 
shifted from concerns over sovereignty of nation-states and territorial boundaries, to 
a concept that focuses on human development.  Overall, it is currently an accepted 
fact that security is central to development, while development is a pre-condition for 
security (Mutisi and Maregere, 2006:16).  The merger of development and security 
makes it obvious that any linear transition from war to peace is difficult to maintain, 
but it also shows how development has been entrusted with the task of controlling 
and pacifying target populations, as well as being a bridgehead for security.     
 
2.3.1. Theoretical analysis of the security-development nexus 
 
According to Duffield (1999:8), development has been increasingly merged with 
and subjected to security concerns.  What some refer to as the „securitisation of 
development‟ became more visible during the 1990s in relation to the salience of 
internal armed conflict in poorer countries and the growing preoccupation with 
crime and violence in developing and rapidly urbanising economies.  This link 
between security and development is highlighted by the continued violent conflict in 
many of the world‟s poorest states, and it has become widely accepted that 
contemporary armed conflicts require sustained efforts that address not only the 
military dimensions of conflict, but also the political, humanitarian, economic and 
social dimensions of conflict.  In general, there has been, for some years, a growing 
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concern with the necessity of linking security and development in order to achieve 
meaningful and lasting peace.  It is to this end that a range of reforms has been 
implemented throughout the international system to facilitate peacebuilding 
endeavours (Neethling, 2005:33).   
 
These reforms have, inter alia, been encapsulated in UN Development reports in 
which it was stated that underdevelopment may not directly cause violent conflict, 
poor social, economic and environmental conditions and weak or ineffective 
political institutions.  However, it certainly diminishes a society‟s capacity to 
manage social tensions in a non-violent manner (UN, 2004b).  While 
underdevelopment can explain armed conflict, the calamities of conflict are viewed 
as having huge cost implications in terms of missed development opportunities, 
disintegrating and failing states and low indexes of human development.  According 
to the World Bank (2005), development institutions should coherently integrate 
crime prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, 
demobilisation, security reforms and good governance into development 
intervention.  To this end, the UN has become involved in development assistance, 
which is geared towards building or rebuilding that capacity. 
 
The security-development nexus should thus be viewed against the background of 
linkages between security and development that formed a central focus of research 
during the latter half of the 1990s.  In addition, it was only in the late 1990s that a 
clear and more politicised agenda emerged, which bore the promise of and 
integration between development and security policy.  “As an agenda related to the 
concept of human security, it was launched in an effort to integrate both 
development and security concerns with the focus on individuals, rather than states” 
(Neethling, 2005:37).  Using the notion of human security, security has been 
developmentalised in the sense that a number of basic human needs have been 
suggested as being indispensable for the survival of the individual (UN, 1994a).  
According to Duffield (2001:7), the traditional conception of (national) security and 
the human security agenda focus on the safety of people rather than states, and on a 
conception of sovereignty that is conditioned by the state‟s respect for the rights of 
its citizens.  The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) (2001) report, The Responsibility to Protect, specifically states that the 
„responsibility to protect‟ – i.e. any form of intervention by international role-players 
or multi-national institutions against a state or its leaders – should be focused on the 
human needs of those seeking protection or assistance (ICISS, 2001:8–13).  
Moreover, according to Neethling (2005:37), this report should be seen as a radical 
political document, by means of which the ICISS effectively makes state 
sovereignty dependent upon the ability to provide human security.  Thus, the 
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emphasis of the security debate should be on human development with access to 
food and employment (ICISS, 2001:15). 
 
2.3.2 Recurring elements of the security-development nexus 
 
From a security-development point of view, the question arises as to what confronts 
the specific peacebuilding agendas of developing countries.  The link between 
conflict and development is complex, but indisputable.  In this regard, most of the 
world‟s 20 poorest states have experienced violent conflict in the past few decades.  
These violent conflicts usually materialise in the form of intra-state conflicts, as 
opposed to the inter-state conflicts that were most prevalent during the Cold War.  
This phenomenon demanded a re-assessment and the development of new 
approaches and concepts in terms of security policies that were formalised by 
governments and related institutions. 
 
The Commission for Human Security (2003:84–85) proposed that the following be 
used as norms for security policies in the new era: 
 
 that all people, no less than states, have a right to a secure existence and all 
states have an obligation to protect those rights; 
 that the primary goals of global security policy should be to prevent 
conflict and war and to maintain the integrity of the planet‟s life-support 
systems by eliminating the economic, social environmental, political and 
military conditions that generate threats to the security of people and the 
planet, and by anticipating and managing crises before they escalate into 
armed conflicts; 
 that military force is not a legitimate political instrument, except in self-
defence or under the auspices of the UN; 
 that the development of military capabilities beyond that required for 
national defence and support of UN action is a potential threat to the 
security of people; 
 that weapons of mass destruction are not legitimate instruments of national 
defence; and  
 that the production of and trade in arms should be controlled by the 
international community. 
 
The conception of the security-development nexus has undergone significant 
changes during the past few decades.  However, rather than regarding the security-
development nexus as a recent post-Cold War invention of the international 
community of the 21st century, it should be understood at a more generic level, and 
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in terms of how linkages are changing between „hard‟ militarised forms of power 
(traditionally linked to the establishment and maintenance of sovereignty), and the 
apparently benign „soft‟ forms of power (linked to the enlightenment agenda of 
human progress, security and development).  Similarly, the global shift in terms of 
what is understood by the concepts of human security and the security-development 
nexus also prompted a re-evaluation of the concepts and processes related to 
peacebuilding and conflict resolution. 
 
2.4 Peacebuilding 
 
The concept of peacebuilding was introduced by the former UNSG, Boutros-
Boutros-Ghali, in An Agenda for Peace in 1992 (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).  In this 
document, the UNSG argued that peacebuilding consists of  “sustained, co-operative 
work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian 
problems…”.  In response, Haudgerudbraaten (1998:6) argues that the measures 
listed in An Agenda for Peace, namely disarming, restoring order, destroying 
weapons, repatriating refugees, training security forces, monitoring elections, 
advancing the protection of human rights, reforming institutions and promoting 
political participation, do not carry the notion of being sustained efforts that address 
the underlying root causes of problems. 
 
2.4.1. Theoretical analysis of the concept of peacebuilding 
 
The concept peacebuilding remains ill defined, and peacekeeping analysts are 
notorious for their conceptual muddles.  It is common for terms such a 
peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peace enforcement and peacemaking to be used 
interchangeably, and even if distinctions are made, there is not necessarily 
agreement among scholars and practitioners to specify a single, universally agreed-
upon definition of peacebuilding.  After considerable debating and disagreements 
regarding the exact meaning of peacebuilding, the UNSG modified his position in 
the 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, and suggested that peacebuilding 
could also be preventive (Boutros-Ghali, 1995).  This notion supports a somewhat 
broader view that peacebuilding is essentially about removing or weakening factors 
that breed or sustain conflict.  It is also about reinforcing all the factors that build 
positive relations and sustain peace (Hitchcock, 2004:38).  Hence, it could be stated 
that peacebuilding has evolved from a strictly post-conflict undertaking to a concept 
with a broader meaning, and the general consensus would seem that peacebuilding 
efforts should already be attempted during the earliest indication of tension in a 
situation of potential conflict.  Against this background, Tschirgi (2003:1) states that 
the term peacebuilding was gradually expanded to refer to integrated approaches to 
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address violent conflict at different phases of the conflict cycle, thus before, during 
and after the conflict.  Hence, the term peacebuilding was being gradually expanded 
to refer to integrated approaches to address violent conflict during all the different 
phases of the conflict cycle.  
 
Shannon (2004:36) purports that, despite the widespread acceptance of the 
peacebuilding concept in academic and political circles, the exact conception of 
peacebuilding remains an issue of conceptual confusion, disagreement and 
discourse.  Disagreements revolve primarily around the point that some international 
role-players or functionaries view peacebuilding as short to medium-term 
undertakings aimed at preventing a resumption of violence, and not as long-term 
developmental and nation-building endeavours.  Others clearly view the purpose of 
peacebuilding as an effort to avoid a return to conflict, and they argue that in some 
cases it may require ambitious long-term nation-building efforts by international 
actors.  Others are of the opinion that the role of peace-builders could be salient 
when civil wars have ended not in the conquest of one of the parties, but rather in a 
peace settlement between parties (typically the situation in Mozambique). 
 
However, where civil war was the consequence of resource scarcity (as 
earlier in the Horn of Africa) or skewed land property structures (as in 
Central America), one could only hope to accomplish limited objectives 
by promoting good governance.  In such cases, undertakings have to 
involve long-term processes and a number of indigenous role-players must 
be involved (Haudgerudbraaten, 1998:6). 
 
Thus, according to Neethling (2005:41), the aim, duration and actors involved 
should depend on specific peacebuilding challenges and would differ from one case 
to another. 
 
The challenge for the UN – as the pre-eminent organisation responsible for 
international peace and security – was how to transform the short-term presence of 
peacekeepers into efforts aimed at societal transformation.  Efforts aimed at building 
peace, as opposed to providing security, brought security thinking and practice into 
close collaboration with development policy.  Experiences from a wide variety of 
peace interventions all suggested that a central challenge for the UN would be to 
formulate policies and strategies that focus on the foundations and requirements that 
are necessary for the rebuilding and restoration of war-torn societies.  Tschirgi 
(2003:1) supports this notion and argues that, from an international macro 
perspective, the concept of peacebuilding needs to be redefined.  It demands that the 
elaborate doctrines, strategies and institutions that had been developed during the 
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Cold War to deal with issues regarding international peace and security, be regarded 
as inadequate and irrelevant for dealing with conflicts in the new era. 
 
Security policy and peacekeeping operations have increasingly assumed 
responsibility for managing large-scale socio-economic and political change.  It has 
also been accepted that investments in both conflict prevention and post-conflict 
resolution form an integral and central element of security (Neethling, 2005:39).  
Peacebuilding should therefore endeavour to address the proximate and root causes 
of contemporary conflicts, which includes structural, political, socio-cultural, 
economic and environmental factors. 
 
2.4.2. Peacebuilding from ‘below’ 
 
Pouligny (2006:x) points out that present-day UN peace missions, described as 
„multi-dimensional‟ or „multi-functional‟, imply much further and much deeper 
intervention in the restructuring of domestic political and social orders.  By their 
nature, the mandates of current UN peace missions affect crucial aspects of the 
organisation of the societies concerned, as well as the values on which such 
organisations are founded.  The organisation of electoral processes and the 
promotion of human rights and civil society are examples of the tasks entrusted to 
these missions, while others take over entire sections of the administration of the 
countries, as was the case in Kosovo and East Timor (Neethling, 2005:39).  This 
implies that the intervening forces, in fact, become a type of sole actor confronting 
human, natural and environmental „obstacles‟ in the accomplishment of their 
missions (Pouligny, 2006:xi).  This results in a situation where the interaction 
between the UN missions and local societies continue to be approached through 
global, homogeneous, static and often, generic categories, without taking the 
specific circumstances and environment of the intervention into account.  However, 
past experience with UN missions have made it clear that the variety and plurality of 
social logics of specific societies should be addressed within their own rhythms and 
references, and that peace missions should therefore be „tailor-made‟ for each 
individual intervention.  This implies understanding the logics and representation 
peculiar to different groups of actors (Pouligny, 2006:xii).  The aim should therefore 
be to analyse the environment in which the peace mission is to take place in great 
sociological detail in seeking to get as near as possible to the viewpoints of local 
actors, especially in terms of what the local role-players understand of and could 
expect from the peacekeepers in their midst.   
 
Nation-building in terms of post-colonial Africa, specifically sub-Saharan Africa, 
poses very specific challenges.  The legacy of colonial boundary making, which has 
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shaped post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa plural societies, has highlighted the great 
challenges to be addressed in terms of establishing sustainable peace and 
development in these societies.  Governments in these states face the daunting task 
not only of moulding nations out of competing modes of belonging and forms of 
identification, but also of enforcing the governmental and developmental state 
apparatus over vast and often thinly populated territories.  The problem is not only 
the vast territories within African societies that are not captured by the state, but also 
the fact that states are in intense competition with other forms of authority, such as 
vigilante groups, political parties, traditional leaders, militias and networks of 
organised crime which, in fact, constitute a kind of public authority.   
 
Haudgerudbraaten (1998:7) identifies six dimensions of variable usage of the term 
peacebuilding.  Shannon (2004:36) refers to these six dimensions and argues that the 
dimensions correspond to a list of questions intended to shift conceptual ambiguities 
from the back of the mind to conscious awareness and scrutiny: 
 
 the aim of peacebuilding: is peacebuilding about removing the root causes 
of a conflict or about finding ways to resolve old and new disputes in a 
peaceful fashion? 
 the means of peacebuilding: do peacebuilding efforts primarily entail 
security, humanitarian, economic or political intervention or all of these at 
the same time? 
 the temporal (time) aspects of peacebuilding: are the measures employed 
in peacebuilding short- to medium-term or long-term measures? Should 
international involvement in peacebuilding be a short- to medium- or long-
term effort? 
 the main actors of peacebuilding:  who are the main actors in 
peacebuilding – indigenous or external actors? 
 the process/action dimensions of peacebuilding: does the word 
peacebuilding refer to a set of concrete actions taken or is it a generic 
concept that refers to an overarching, aggregate process? 
 the organisation of peacebuilding: should peacebuilding be viewed as a 
top-down or bottom-up process, as a planned and co-ordinated process, or 
as one that, to a large extent, is initiated locally and pursued by a multitude 
of actors in their field of concern and comparative advantage? 
 
2.4.3. Primary elements of peacebuilding 
 
The concept of peacebuilding has many facets and has been the topic of widespread 
debate.  There is no formal or prescribed peacebuilding process that has been 
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officially adopted by IGOs such as the UN, but there are a few fundamental 
elements that have become central to the debate on what is required for effective 
peacebuilding.  These elements include, inter alia:    
 
2.4.3.1 Governance programming 
 
This is aimed at shaping a society‟s capacity to reconcile conflicting interests and to 
manage change peacefully.  Traditionally, neither development nor security agencies 
concerned themselves directly with governance programming.  Tschirgi (2003:9) 
argues that the ongoing dilemmas regarding the security situations in weak, failing 
or vulnerable states have prompted both development and security agencies to 
initiate processes that provide guidance to governance programming.  The UN, 
therefore, became increasingly aware of the need to integrate governance issues 
through the provision of technical assistance with regard to constitution making, 
election monitoring and public sector reform.  In addition, other IGOs became 
involved in democratisation projects, civil society support, transparency and anti-
corruption initiatives, as well as conflict resolution projects (Neethling, 2005:44). 
 
2.4.3.2 Security sector programming 
 
This programming implies the involvement of IGOs in security sector reform, 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, and the 
protection of vulnerable and war-affected populations.  Tschirgi (2003:9) purports 
that it also involves the fundamental restructuring of security institutions such as the 
police and defence forces, as well as instituting civilian oversight to advance 
democratic control and accountability.  Traditionally, the security sector fell within 
the exclusive domain of political and security institutions.  However, it is currently 
also recognised as a central building block to peacebuilding and extensive research 
has recently been conducted in this regard (Neethling, 2005:44). 
 
2.4.3.3 Establishing the judiciary and the rule of law 
 
According to Tschirgi (2003:9), the judiciary and the rule of law embrace multiple 
aspects such as the promotion of human rights, constitution making, traditional 
justice mechanisms and legal and penal reform.  Given its centrality to 
peacebuilding, there has been a proliferation of rule of law initiatives and activities 
in peacekeeping operations, post-conflict reconstruction and in supporting 
governments to strengthen their legal institutions within a longer-term peacebuilding 
agenda (Neethling, 2005:44). 
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2.4.3.4. Poverty reduction 
 
According to Mutesa and Nchito (2005:9), “pervasive poverty is a silent threat to 
human security”.  Whereas traditional state-centric views of security occupy 
themselves with territorial interests and foreign aggression, the human security 
approach casts the spotlight on people‟s welfare (Mutesa and Nchito, 2005:9).  
Poverty, like human security, is a multi-dimensional social phenomenon.  It not only 
entails lack of what is necessary for material well-being, it also has important 
psychological dimensions.  Poverty aggravates social exclusion and disaffection and 
undermines human dignity and self-esteem (Leaning, 2000:23).  The Commission 
for Human Security (2003:74) found that hunger, unemployment, homelessness and 
illiteracy provide powerful emotional appeals for separatist movements and those 
who seek to wrest control of state power.  Narayan et al (2000:7) adds to this 
argument by stating that poor people in general lack voice, power and independence 
to participate effectively in community life. 
 
2.4.3.5. Promoting participation in community life 
 
The promotion of participation in community life is another primary element that 
has to be established to promote peacebuilding.  The catalysts in promoting this 
participation are firstly the establishment of effective leadership, and secondly that 
of promoting gender equity.  This can be established by: 
 Enhancing social integration by means of effective leadership.  History 
has proven that post-conflict leaders that had been socialised in wartime 
institutions such as insurgent movements, military-led governments and 
predatory, black market economies are usually least prepared to face the 
enormous tasks of transition from violence to peace (Khadiagala and 
Lyons, 2006:9). 
 
While the tension between institutional- and personality-based leadership 
occurs in all post-conflict cases, the challenges to post-conflict leaders are 
highly context-sensitive and vary depending on whether the old state 
collapsed in conflict, whether the war ended in victory by one side or in a 
stalemate and a negotiated agreement, and whether the war ended with 
self-determination for a new state (Snodgrass, 2004:259).  
 
The strength of the institutional legacies of civil war may curb the 
potential for post-conflict leaders to engage in peacebuilding.  Some 
leaders face difficulty in adapting the experiences of mobilisation and 
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Supplementa 3, 2009. doi: 10.5787/0-0-75
 34    
organisation for war to the managerial imperatives of reconstruction.  
They may squander the exceptional opportunities that stem from the 
transition from leadership as mobilisation for war and rebellion into 
leadership for the post-conflict context.  “In some cases, wartime 
challenges forge strong bonds in a small group that is then effective in 
leading the insurgency through discipline and clear vision” (Khadiagala 
and Lyons, 2006:15).   
 
 Promoting gender equity.  Hudson (1998:2) argues that the current 
security framework with its acceptance of multi-level and multi-
dimensional principles of security errs in the sense that it holds up a false 
holism. An increased sensitivity to the so-called „marginalised‟ without 
openly acknowledging women‟s specific gendered security needs defeats 
all claims to total inclusively.  Women‟s security must first be examined 
in terms of their gender roles before comprehensive human security 
demands can be met.  The feminist perspective is highly critical of the 
masculine underpinnings of a state-centric approach and offers theoretical 
insights as well as practical mechanisms on how a fusion of masculine and 
feminine values may serve the goals of human security over and above 
those of the state. 
 
Taking gender-based violence into account, conventional understandings 
of human security is extended.  Lewis (2006:11) argues that the extended 
understanding of human security can also deepen investigations of the 
gendered dimensions of subjects more frequently explored in human 
security studies, such as militarism, ethnic formation and conflict and 
nationalism.  Many of the intra-state wars that have characterised the 
developing world over the last few decades, reveal that many of the 
conflicts are deeply rooted in gender relations, identities and ideologies.  
Also, gender identities are central to the formation of group identities, 
such as national and ethnic identity.  Fully understanding and responding 
to patterns such as militarism and ethnic conflict therefore require an 
exploration of gendered identity-formation.   
 
Lewis (2006:15) adds that the view that women‟s experiences and 
perspectives form some kind of corrective to masculine militarism, has 
been important to arguments in favour of making women central to 
peacebuilding.  Since the early 1990s, this view has resulted in numerous 
women-centred peace networks and initiatives in Africa.  The notion that 
women have a central role to play in peacebuilding has also been adopted 
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by the UN, which accepted (in terms of a UNSC Resolution in 1999) that 
gender should be mainstreamed in peacekeeping (UNSC, 1999). 
 
Post-conflict environments thus furnish significant prospects for 
redefining gender roles, redrawing the rules that underpin property rights, 
and propelling women into leadership positions across society.  In 
addition, the gender dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction can 
involve the encouragement of policies that compensate for gender 
disparities in rights, education, resources and power.  Zuckerman and 
Greenberg (2004) states that given their standing and social power, 
women should be considered key actors in post-conflict service delivery – 
particularly where formal mechanisms of delivery are frail or absent. 
 
2.4.3.6. Protecting and safeguarding the environment.   
 
According to Clover (2005:104), security researchers have increasingly moved away 
from the narrowly defined military understanding of threat, vulnerability and 
response mechanisms and have increasingly embraced the concepts of 
environmental security.  The focus of environmental security is on a common 
concern for the implications of environmental change.  Clover (2005:104) purports 
that current research on the environment and security has, for quite different reasons, 
failed to produce a commonly agreed definition or a common policy agenda, with 
both the traditional security community and the environmental community resisting 
the use of the terms.  
 
Most of the case studies pertaining to the safeguarding of the environment focused 
on environmental scarcity: the relationship between environmental degradation, 
depletion of renewable resources such as water, land and forests, and violent 
conflict.  More recent research has focused on the importance of conflict arising 
from access to or control over non-renewable resources, such as gold, diamonds and 
oil, for strategic purposes.  Clover (2005:104) points out that the term new wars has 
been used to capture the changing nature of war, the gradual shift in the causes and 
duration of conflicts, the duration of such conflicts and the increase in the incidents 
of regional conflict.  Ostensibly based on identity politics, statehood (control or 
secession) or the control of natural and other resources, these conflicts are largely 
devoid of the geo-political or ideological goals that characterised earlier wars.  
Implicit in these greed or grievance debates are the fact that environmental factors 
can and should be integrated into the traditional security affairs in so far as they 
threaten the national interest.  
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Two of the key factors that contribute to tension and insecurity throughout the world 
are poverty and inequity.  There are close and complex interconnections between 
people, the environment and livelihood opportunities in terms of access to natural 
resources, and vulnerabilities to environmental threats which are expressed in their 
overall impact on human survival, well-being and productivity.  Khagram et al 
(2003:230) conclude that insecurity often arises from conditions of inequality and 
impoverishment, such as seen when political and economic power relations affect 
society-nature interconnections as evidenced by resource capture and ecological 
marginalisation.  Environmental security problems must therefore focus on the 
ecosystem level and not simply within political or nation-state boundaries – creative 
solutions are called for. There is no place for traditional security responses where 
states can take unilateral action to attain and maintain the security of their own 
environment.  In addition, whilst the challenges of the environment and of security 
are principally at the domestic level, they are common to a region, as well as for 
advanced industrialised countries that carry much of the responsibility for global 
environmental change (Clover, 2005:106).    
 
2.4.3.7 Protecting and fostering human rights 
 
The upholding and protection of human rights are inextricably tied up with the 
necessity for good governance.  Human rights are the basic expectations and 
entitlements that individuals and groups should enjoy by virtue of their membership 
of a given society.  This implies that governments are obliged not only to extend 
these basic rights, expectations and entitlements to its citizens, but also to uphold 
and to protect them.  Thus, it is impossible to refer to the enhancement of human 
security without reference to the protection of human rights.  In instances where 
human rights are not upheld, they are transformed into demands that individuals and 
groups make on the polity.  Oche (2000:50) argues that the nature and form in which 
such demands are manifested is a critical issue, because whilst some demands may 
be made peacefully, others may take the form of protests, rebellions or other forms 
of violence.  Oche (2000:50) also states that it is imperative to establish a political 
system that will ensure the protection of these rights which democracy provides.  A 
democracy also provides the necessary framework for the pursuit of other aspects 
that are crucial for the enhancement of human security, such as equitable and 
sustainable development policies.   
 
2.4.3.8 Fostering sustainable development 
 
Most of the states that have been plagued by intra-state conflict have no effective 
police services, show limited inclination in providing public services to their citizens 
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and are primarily dependent on war-economies for their survival.  As a result, the 
deepest causes of conflict – economic despair, social injustice and political 
oppression − continue to pose serious challenges to the lives of millions of ordinary 
people despite interventions by organisations such as the UN.  According to Gueli et 
al (2006b:14), it has become clear that the use of military force to dismantle war 
economies will be insufficient if applied independently from other key peace 
mission activities.  History has shown that, as the lifelines of war economies are 
progressively dismantled, so will the expectations of ordinary citizens to receive 
shelter, food and health care and other basic needs increase.  These needs are more 
important than the formal procedures of democracy: without essential services, ex-
combatants and ordinary citizens will return to a life of violence and crime to 
survive.  Therefore, for any military intervention to be effective, complementary 
efforts should aim to fill the void of public administration and undercut popular 
participation in the war economy.  Gueli et al (2006b:6) also argue that that special 
focus should be placed on introducing labour-intensive (maximising employment 
opportunities) and labour-extensive (maximising skills-development) programmes.  
Only when a peace mission has succeeded in effectively curbing the functioning of a 
war economy, the task of developing effective institutions can be embarked upon.   
 
2.4.4. Peacebuilding and conflict resolution 
 
In the same manner that a reassessment of the concept of security has occurred, it 
has become widely accepted that the nature and impact of peacekeeping has changed 
significantly in recent years.  The early 1990s were the high-water mark in the 
euphoria of the post-Cold War era of peacekeeping, both in terms of the number of 
peace missions that were embarked upon, as well as in terms of the manner in which 
these interventions were conducted.  According to Cilliers (1999a:1), only 13 
operations were initiated during the first 40 years of UN peacekeeping, whereas 
more than 36 new operations were launched since 1988.  The nature of peace 
missions has also changed and it has become evident that political, military and 
humanitarian activities are all required to be executed simultaneously, in contrast to 
the former „traditional‟ UN peacekeeping, which typically involved primarily 
military tasks, such as monitoring ceasefires, separating hostile forces and 
maintaining of buffer zones.  This said, since the early 1990s, there has been a shift 
from the „traditional‟ approach to peacekeeping, to an understanding that 
peacekeeping entails much more than the contributions of the military component of 
a peace missions.  A leading voice in this change in approach was the former UNSG, 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who, more than a decade ago, addressed the issue at the 
Summit Meeting of the UNSC on 31 January 1992.  During this address, he stressed 
that “peacekeeping will increasingly require civilian-political officers, human rights 
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monitors, electoral officials, refugee and humanitarian aid specialists and police to 
play as central a role as the military” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:12).  
 
In view of the above, peacekeeping operations during the Cold War mainly entailed 
the creation of buffer zones and interposition of troops between warring factions.  
The troops were deployed with the consent and agreement of the parties to the 
conflict, which were often states and whose armies respected internationally 
recognised rules of war and in most cases, maintained a professional relationship 
with the peacekeepers.  However, it became evident that this traditional approach to 
peacekeeping needed to be reviewed as conflicts witnessed during the 1990s in the 
Balkans (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo) and Africa (Sierra Leone, Liberia and 
Rwanda, for instance) had been intra-state or internal by nature.  Moreover, warring 
parties fought brutally without regard for the rules of war or respect for human 
rights. 
 
This shift from traditional border-monitoring peacekeeping to more complex and 
multi-dimensional operations has entailed substantial civilian components in many 
UN and AU missions.  There have been many attempts to make a clear distinction 
between traditional peacekeeping and the new type of operations.  Traditional 
peacekeeping operations are described as performing a monitoring and inter-
positional role, whilst modern peacekeeping operations are concerned with 
operations responsible for overseeing or executing the political solution of an 
interstate or internal conflict, with the consent of the parties.  Subsequently, the 
conception of peacebuilding is increasingly being considered as a tool to be used 
across the full spectrum of conflict.  Tschirgi (2003:1) concludes that this 
broadening of the concept implies a more fluid, non-linear interpretation of 
peacebuilding, and suggests that peacebuilding can either accompany or 
immediately succeed military operations in order to ensure sustainable development 
and security.   
 
Against this background, it has become evident that most contemporary peace 
missions are endeavours where multi-functional military and civilian components 
are working closely together.  Neethling (2003:102) points out that peace missions 
are generally characterised by civilian presence at the strategic, operational and 
tactical levels of operations and this implies that military peacekeepers have to deal 
not only with belligerents, but also with civilian and humanitarian components.  The 
idea of integrating civilian-military resources at the earliest possible stage of peace 
missions seems logical and could serve as a plausible framework for successful 
peacebuilding.  This implies that the response to conflict cannot solely be dependent 
on the deployment of military peacekeepers, but it should include a group of special 
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civilian teams that can fast-track the delivery of critical infrastructure and other 
socio-economic or development-related activities, even before peace agreements are 
brokered, break down or potentially exacerbate more conflict (Gueli et al, 
2006b:29).   
 
The essential link between peacebuilding and the security-development nexus is the 
reason why it has become commonplace to assert that peace and development are 
intimately linked and that the UN and other international role-players need to 
address the twin imperatives for security and development by means of integrated 
policies and programmes through peacebuilding in support of conflict prevention, 
conflict management, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction (Neethling, 
2005:38).  Although the boundaries between peacekeeping and peacebuilding have 
become less defined, it is clear that the bureaucratic division of responsibilities 
between the UN Department of Peacekeeping (UNDPKO) and other UN 
departments, agencies and offices have created both gaps and duplication, as well as 
adding additional room for political and institutional competition.  According to De 
Coning et al (2008:3), the distortions that are brought about by the underlying 
funding arrangements work against overall coherence and integration.  This is 
especially evident in events where the political and security dimensions are funded 
by assessed contributions, whilst the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding 
dimensions are funded by voluntary contributions (De Coning et al, 2008:4). 
 
The current approach to peace missions was defined in the new UNDPKO doctrine 
that was released in early 2008 (De Coning et al, 2008:1).  The new doctrine is built 
on the principle that, whilst UN peacekeeping operations are supposed to support 
peace processes, there is a clear realisation that it cannot deliver peace on its own – 
conflict resolution requires commitment from all the relevant role-players.  The 
capstone document clearly points out that UN peacekeeping operations are part of a 
larger peace process (De Coning et al, 2008:3).  The 2008 UN peacekeeping 
doctrine thus emphasises the fact that UN operations are essentially political and 
security focused, but that it also has an important role to facilitate overall coherence 
and coordination in order to support conflict resolution processes.   
 
2.4.5. Peacebuilding as a link between security and development  
 
Neethling (2005:38) purports that not all development has an impact on the security 
environment.  Conversely, not all security issues have ramifications for 
development.  Where peace and security are affected by factors that cause, 
perpetuate, reduce, prevent or manage violent conflicts, peacebuilding comes into 
play.  In support of this argument, Tschirgi (2003:2) argues that peacebuilding lies at 
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the nexus of development and security, and that it requires a readiness to make a 
difference on the ground in preventing conflicts or establishing the conditions for a 
return to sustainable peace.   
 
Tschirgi (2003:2) furthermore contends that, since the early 1990s, peacekeeping 
operations have become charged, for example with the task of enforcing peace and 
of assuming de facto sovereignty over a territory, as in the case of East Timor and 
Kosovo.  As a result of these developments, security policy and peacekeeping 
operations have increasingly assumed responsibility for managing large-scale socio-
economic and political change.  It has been realised and recognised that investments 
in both conflict prevention and post-conflict resolution form an integral and central 
element of security policy.  Neethling (2005:39) argues that it is today widely 
accepted that policy instruments outside the toolbox of traditional security policies 
need to be mobilised to provide long-term peace and security.  De Coning (2006:4) 
points out that, as a result, contemporary UN complex peace operations are in effect 
peacebuilding operations aimed at addressing both the immediate consequences and 
root causes of conflict, in that such operations have mandates that combine political, 
security, humanitarian, development and human rights dimensions in the post-
conflict phase. 
 
The importance of non-military dimensions of security, such as the economic, social 
and environmental spheres of security, should be taken into account in terms of 
peacebuilding.  Both the security and development fields have the ultimate purpose 
of seeking to enhance and improve the human condition.  Goldman (2005:1) argues 
that this notion was supported by the former UNSG, Kofi Annan, who 
acknowledged that development and security are inseparable and mutually 
reinforcing factors. Annan (2005) concludes that poverty, inequality and 
underdevelopment create and reproduce conditions of instability, making poor 
countries ripe for civil discontent.   
 
In terms of security, development and peacebuilding, development actors have only 
in exceptional cases worked and focused on conflict – by acknowledging and setting 
out to address the inter-linkages between conflict and development programming.  
Tschirgi (2003:8-9) argues that in recent times, donors and agencies have 
endeavoured progressively to undertake „conflict-sensitive development‟.  In 
addition to the above, there are especially three sectors where international actors 
have started to design and develop new programmes and activities to respond to 
peacebuilding challenges.  These are programming in the fields of governance, 
security sector reform and the rule of law. 
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The process of building and developing society is an enormous challenge.  However, 
Oche (2000:46) states that undertaking this challenge within the context of a society 
devastated by conflict is infinitely more difficult.  Yet despite the difficulties 
associated with such a venture, post-conflict peacebuilding is imperative for the 
enhancement of human security in war-torn societies. 
 
2.4.6. NGOs and peacebuilding 
 
NGOs have become essential in building stable communities and effective 
institutions, especially since the end of the Cold War, where it has become apparent 
that, NGOs not only have a role to play in peacebuilding, but that they are vital to 
the process entailed in the construction of the liberal peace (Richmond and Carey, 
2005:19).  Although NGO involvement can hardly be described as a panacea for the 
establishment of sustainable peace and development, NGOs have made enormous 
differences to complex peace processes through both their independent interventions 
at grass roots level, and via their cooperation with the local population, or attempts 
to modify state and unilateral interventions at the socio-political and developmental 
levels.  However, NGOs are sometimes convinced that their involvement in 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding is not sufficiently meaningful or effective, while 
some governments dislike the increasing pressure to make room for civil society 
through NGO participation in peace deliberations, monitoring and service provision 
(Richmond and Carey, 2005:19).   
 
According to Richmond and Carey (2005:20), NGOs and the networks that they tend 
to form are perceived as key providers of the resources necessary to institutionalise 
human security in conflict zones by liberal states and actors.  NGOs have, to a great 
extent, inherited the role of building civil peace as a key component of the liberal 
peace, along with the parallel construction of the constitutional peace (through 
democratisation) and institutional peace (associated with the UN system), which are 
also components of the liberal peace.  Effectively, NGOs are thus crucial in building 
the institutions of the liberal peace from the bottom up, including free market 
economies and development strategies, social reform, political democratisation to 
human rights and humanitarian assistance (Duffield, 2001:11).  NGOs are part of the 
peacebuilding consensus that include donors, major states, IGOs and international 
financial institutions, in which there is a broad concurrence on liberal peace, though 
there might be disagreement of how this is to be achieved in a technical sense 
(Richmond and Carey, 2005:3).  This consensus effectively indicated that NGOs 
have become part of the external governance of post-conflict zones.  The 
construction of liberal peace now focuses on peace-as-governance, and the NGOs 
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are vital actors in this project within the broader context of the globalisation of the 
norms of the liberal peace and of global civil society.  
 
Non-state actors and the NGOs have been instrumental in broadening the 
understanding of peace and security.  In 1914, there were only 1 083 NGOs world-
wide and no firm conception of universal human rights affirmed by the international 
community, as it was at the time.  The estimated number of NGOs is now believed 
to be between 37 000 and 50 000 (UN, 2004b:5).  Though still contested, there are 
now firm conceptions of human rights, as well as emerging humanitarian norms and 
the discourse on human security that provides a basis for non-state actor 
intervention.  Many NGOs were formed in the 1990s as a response to the broad 
requirements of the synthesis of peacebuilding, humanitarianism, human rights 
monitoring and advocacy (Richmond and Carey, 2005:21).  NGOs have proven to 
be very useful in the initial stages of establishing sustainable peace. They have also 
become essential tools for states and IGOs and other institutions in the construction 
of the liberal peace, due to their unique access, legitimacy and flexibility.  NGOs 
have the ability to react quickly, are not bureaucratically crippled, cannot coerce and 
are widely respected.  Most importantly, according to Richmond and Carey 
(2005:24), the combination of these assets means that they can fulfil roles and tasks 
which states and their liberal organisations simply cannot fulfil. 
 
However, NGOs also have certain limits to what they can achieve and there are 
certain requirements that have to be in place in order for them to function 
effectively.  Above all – NGOs require security.  They cannot control what happens 
to resources that they bring into the conflict zone, and they might even inadvertently 
confer a level of legitimacy on to actors who are not adverse to the use of violence.  
Secondly, there is also a level of conditionality that is introduced into the 
relationship between NGOs and their benefactors, especially when it comes to the 
economic, social and political dimensions of the peace that they are helping to 
construct in conflict zones.  There is obviously a significant tension between 
attempts to introduce conditionality into relationships between IGOs, NGOs, 
agencies and belligerents, especially as this may undermine or impede on attempts to 
act in a humanitarian manner.  There is also a great problem with the sheer numbers 
of NGOs operating in conflict zones in terms of the division of labour and overlap of 
roles and responsibilities.  Perhaps most controversially – there is the issue of 
accountability.  The question remains whether NGOs be held accountable and what 
kind of frameworks can be constructed to ensure accountability.  Despite these 
problems, NGOs have been recognised as an essential part of the broader UN system 
as they play an essential part in the peacebuilding consensus (Richmond and Carey, 
2005:24).     
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However, despite the increased quantitative and qualitative demands for civilian 
capabilities in peace missions, few UN-contributing states have actually paid 
sufficient attention to enhancing their civilian capacities in a systematic manner.  As 
a result, peace missions lack adequate civilian experts, especially in terms of 
construction.  According to Guehenno (2005), the armed forces tend to play a more 
dominant role in UN missions because they are so much easier to deploy, because, 
unlike civil servants they work under a common strategic framework, operate under 
a permanent budget and have systems in place that allow for rapid deployment.  As a 
result, military troops have been saddled with a disproportionate share of the post-
conflict burden, even though they lack formal training to provide essential socio-
economic services and have battled to produce a tangible peace dividend to host 
populations (Gueli and Liebenberg, 2006b:3).  
 
2.5. Conclusions 
 
Armed conflicts in the developing world have seriously undermined the attainment 
of development, security and democratic consolidation.  There is no question about 
the impact of conflict on the inextricable link between durable peace, long-term 
security and sustainable development.  It is today widely accepted that contemporary 
armed conflicts requires sustained efforts to address not only the military dimensions 
of conflicts, but also the political, humanitarian, economic, and social dimensions of 
conflicts.  As a result, there has been growing support for the notion that the 
concepts of security and development should be linked in order to achieve 
meaningful peace.  There is thus a growing awareness that peacebuilding should be 
an essential part of any multi-national peacekeeping undertaking.   
 
In order to effectively address the challenges associated with complex emergencies, 
it is essential to recognise that human insecurity takes many forms and that the 
traditional understanding of the concept of human security should be expanded.  As 
a result, approaches to address these issues must be diverse, multi-dimensional and 
located at many levels.  This demands a critical review of current structures, 
institutions and processes where these are seen to threaten or undermine people‟s 
security.    
 
The end of the Cold War has offered such an opportunity for international role-
players to revisit dominant conceptions of security and development policy, and to 
devise integrated and coherent policy instruments and programmes to address 
violent conflict from a peacebuilding perspective.  Development and security need 
to be mutually reinforcing – especially when many of the threats that confront the 
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international community emanate largely from failures of development (Tschirgi, 
2003:13). 
 
It is clear that a significant range of international reforms throughout the 
international system has taken place to facilitate peacebuilding endeavours.  This 
included a major overhaul of the UN system, while major agencies established 
conflict prevention and peacebuilding units.  Some governments also aligned their 
foreign, security and development policies and programmes to respond to the 
conflict prevention and peacebuilding agenda and challenges of the contemporary 
international community.  This also impacted positively on supporting policies, 
programmes and projects that facilitate war-prone, war-torn or post-war countries to 
recover from conflict in order to address longer-term developmental and security 
goals.  This has, in general, led to a better understanding of the political economy of 
armed conflicts, as well as a drive towards applying appropriate strategies and 
priorities to deal with developmental and security challenges in response to violent 
conflict and civil war.  Obviously, this is of great importance to all developing 
countries, given the acute need to apply relevant and constructive measures and 
strategies in the search for sustainable development and long-term security. 
 
The discourse on human security and humanitarianism has become an important 
indicator of the agendas of IGOs, agencies and non-state actors in their contribution 
to sustainable development and peace.  These actors, with access, reach and 
legitimacy are crucial in the evolving peacebuilding consensus.  In their conditional 
relationships with recipients, donors, IGOs and international financial institutions, 
non-state actors have developed the capacity for the most intimate forms of 
interventions in civil society in order to develop civil peace and contribute to the 
broader understanding of sustainable peace and development through the 
institutionalisation of bottom-up forms of governance, engendered in the liberal 
peace.    
 
The concept of DPMs was developed to address sustained development and to 
facilitate the institutionalisation of the liberal peace on the African continent.  The 
DPMs framework constitutes a very ambitious concept that focuses on the 
realisation of the AU and NEPAD‟s priorities through an integrated plan or 
framework for post-conflict reconstruction and development.  Proponents of the 
concept purport that DPMs will provide a framework and practical paradigm 
towards achieving sustainable political and economic development that will, 
furthermore, advance democracy, as well as regional integration and co-operation 
through the dismantling of exploitative war economies.  It is also contended that 
DPMs will create platforms for policy reforms and set the scene for increased 
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investment through the dismantling of war economies.  This premise will be 
explored in Chapter 3 of this study. 
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CHAPTER 3: DEVELOPMENTAL PEACE MISSIONS: 
CONTEXT, CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The origins of the UN‟s current Complex Peace Operations Model (sometimes also 
referred to as Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping) can be traced back to the early 
1990s when the UN found itself in the midst of a series of violent and complex intra-
state wars that called on the political, military, humanitarian, as well as the 
developmental components of the UN system.  Earlier UN peace missions were 
essentially focused on the inter-positioning of peacekeepers between warring 
factions.  Gueli et al (2006b:15) argue that, as a rule, this entailed separating warring 
factions from each other and assisting the withdrawal and assembly of opposing 
factions from cease-fire lines, without effectively addressing long-term development 
and peacebuilding activities. 
 
Recent history has proven that this traditional UN approach to peace interventions 
has generally attained limited success and that conflict often breaks out as soon as 
the peacekeeping forces withdraw.  The chances of successful peace interventions 
have proven to be even lower when warring parties fight for the control of valuable 
natural resources.  The UN conducted research in this regard and the results 
indicated that 60% of African countries that are emerging from conflict stand to 
relapse back into conflict (UNDG/ECHA Working Group, 2004).   
 
There are many reasons for the mixed successes that the UN has achieved with 
peace operations.  One of the primary reasons for these limited successes, can be 
ascribed to the fact that there is usually a long delay between the time when 
peacekeeping ends and peacebuilding begins – the so-called reconstruction gap.  It 
has become evident that the longer it takes for peacebuilding activities to commence, 
the greater the probability that a country might return to conflict (Bakhet, 2001:3).  
In a bid to improve on the success rate of peace missions, several changes were 
subsequently made to this traditional linear approach that essentially regarded 
security as a precursor for development (Gueli et al, 2006c:6).  It became evident 
that the traditional processes of focusing on establishing security first, and only then 
addressing developmental issues, have proven inadequate to effectively address 
modern complex emergencies.  In response to this, the UN introduced some changes 
in terms of approaches to peacekeeping operations with the aim of addressing some 
of the underlying causes of conflict during the early stages of a mission.  These 
changes were introduced, following the findings of the Report of the Panel on UN 
Peace Operations in 2000 – also known as the Brahimi Report (UN, 2000).  
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However, Gueli et al (2006b:8) purports that, despite the changes that have already 
been implemented with regard to the UN‟s traditional approach to peacebuilding, 
even more changes should be forthcoming, as many of the current measures still fall 
short of providing real impetus in addressing the key issues regarding the security 
and development that is to lay the foundation for long-term development and 
reconstruction.  They argue that, in essence, the approach to complex emergencies 
should move from a traditionally linear and essentially sequential approach, to that 
of a systems-thinking approach, in which many of the processes are implemented 
and managed simultaneously.  This implies that peacebuilding must be brought 
closer to peacekeeping in order to effectively close the reconstruction gap (Gueli et 
al, 2006b:6).  One of the methods by means of which this could be achieved is to 
adopt DPMs as an approach to peace missions.   
 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the concepts and principles of DPMs.  This 
analysis will consist firstly of an examination of the current UN Complex Peace 
Operations Model and how it has evolved after the Cold War.  Following this 
analysis, peace missions will be analysed from a global perspective, where after the 
analysis will be focused on peace missions in Africa.  The results of this analysis 
will then be coupled to an analysis of the development and possible implementation 
of the DPMs concept as a framework to effectively conduct multi-functional peace 
missions.  The UN‟s newly adopted IMPP will also be analysed in terms of its 
possible interface with DPMs.  This will be followed by the identification of the 
challenges that will have to be met as a precursor for the successful implementation 
of DPMs during peace operations. 
 
3.2. A new approach to peacekeeping 
 
The concept of DPMs was created as a practical or functional concept to effectively 
address human security and development in answer to the UN‟s mixed success 
record regarding peace missions (Gueli et al, 2006c:5).  As far as Africa is 
concerned, the former South African Deputy-Minister of Defence, Ms Nosizwe 
Madlala-Routledge, in conjunction with members of the CSIR, started to develop 
and present the concept in terms of its applicability in Africa.  The initial research on 
DPMs was conducted by four researchers, Richard Gueli, Sybert Liebenberg, Elsona 
van Huysteen and Orienda Maitlin, and the results of their research constitute the 
basis of this chapter (Gueli et al, 2006d).  The initial project was funded by CAGE 
and additional funding for the project was provided by the CSIR. 
 
This project calls for a more timely effort to bring security closer to development in 
order to minimise the return of conflict and to facilitate a transition to international 
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and local actors responsible for conducting longer-term state building efforts.  In 
essence, DPMs are based on the premise that engaging in development and 
reconstruction efforts as soon as possible – even when conflict is still ongoing – 
could contribute towards security, peace, and obtaining long-term political order and 
economic legitimacy.  Fundamentally, DPMs calls for a developmental approach, as 
well as quicker mobilisation of reconstruction and development resources, as well as 
embarking on these initiatives in unison with security efforts.  “On an operational 
level this implies many things, among these, the deployment of civilian 
peacebuilders alongside military peacekeepers” (Gueli et al, 2006c:7).  In this 
context, DPMs as a concept has been presented as a practical approach to effecting 
peacebuilding in strife-torn nations and to ultimately set the stage for nation-building 
and sustainable security and development.  
 
3.3. The African peacekeeping context 
 
Many academics and policy-makers have endeavoured to define and determine the 
root causes of conflict in Africa.  The post-colonial era in Africa has been 
characterised by widespread political instability, reflecting the uncertainty of 
Africa‟s standing in the post-war capitalist order (Zack-Williams, 2002:9).  In his 
1998 political report on Africa, the then UNSG, Kofi Annan, noted that 14 of the 
continent‟s 53 countries had been afflicted by armed conflict in 1996 alone, and that 
over 30 wars had occurred in Africa since 1970, mostly within states, counting for 
“more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide” in that period (Annan, 
1998:20).  Furthermore, the security situation in Africa is characterised by 
widespread violence, civil wars, repression, migrations and displacements, famine, 
disease and debt. 
 
Many studies have been conducted to determine the root causes of conflict in Africa.  
In most of the cases, it was found that the interaction between economic greed, 
coupled with long-standing political grievances over the unfair distribution of 
resources, as well as the exclusionary nature of political systems in general, have 
been the primary causes of the outbreak and duration of these conflicts (Ballentine, 
2004:4).  In this regard, the World Bank similarly acknowledged that important 
economic resources do appear to make conflict more feasible when political 
grievances already exist, particularly when corrupt government elites distribute them 
(Collier, 2003:10).  This is especially relevant to the situation in Africa. 
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3.3.1. Peace operations in Africa 
 
As the new millennium commences, Africa is faced with a troika of what seem to be 
insurmountable problems: economic marginalisation from the global market; a 
major health crises stemming from the destructive effects of malaria and HIV/AIDS; 
and the search for peace, political stability and an end to the succession of 
devastating civil wars.  Many countries in Africa have weak security forces and 
show only a limited inclination in providing any kind of public services to their 
citizens (Zack-Williams et al, 2002:3).  In the broadest sense, the deepest causes of 
the conflict – economic despair, social injustice and political oppression – continue 
to pose serious challenges to the lives of millions of ordinary people. 
 
Despite this increase in instability and insecurity in Africa, Western countries 
increasingly disengaged from peace missions on the continent during the 1990s 
(Cilliers and Mills, 1999:vii).  This can be ascribed to a general decrease in the UN 
and international participation in multi-dimensional complex emergencies during the 
1990s.  In 1993, the total deployment of UN military and civilian personnel 
decreased from more than 80 000 members (with a budget of $3,4 billion) in 1994 to 
only 14 000 troops in 1998 − with a budget that had shrunk to less than $1 billion.  
Only four of the UN missions in 1998/1999 were deployed in Africa – whereas 70% 
of all UN deployments took place in Africa in 1994 (Cilliers and Mills, 1999:1).  
The UN‟s failures and difficulties in countries such as Somalia, Rwanda, Angola 
have overshadowed the UN‟s relative success stories in countries such as Namibia, 
Mozambique and the Central African Republic.  However, the failures highlighted 
the weaknesses of the UN as diplomatic arbiter, peacekeeper and peace-enforcer.  
This resulted in a cynical perception in the international community that 
peacekeeping in Africa absorbs enormous amounts of resources and energy, but, in 
fact, delivers very little in return (Neething, 2003:88).  
 
Fortunately, since the start of the 21st century, there has been renewed interest and 
participation in peace missions globally, as well as in Africa.  According to the 
Report of the UNSG on the Work of the Organisation (Ki-moon, 2007c:1), the “UN 
has witnessed a surge in peacekeeping activity during the past few years.  At the 
beginning of 2006, UN peacekeeping supported eighteen peace operations and 
thirteen other field missions and offices, involving approximately 85 000 deployed 
personnel.  By August 2007, this number had grown to over 100 000 personnel, 
without counting the highly complex AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur.  The 
current annual budget for UN peacekeeping is approximately $5,6 billion, which 
represents one half of 1 percent of global military spending”.  In order to reap the 
maximum benefits from this phenomenon, it is essential that all efforts should be 
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made to increase the chances of success with peace missions in order to retain this 
renewed interest in and commitment to peace missions (Ki-moon, 2007c:1). 
 
Many lessons have been learnt by peacekeepers in Africa.  From the viewpoint of 
these intervening forces, the history of political breakdown that took place in the 
states where the intervention was instituted, meant that the problems that the 
peacekeepers were expected to resolve, long pre-dated their own arrival, and were 
essentially concerned with domestic issues that the peacekeepers could do little if 
anything about.  In most instances, the local trust or respect for institutions of the 
state in which the intervention was conducted, had long since broken down and most 
of the leaders of the various factions were tarnished, in one way or another, by their 
involvement in the events of previous years.  Clapham (2000:201) points out that 
“peacekeepers found themselves baffled by rivalries between faction leaders and 
their failure to agree to apparently obvious conflict-resolving measures or to abide 
by them, even when they did agree”.  The political breakdown that took place in the 
countries where the intervention was necessitated usually caused a high level of 
devastation to infrastructure and systems long before the peacekeepers arrived 
(Clapham, 2000:201). 
 
3.3.2. Challenges relating to war economies 
 
In addition to the political, institutional and social breakdown that is a characteristic 
result of intra-state wars in Africa, peace missions must also address what is often 
referred to as war economies in order to establish lasting peace.  Renner (2002:10) 
states that: “a war economy can be defined as a self-sustaining system in which 
resource exploitation funds conflict, a conflict provides the means and conditions 
that allow continued illegitimate access to these resources”.  The Post Conflict Unit 
of the World Bank also portrays wars as essentially driven by economic agendas – 
particularly the conflicts of the developing world.  Statistical analyses of conflicts by 
the World Bank of the period 1960 to 1999 indicate that economic agendas appear to 
be central to the origins of many wars – i.e. “greed largely causes wars” (Collier, 
2000:2).  According to Gueli et al (2006b:13), a prime example of such a war 
economy is that of the former Liberian rebel leader, Charles Taylor.  His illegal 
trade in Liberia‟s diamonds, rubber, timber and iron resources during the 1990‟s 
yielded approximately $200 million to $250 million per year from 1990 to 1994.  In 
the DRC, the armed conflict that lasted for about 45 years, was fuelled by local and 
regional actors who were attempting to gain access to roughly 80% of the world‟s 
supply of coltan (metal heat conductor).  The coltan was exported to foreign markets 
for hard cash that was in turn used to finance the armed conflict.  This phenomenon 
has led some analysts to conclude that the easily exploitable natural resources in 
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Africa are used to finance civil wars and that the perpetuation of war in certain 
countries serves as an alternative way of gaining income.  This approach has been 
collated into so-called „resource wars‟ – sometimes presented as reflecting an 
additional „new type of war‟.  However, Cilliers (2002:2) points out that although 
war might have both planned or intended and unintended economic consequences, 
any analysis that seeks to reduce the study of extensive social conflict to a single 
determinant, should be treated with care.  Thus, economic considerations should not 
be used as a single-factor explanation for ongoing conflict.    
 
Nevertheless, the primacy of war economies in weak or failed states has significant 
implications for conflict in Africa.  Firstly, conflict is largely based on the logic of 
trade and the struggle for competitive advantage and accumulation of wealth and not 
on the attainment of definable geo-strategic goals.  The continuation of conflict, and 
not military victory, therefore becomes a critical factor to maintain positions of 
power and to access the resources necessary to fund conflict.  War economies are 
thus sustained through the prospects of profit and not through the cessation of 
hostilities (Kaldor, 1999:110).  The money that is generated from the trade of 
resources allows warring parties to enforce and centralise their political-military 
power, which in turn, enables them to control and protect valuable resources.  
 
In terms of establishing sustainable peace and development, it is clear that war 
economies must be dismantled as a precursor for development and peace.  This 
dismantling of war economies offers a key opportunity to re-balance the economic 
scales between war and peace in the favour of peace (Cooper, 2001:35). 
 
Solomon (2002:221) presents the following statistics to underline the relationship 
between economic factors and violent armed conflicts: 
 
 since the mid-1980s, 15 of the world‟s 20 poorest countries have 
experienced violent conflict; 
 half of the world‟s low-income countries are either engaged in conflict or 
are in the process of transition from conflict; 
 almost every low-income country at least shares a border with a country in 
conflict, if not embroiled in its own conflict; and 
 in the 1990s, 70 million of the world‟s poor were displaced from their 
homes as a result of conflict.  In Africa alone, one-third of its countries 
have produced refugees. 
 
These statistics confirm the notion that economic recovery cannot be dealt with, 
simply in the post-conflict or post-intervention stages of peace missions.  Solomon 
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(2002:221) argues that, indeed, economic development should also be viewed as a 
conflict-preventative measure and should occur during all stages of an operation.  
This highlights the fact that one cannot separate peacemaking from the processes of 
reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation.  Rather, they should be viewed as 
parallel processes that are complementary to one another, and if approached in this 
holistic manner, can contribute to sustainable peace (Solomon, 2002:221).     
 
Development initiatives and peacebuilding can only commence, once the war 
economies have been dismantled and essential services and infrastructures have 
been restored.  Most important is the building of effective institutions that are 
capable of alleviating structural roots of instability.  “The exit strategy of peace 
missions should be that of establishing a minimally capable state.  In this regard, the 
ability of peace mission actors to transfer valuable knowledge and skills to local 
stakeholders is critically important to ensure a timely withdrawal of forces.  This is 
because, without sufficient local demand for peace and reform, state-building efforts 
will almost certainly fail” (Flavin, 2003:95).  Considering Africa‟s current poor 
capacity to do state-building, peace missions should try to leverage the limited 
resources available in Africa to create the momentum needed for restoring those 
core functions that only local governments can provide (providing public goods, law 
and order, macro-economic management etc), rather than create the false 
expectations that institutions such as the AU have the capacity to implement grand 
designs for state-building. 
 
It is evident that a detailed understanding of war economies is required in order to 
effectively implement peacebuilding efforts and it is also clear that economic 
developmental strategies are essential to any peacebuilding initiatives, as political 
and security solutions have proved less than successful.  One of the greatest 
challenges to peace missions in Africa is often to provide viable alternatives to the 
sustainment of war economies.  The underlying economic dilemmas must be 
analysed and understood, before any peacemaking or peacebuilding efforts are 
embarked upon.  It is evident that by merely separating warring factions, the 
underlying causes of intra-state conflict are not addressed.  To simply separate actors 
that have neither the political will, nor the financial compulsion to end violent 
conflict is insufficient as they commonly make use of global commodity markets to 
trade resources to fund more conflict.  Africa‟s peace and security and development 
agendas cannot realistically be attained if war economies continue to influence the 
nature of politics and trade in Africa.  These war economies are exceptionally 
complex and multi-faceted and any attempt to challenge the full range of inter-
related issues that characterise war economies must be addressed concurrently and in 
an integrated manner. 
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3.4. Current peace mission approaches and initiatives 
 
Malan (2000:178) points out that significant developments have taken place globally 
in regard to the approaches and processes utilised to effect multi-functional peace 
missions during the past decade.  He states that: “peace support operations have 
evolved rapidly from classical peacekeeping (involving military interposition to 
monitor inter-state cease-fire agreements) to complex multi-dimensional 
interventions where the military is but one of the many participants within any 
particular peace process” (Malan, 2000:178).  In fact, according to Neethling 
(2003:89), military operations play a distinctively supportive role and may even 
produce few obvious results as regards the outcome.  Modern multi-national peace 
missions depend primarily on a broad political process and as a result, multi-national 
peace operations in the realm of peace and security are critically dependent on the 
extent to which international or regional authority underpins such endeavours and on 
the political will of the participating member states (Neethling, 2003:89).  As a 
result, several concepts such as preventive diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, 
peacemaking and peacebuilding have now all been incorporated in a holistic vision 
of comprehensive peace missions.  This, according to the Pearson Peacekeeping 
Centre, has given rise to the new peacekeeping partnership that includes the 
military, civilian police, government and NGOs, diplomats, the media and 
organisations that sponsor development and democratisation programmes (Malan, 
2000:178).  The wide variety of role-players, coupled to the immense complexities 
of multi-dimensional interventions makes it clear that democratisation in Africa is 
not a simple, uni-linear process or a tactical procedure with predetermined means 
and goals. 
 
Another significant development regarding current peace mission approaches, is the 
change towards a more robust approach regarding the use of force, although 
contemporary UN Complex Peacekeeping Operations in Africa are still grounded in 
and characterised by the core principles of consent, impartiality and the minimum 
use of force.  The interpretation of and application of these principles have, 
however, in terms of its practical application, undergone significant development 
(De Coning, 2006:5). 
 
One of the major changes was in terms of what is understood with consent, and the 
fact that the parties to the conflict must agree to the UN‟s peacekeeping role.  This is 
still relevant, but it is understood and accepted that strategic consent at the level of 
leadership of the belligerents does not necessarily translate into operational and 
tactical consent at all levels in the field.   
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The use of force in terms of the minimum use of force still implies that the UN 
peacekeeping mission will use the minimum force necessary to protect itself and 
others covered by the mandate, but it is now understood that it should have the 
capacity and mandate to prevent or counter serious threats to itself or those it has 
been mandated to protect.  According to De Coning (2006:5), it is unlikely that the 
UNSC will deploy new complex peace operations in Africa, or elsewhere, without 
mandates that reflect this new interpretation and contain elements of Chapter VII‟s 
enforcement authority.  Furthermore, UN peacekeeping missions will remain 
impartial and will not take sides in the conflict among the parties to the conflict.  
However, this does not imply that the UN will stand by when civilians are in 
imminent threat of danger, or that it will not record and report human rights abuses 
that may have occurred to the International Criminal Court.  
 
In addition to the above, there has been a change in approach of how peacekeeping 
missions are comprised, funded and driven.  According to Othieno and Samasuwo 
(2007:25), this has led, to a certain extent, to the UN de-monopolising peacekeeping 
and ceding its „responsibility to protect‟ to either lead states or regional 
organisations to deal with crises in the respective regions.  In the first place, these 
lead nations/states have been empowered, financially and militarily, by 
peacekeeping powers to attend to crises in their respective regions to drive 
peacekeeping efforts.  Secondly, whilst financial and military support is not 
paramount, regional powers have obtained the blessing of the UN to deal with 
regional issues and crises in various parts of their respective regions (Othieno and 
Samasuwo, 2007:25).    
 
3.4.1. Global conflict and the UN Complex Peace Operations Model  
 
As part of the ongoing developments in terms of UN peace missions, the concept of 
complex peace operations was also established.  This term is used by the UN to 
denote the inclusion of peacebuilding mandates into peacekeeping operations.  Prior 
to the emergence of the concept of „complex peace operations‟, „traditional‟ UN 
peacekeeping typically involved primarily military tasks, such as monitoring 
ceasefires and separating hostile forces (Cilliers and Mills, 1999:1).  The UN‟s 
current Complex Peace Operations Model prescribes that peacekeepers deploy to do 
more than separating belligerents, but also to stabilise conflict between warring 
factions.  As a rule, this entails separating warring factions, and assisting the 
withdrawal and assembly of opposing factions from a ceasefire line (UN, 2004b:8).  
Apart from monitoring ceasefire agreements and patrolling buffer zones, UN 
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mandates were expanded to include the organisation of elections, the disarmament 
and demobilisation of combatants and assisting in post-conflict reconstruction.     
 
The shift from traditional border-monitoring peacekeeping to more complex and 
multi-dimensional operations has entailed substantial civilian components, including 
experts in political affairs, law, civil affairs, human rights, humanitarian affairs, 
gender, child protection, elections, disarmament and demobilisation.  The concept of 
peacebuilding is increasingly being considered as a tool to be used across the 
spectrum of conflict.  This broadening of the concept implies a more fluid, non-
linear interpretation of peacebuilding and suggests that peacebuilding can either 
accompany or immediately succeed military operations, accentuated its importance 
as a strategy to prevent violent conflicts in addition to preventing its re-occurrence 
and assisting with reconstruction in order to ensure sustainable development and 
security (Tschigri, 2003:2)  
 
The first significant changes to the traditional peacekeeping model was observed 
during the UN‟s missions in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia when the UN 
authorised the use of force to protect humanitarian aid.  However, the ultimate 
objective was still held to be the restoration of peace and the support to rebuild state 
infrastructures.  This approach was applied in Sierra Leone, the DRC, Ivory Coast, 
Kosovo and East Timor, marking a new departure with „transitional administrations‟ 
(Pouligny, 2006:2).  In all these cases, the objective was no longer to interpose 
between two states or two armies, but to assist the installation of the foundations 
necessary for the restoration of law and order in a given society. 
 
However, whilst the Complex Peace Operations Model has gradually become 
incorporated into the UN‟s conflict management repertoire, its success rate remains 
limited.  About 40% of countries emerging from conflict relapse into conflict and in 
Africa, this figure rises to 60% (UNDG/ECHA Working Group, 2004).  Faced with 
these challenges, the then UNSG, Kofi Annan, commissioned the Brahimi Report 
with a view to reviewing the shortcomings of UN peace operations and to take 
practical recommendations to ensure their future success.    
 
After reviewing the successes and failures of current and previous UN peace 
missions, the Brahimi Report (UN, 2000:1) offered clear advice about the minimum 
requirements for successful UN operations.  These recommendations include aspects 
such as political support, a rapid deployment capacity and robust force structures, as 
well as a sound peacebuilding strategy.  The Brahimi Report encouraged the UN to 
update its peacekeeping doctrine and strategies from primarily observing ceasefires 
to laying the foundations for peacebuilding (UN, 2000:1).  It also emphasised the 
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need for a more integrated post-conflict peacebuilding strategy.  The report 
prescribed that the revised strategies for peacekeeping and peacebuilding need to 
combine in the field to produce more effective complex peace operations (UN, 
2000:2).  Gueli et al (2006c:9) argues that by expanding the concept of 
peacekeeping beyond conventional military operations, the Brahimi Report gives 
some recognition to the underplayed role and untapped potential that initial 
development work can bring to address the causes of conflict and to prevent the 
recurrence of conflict. 
 
As part of the transformation that took place in UN systems, following the 
recommendations of the Brahimi Report (UN, 2000), the UN made several structural 
changes to its organisational framework in order to play a more coordinated role in 
peacebuilding activities.  In December 2005, the UN established the Peacebuilding 
Commission (PBC) as an inter-governmental body, which will convene 
representatives of the UN‟s major organs, financing institutions, troop contributors, 
the respective governments in question, as well as other stake-holders in order to 
improve on the coordination activities and the marshalling of resources for post-
conflict peacebuilding initiatives (UN, 2000).  
 
The establishment of the PBC was based on the realisation that nearly 50% of 
countries in which the UN had intervened, had slid back into conflict within five 
years of signing the peace agreement.  This phenomenon has primarily been ascribed 
to the lack of effective coordination of activities, the lack of sustained commitment, 
poor financing and funding gaps and poor coordination of peacebuilding activities 
(UN, 2004a:par 261–269). 
 
The recommendation for the establishment of a PBC were first presented to the UN 
in the 2004 reports of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change that 
was convened by the UNSG to assess the greatest threats to global insecurity.  This 
Panel reported that the UN suffered a key institutional gap in specific areas in that 
the UN system was explicitly designed to avoid state collapse, as well as to assist 
war-torn societies in their transition from war to peace (UN, 2004a:par 261–269). 
 
In the light of the latter, the PBC was established as an UN inter-governmental 
advisory body during the 2005 World Summit.  The Summit Declaration called for 
the PBC to (UN, 2005a:24-25; UNSC, 2005:2-3):  
 
 bring together all actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose 
integrated strategies for post-conflict peacekeeping and recovery; 
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 focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts for 
recovery from conflict; 
 support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the 
foundation for sustainable development; 
 provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of 
all relevant actors within and outside the UN; and 
 develop best practices, help to ensure predictable financing for early 
recovery activities and extend the period of attention by the international 
community to post-conflict recovery. 
 
The PBC‟s role and resources are limited.  A small staff and a small peacebuilding 
fund that is made up of voluntary contributions will support the activities of the 
PBC.  The PBC will be tasked with addressing critical gaps, particularly after the 
signing of peace agreements, until long-term support is made available (UNSC, 
2005:2-3; UN, 2005a:24-25).  However, several issues regarding the working of the 
PBC are yet to be finalised.  Still, the contribution of the PBC in terms of more 
effective coordination of peacebuilding activities will clearly contribute to greater 
success with peace missions in general and the establishment of the PBC is a clear 
indication that the UN is working towards more practical solutions for bringing 
peacebuilding closer to peacekeeping.   
 
Despite significant changes to UN peace mission strategies that expand the concept 
of what was initially understood in terms of complex peace operations, Gueli et al 
(2006a:1) point out that, although this expansion heralds a significant change to the 
approach to UN peace missions, the changes to processes that have been instituted, 
have not been formalised to its required depth as yet.  A crucial factor in effecting 
successful peace missions is the contribution of the civilian reconstruction sector.  
However, very few UN-contributing states have paid sufficient attention to 
enhancing their civilian capacities in a systematic way.  As a result, civilian experts, 
especially those involved in reconstruction, are in short supply during peace 
missions.  As an example, only 19% of the total UN forces in the DRC in April 2006 
were civilians – a very poor contribution if one considers that the UN mission 
intends to fast track the provision of social services and other reconstruction 
programmes in the course of 2006.  During the same time, merely 12% of the UN 
mission in Côte d‟Ivoire (UNOCI) was civilian (Gueli et al, 2006b:81).   
 
Gueli et al (2006c:7) also point out that, despite a general acceptance that the 
processes of peacekeeping and peacebuilding should be managed in a parallel 
fashion, the manner in which current UN Complex Peace Operations Model is 
operationalised is essentially still based on the premise that peacebuilding work is 
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generally not feasible during conditions of instability, and that long-term 
humanitarian, development and reconstruction efforts at this time would likely be 
wasted.  As a result, peacebuilding will usually only commence, once the 
environment has been secured by peacekeepers. 
 
In this respect, Jean-Marie Guehenno, the Under-UNSG for Peacekeeping once 
remarked: “We (the UN) have peacekeeping operations that succeed – only to lapse 
back into conflict.  Successful operations, as it were, in which the patients dies” 
(Guehenno, 2005:2).  These comments are relevant to most developing countries in 
which cease-fires are only partially adhered to, peace efforts often fail and post-
conflict societies often relapse into conflict.  It is these challenges that prompted the 
re-evaluation of the systems, approaches and processes that are currently being 
utilised during peace missions. 
 
3.4.2. Developments in the African context 
 
According to Cilliers and Mills (1999:1), the “nature of peacekeeping globally and 
in Africa has changed in many respects in recent years.  The early 1990s were the 
high water mark in the euphoria of the post-Cold War era of peacekeeping. While 
thirteen operations were established in the first 40 years of UN peacekeeping, 36 
new operations have been launched since 1988.  Malan (2000:178) points out that, 
“in less than a decade, peace support operations have evolved rapidly and in an ad 
hoc fashion, from classical peacekeeping (involving military interposition to monitor 
inter-state cease-fire agreements) to complex multi-dimensional interventions where 
the military component is but one of many participants within any particular peace 
process.  The concepts of preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, 
humanitarian assistance, peacemaking and peacebuilding have all been incorporated 
in a holistic vision of comprehensive and ambitions peace missions.  This has given 
rise to what the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre has dubbed the new peacekeeping 
partnership – a partnership that includes the military, civilian police, government 
and NGOs, diplomats, the media, and organisations sponsoring development and 
democratisation programmes. 
 
According to Mandrup-Jorgensen (2007:37), the relationship between defence and 
development is seen as both an oxymoron and a contingent relationship.  Williams 
(2005:57) points out that investment in defence has traditionally been considered as 
the use of state resources in an unproductive sector, something that is highly 
contested.  The role of the armed forces have changed from the traditional narrow 
territorial defence to a broader societal approach, in which the armed forces are just 
one element in dealing with the security threats that modern societies face.  This 
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evolved understanding of the concept of „defence‟ emphasises the shift away from 
the former „peace-crisis-war‟ logic, based on the mobilisation of a defence force, to 
dealing with declared and undeclared challenges or conflicts, which means that 
modern society is in a state of constant preparedness against a multitude of mostly 
unconventional security threats (Mandrup-Jorgensen, 2001:38).  The consequence of 
this is that the traditional distinctions between civilian readiness, both state and 
NGO, and military readiness are undergoing significant change and are being 
incorporated into what is called „integrated thinking‟ in defence circles.  As a result, 
modern complex peace missions, which involve simultaneous political, military and 
humanitarian activities, have thus expanded the concept of „traditional‟ UN 
peacekeeping, which typically involved primarily military tasks, such as monitoring 
ceasefires, separating hostile forces and maintaining of buffer zones (Cilliers and 
Mills, 1999:1).   
 
This shift from traditional border-monitoring peacekeeping to more complex and 
multi-dimensional operations has entailed the inclusion of substantial civilian 
components in many UN and AU missions, since the establishment of the AU in 
Durban, South Africa in July 2002.  This should also be viewed in the context of the 
emerging AU‟s security architecture and is informed by the Continental body‟s Post-
Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) framework. Importantly, the 
African Heads of State and Government agreed to the establishment of the AU 
Peace and Security Council (PSC) in 2003, which, like its UN counterpart, would be 
in a position to deploy multi-national contingents to conflict when peace and 
security on the continent were threatened (Munusamy, 2002:1).  The PSC was 
established by AU member states in 2003 as the main decision-making organ for the 
prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, and several entities such as the 
AU Commission, the ASF, a Panel of the Wise and a Continental Early Warning 
System.  A Special Fund has also been established to support the PSC (Munusamy, 
2002:1).  
 
3.4.3. Hybrid peacekeeping operations in Africa 
 
In the light of the failure of the UN to deal with all Africa‟s security requirements, 
the UN and some regional organisations such as the AU and the EU have developed 
what is referred to as „hybrid peacekeeping‟.  This implies that regional 
organisations initially take the lead in peace intervention operations, until the hybrid 
force eventually transitions into a full-blown UN multi-functional peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding mission.  This implies essentially that the regional organisation will 
run the day-to-day operations, whilst the UN will have overall control of the 
mission. 
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The trend towards hybrid peacekeeping has highlighted several problems that were 
not initially appreciated.  One of the primary problems is that of sidelining the UN in 
favour of hegemonic unilateral initiatives.  The UN, as the most representative 
supra-national body, should not be allowed to become obsolete in the global 
peacekeeping agenda.  Despite its shortcomings, the UN‟s operations are still 
observed as legitimate and viewed as having a significant role to play in 
peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding.  According to Othieno and 
Samasuwo (2007:23), the UN not only has the moral high ground or impartiality that 
other organisations may not necessarily have, but also has certain clear comparative 
advantages in setting global security standards, humanitarian assistance and 
development.   
 
The issue of legitimacy of hybrid operations have also not been finalised and hence 
the legitimacy and legality of certain peace missions, although they might enjoy the 
support of the AU or UN, may be disputed.  Disputes might emerge between donors 
and regional organisations over who should play the leading or bigger role in a 
particular region or peace mission.  By virtue of their financial muscle, donors may 
wish to smuggle in their own political agendas.  Disputes might also arise over who 
will have the authority to implement future peace missions or ceasefires – especially 
in hybrid operations in which the UN plays a secondary role or only enters a 
particular mission at a later stage to legitimise unilaterally initiated missions. 
 
Although it is evident that rich countries have borne the burden of the UN‟s overall 
budget, it is also true that some of these countries have attempted to use the „power 
of the purse‟ to control the way in which the UN operates in general.  In addition, 
there is a tendency that developed countries prefer deploying their citizens in 
missions outside the African continent.  This has resulted in the situation that 
African missions have had to rely on an increase in the number of African and Asian 
personnel, while places such as the Balkans and the Middle East have relied almost 
purely on Western military personnel (Gowan and Johnstone, 2007:2).  According to 
Sidhu (2006:32–37), this „peacekeeping apartheid‟ has strengthened the perception 
that powerful donor countries prefer „big leagues, big budget, advanced technology, 
war fighting roles‟ and that they leave the UN and other continental bodies such as 
the AU to clean up the mess in African peacekeeping theatres. 
 
In the light of the above, critics of modern peacekeeping operations have likened 
them to a new form of neo-colonialism.  According to Adebajo (2007:6), the five 
permanent members of the UNSC have tended to maintain an ambiguous attitude 
towards regional organisations, by rejecting to fund them and then recognising them 
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while attempting to maintain control over certain missions.  This point is supported 
by the fact that some of the UNSC veto-wielding members have shown greater 
willingness to sanction deployments of peace missions only in their former colonial 
or geo-strategic spheres of influence.  Examples are the British in Sierra Leone, the 
Americans in Liberia and Somalia, and the French in Côte d‟Ivoire.  In reaction, 
some critics have stated that some peacekeeping missions have thus provided the 
opportunity for former colonial powers to interfere in the internal affairs of their 
former colonies, especially against unpopular governments, by motivating their 
actions by using the newly adopted controversial norms of intervention in 
international affairs, such as the concept of „the responsibility to protect‟.  There is 
no doubt that such perception contributed to the attack on French peacekeepers in 
the Côte d‟Ivoire in November 2004 (Othieno and Samasuwo, 2007:34). 
 
In order to meet the implementation challenge of integrated and hybrid missions, 
UN-contributing states cannot continue their ad hoc, piecemeal and fragmented 
responses to complex emergencies by piecing together makeshift committees or 
teams for each new crisis.  What is needed is an overall political framework and 
institutional base, backed by permanent staff for developing plans and procedures 
for integrated civil-military efforts.  The current absence of any specific 
coordinating entity for reconstruction within Africa‟s peace and security 
architecture, for example, contributes to the clouding of priorities, the ineffective use 
of resources and their reactive nature of responses.  As such, it would be useful to 
establish lead agencies that can provide clear strategic direction, and identify key 
gaps and clarify roles and responsibilities for responding to conflict and assisting 
with reconstruction.  In order to improve integration, such agencies should be 
endowed with sufficient authority to bring together all the relevant military and 
civilian agencies when a crisis emerges.  In this regard, the establishment of a 
standing civilian corps for reconstruction will require conducting and inventory of 
existing capabilities and support technologies or to determine human resource, 
organisational, and technical gaps for civilian reconstruction-related activities.  Gaps 
for stability operations will invariably be addressed as Africa has many trained and 
experienced military peacekeepers, but very few civilian experts (Gueli and 
Liebenberg, 2006b:3). 
 
The AU has also acknowledged the requirement for improved integrated systems 
that are required between the military and civilian components involved in post-
conflict reconstruction and development.  During the 5th Meeting of the African 
Chiefs of Defence Staff and Heads of Security in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 24–28 
March 2008, the AU decided that a working group of experts should be appointed 
to, inter alia, consider “the need for appropriate terminology (to be used by the AU) 
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to reflect the multi-dimensional and multi-functional mechanisms, given that the 
expressions „Standby Force‟ and „Standby Brigade‟ have exclusive military 
connotations (AU, 2008:2).    
 
3.4.4. The African Standby Force 
 
In the light of the UN‟s challenges to deal with all Africa‟s security requirements, 
the UN and AU has begun to put its own security architecture in place in order to 
effectively deal with the conflict on the continent (Murithi, 2005:101).  To this 
effect, it has established its own PSC as a collective mechanism to facilitate timely 
and quick responses to conflicts, as well as promote and implement peacebuilding 
and post-conflict reconstruction activities (AU, 2004).  In addition to the PSC, the 
AU also established the ASF in its goal to beef up its security apparatus.  The 
creation and development of the ASF is the first initiative to establish a common 
approach and action plan for the development of an effective peacekeeping capacity 
in Africa.  De Coning  (2006:7) points out that: “this means that the various 
disparate donor initiatives to enhance Africa‟s peacekeeping capacity can positively 
be channelled to support one coherent effort”.  Despite all the shortcomings and 
problems experienced with the establishment of the ASF, it does, however, point to 
the fact that Africa has a comprehensive African Peace and Security Architecture in 
place.   
 
The concept of the ASF entails that it shall be flexible and transparent in nature and 
that it would perform its functions in the context of preventative deployment and 
peacebuilding – including post-conflict disarmament and demobilisation.  The 
concept of the ASF prescribes that it should be structured to undertake the full 
spectrum of missions and tasks, ranging from observation and monitoring, to peace 
enforcement, as well as to contribute to post-conflict peacebuilding and 
reconstruction.  The fact that the foreseen tasks of the ASF included peacebuilding 
activities makes the concept of the ASF a useful conduit for the operationalisation of 
the concept of DPMs.  
 
Despite good progress with the development of the overall concept of the ASF, the 
actual operationalisation of the ASF has proven to take longer than anticipated.  The 
primary focus during the establishment of the ASF has been on military aspects of 
peace operations.  One of the remaining key issues is the requirement to equally 
develop the civilian and police components of the ASF framework so that the multi-
dimensional nature of complex peace missions can be integrated into the overall AU 
peacekeeping concept (De Coning, 2006:7).  Initial progress with the 
operationalisation of the five regional brigades that should constitute the ASF, has 
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Supplementa 3, 2009. doi: 10.5787/0-0-75
 63    
been slow.  The major problem with many of the regional brigades is to get the 
required number of troop pledges from the various countries as well as getting 
together a regional military logistic depot.  However, at the time of writing progress 
has been made in all the other regions on the continent in terms of the establishment 
of headquarters, ensuring that a continental planning element exists in each region, 
instituting Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between member states, setting up 
policy frameworks, having host nation agreements and having standby agreements 
between regional states.    
 
During the 5th Meeting of African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS) and Heads of 
Security on the operationalisation of the ASF and the Military Staff Committee 
(MSC) that was held at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 27th 
March 2008, progress with the operationalisation of the ASF was discussed.  During 
the meeting, it was confirmed that the ASF draft policy documents on Doctrine, 
Standard Operating Procedures, Logistics, Training and Evaluation, Command, 
Control, Communication, Intelligence and Surveillance (C3IS) and related 
recommendations as proposed should be adopted.  It was requested to convene 
meetings of Member States and Regional Economic Communities/Regional 
Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) to review the policy documents by 2010. It was also 
decided that the additional documents formulated with respect to the ASF Rapid 
Deployment Capability (RDC) and the Logistic Depot Study Reports should be 
accepted in principle and that the Commission should be requested in liaison with 
the RECs/RMs and Member States, to further continue developing these areas and 
submit proposals by 2010 (AU, 2008:1). It was confirmed that in the event of an 
intervention, the RDC would be part of the regional brigade that will deploy in 
advance, while the rest of the brigade would deploy as a follow-on force.  It was also 
confirmed that in terms of logistical support, the initial concept of one continental 
depot and five regional depots should be retained, pending the outcome of further 
consultation on the issue with the RECs/RMs and Member States (AU, 2008:1). 
 
Interestingly, it was decided that appropriate terminology should be introduced 
which would reflect the multi-dimensional and multi-functional mechanisms, given 
that the expressions „Standby Force‟ and „Standby Brigade‟ have exclusive military 
connotations.  It was also stressed that the MSC‟s capacity and effectiveness should 
be enhanced as a critical advisory structure to the PSC.  Member States concerned 
were urged to urgently take the necessary steps to be appropriately represented in the 
MSC by deploying Defence Attaches who should be actively involved in the 
evolving process to establish the ASF and offer assistance to the AU Commission in 
order to ensure African ownership.  It was also recommended that reflection should 
be initiated on the composition of the MSC to reflect the multi-dimensional nature of 
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the ASF and peace support operations.  It was also confirmed the ASF Training Plan 
of 2007 to 2010 would continue as planned (AU, 2008:2).  It is clear that, although 
progress with the operationalisation of the ASF continues to be slow, progress is, 
however, still being made.  While better training and coordination will definitely 
help to make ASF arrangements more effective, it is important to note that sub-
regional arrangements remain highly dependent on the political will of African 
leaders themselves.  Without new and locally funded innovative approaches, there is 
a risk that the continent will continue to limp from one crisis to the other.  Millions 
of people will continue to die and suffer and subsequently, hundreds of billions of 
dollars will be required for post-conflict reconstruction and recovery (Othieno and 
Samasuwo, 2007:37).  
 
Resources and capacity constraints such as technological, financial, human, 
logistical and infrastructure have all impacted heavily on the AU‟s efforts to resolve 
conflict through regional and continental initiatives.  This is primarily as a result of 
asymmetric political and political development of member states (DFA, 2007:11).  
Therefore, the consensus and capacity required to pursue a collective security 
mandate and execute effective responses to conflict is severely undermined.  The 
AU must develop a strategy of financing its own operations and to develop the ASF 
capacity. 
 
3.5. Between peacekeeping and peacebuilding: the reconstruction gap 
 
It has become evident that the initial response to conflict cannot rest solely on the 
deployment of military peacekeepers, but should also include a group of special 
civilian teams that can fast-track the delivery of critical infrastructure and other 
socio-economic institutions – even before peace agreements are brokered, break-
down or potentially exacerbate more conflict (Gueli et al, 2006b:9).  This 
„peacekeeping-peacebuilding gap‟ results from, inter alia, slow mission build-up, 
prolonged military action, delayed civilian reconstruction build-up and few 
dedicated civilian reconstruction resources.  It is evident that multi-national 
intervention in intra-state wars will involve considerable costs for those states that 
initiate the intervention, and that the intervention often impedes, rather than aids or 
expedites the process of domestic political reconstruction, which ultimately, 
provides the only long-term solution to the conflicts that precipitate the intervention 
(Clapham, 2000:212).  
 
The AU, in its Draft Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development 
(PCRD) also states that experience has proven that in the early phases of transition 
from conflict to peace, “peace processes remain fragile and the risk of resumption of 
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violence high” (AU, 2006:2).  This is because countries emerging from conflict are 
characterised by weakened or non-existent capacity at all levels, destroyed 
institutions and the absence of a democratic culture, good governance, rule of law 
and respect for human rights, as well as widespread poverty.  “In addition, responses 
to post-conflict situations have, in the past, remained fragmented and largely 
ineffectual” (AU, 2006:2).  The AU‟s policy framework goes beyond merely 
addressing the physical conflict that forms part of intra-state wars, noting that PCRD 
activities do not cease with stabilisation, but seek to achieve long-term sustainable 
development as underpinned by the vision for Africa‟s Renaissance.  
 
Gueli (2007:29) argues that the functional gap between military peacekeeping and 
civilian peacebuilding or post-conflict reconstruction has “received a lot of attention, 
because it remains a weakness in the policy framework of the United Nations (UN) 
conflict resolution repertoire, particularly in peace missions”.  Experience has shown 
that “the window between the end of military action and the start of development is 
very narrow and that the first few months and weeks following an intervention are 
perhaps the more critical period for laying the ground work for peace and 
establishing the credibility of foreign forces” (Gueli and Liebenberg, 2006a:14).  To 
this effect, it is argued that the concept of DPMs provides a practical approach to 
effecting peacebuilding and to ultimately set the stage for nation-building and 
sustainable security and development.  DPMs call for a more timely effort to bring 
security nearer to development – “the two veritable pillars of all UN peace missions 
– in order to minimise the return of conflict and to facilitate a transition to 
international and local actors responsible for conducting longer-term state-building 
efforts” (Gueli et al, 2006c:3).  However, although the notion of integrating civil-
military resources at the earliest possible stages of a mission seems plausible, 
civilian reconstruction specialists are notably absent in peace missions (Gueli et al, 
2006b:22).  This results in the situation where the pace of reconstruction and 
development becomes very slow and a number post-conflict societies have relapsed 
into armed conflict, as there was no other alternative.  This confirms the assumption 
that the response to conflict cannot solely be dependent on the deployment of 
military peacekeepers, but that it should also include groups of special civilian teams 
that can fast track the delivery of critical infrastructure and other socio-economic 
activities. 
 
DPMs are focused on the realisation of the AU and NEPAD‟s priorities.  Firstly, it is 
believed that DPMs would work towards achieving sustainable political and 
economic development which will, furthermore, advance democracy, as well as 
regional integration and co-operation through the dismantling of exploitative war 
economies.  Secondly, it is contended that DPMs will create a platform for policy 
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reforms and increased investment through the dismantling of war economies.  This 
is primarily to be achieved through the development of an integrated development 
plan or framework for post-conflict reconstruction and development (Neethling, 
2005:56).  
 
3.6. Concept of DPMs 
 
The concept of DPMs evolved from concepts such as peace operations, complex 
peace operations and multi-dimensional peacekeeping.  The UN, in most cases, still 
uses the expression peace operations as a generic term that addresses the entire 
continuum of peace missions.  This includes aspects such as conflict prevention, 
peacemaking, peacekeeping, as well as peacebuilding.  Furthermore, the term 
complex peace operations refers to the inclusion of peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
operations into one mandate as authorised by the UNSC (UN, 1999:8).  Despite the 
differences that exit in terms of what is understood with these concepts, they 
were/are all still based on a linear approach to peace missions – following an 
essentially phased approach in which peacekeeping must be concluded, before 
peacebuilding can commence. 
 
However, those who support the concept of DPMs do not follow the traditional 
time-line in terms of the stages of peace enforcement, peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding.  The concept of DPMs is defined as a post-conflict reconstruction 
intervention that aims to achieve sustainable levels of human security through a 
combination of interventions aimed at accelerating capacity-building and socio-
economic development, which would ultimately result in the dismantling of war 
economies and conflict systems, and replacing them with globally competitive peace 
economies (Madlala-Routledge, 2004a:23).  The concept of DPMs proposes that 
these stages be combined or integrated in order to address the non-linear and inter-
related nature of complex emergencies, rather than being approached as separate, but 
related concepts of a linear process.  On an operational level this means that post-
conflict reconstruction interventions operate in synergy with peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement.  According to Gueli et al (2006c:21), the application of a 
systems-approach to address conflict will enable decision-makers to effectively 
identify the most important activities and relationships in a manner that is useful for 
the development of policy to ensure sustainable development and peace on the 
African continent.  This demands that the characteristic delay between security and 
development in UN and AU operations is diminished and that, in fact, peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding operations should be collapsed and integrated into one mutually 
reinforcing process (Madlala-Roudledge, 2004b:3).   
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DPMs are based on the premise that engaging in development and reconstruction 
efforts as soon as possible, even when conflict is still continuing in some 
areas/regions of the theatre of operations, could contribute toward securing peace 
and obtaining long-term political order and sustained economic development (Gueli 
et al, 2006a:7).  Solomon (2001:220) points out that the challenge for peacemakers 
is to “engage in peacemaking between belligerents while at the same time making 
efforts towards reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation.  Although the 
prospect of rebuilding in the face of destructive forces might seem like a 
contradiction, the complex interaction between the diverse variables can make this 
possible”.   Although the intention with the implementation of DPMs is essentially 
to „bring development closer to security‟ and that this essentially implies the 
deployment of civilian peacebuilders and peace workers in the midst of conflict, it is 
clear that civilians cannot be expected to constantly operate in the face of ongoing 
violence.  The cornerstone of the DPMs approach is to replace ad hoc institutions 
and approaches with a permanent capacity endowed with sufficient authority to 
bring all relevant public and private agencies on board when a crisis emerges with a 
view to facilitating a greater depth of coordination between the diverse military and 
civilian agencies involved in a peace mission (Gueli et al, 2006c:19).  
Fundamentally, DPMs calls for an approach that entails quicker mobilisation of 
reconstruction and development resources and embarking on these initiatives 
parallel to and in unison with security efforts.  The development of this type of 
capacity will require better inter-departmental cooperation and strong political 
leadership, partnering with the private sector to develop appropriate reconstruction 
platforms and technologies (Gueli et al, 2006c:19).  The concept of DPMs is thus 
intended to provide decision-makers with a framework in which the challenges 
related to the security-development nexus can be addressed simultaneously – thus 
decreasing the risk that a country would fall back into a protracted conflict situation.  
 
It is clear that role-players and belligerents who have vested interests in the 
continuation of conflict and disorder, need to be effectively dealt with.  However, to 
simply separate these actors through ceasefires is insufficient, as they often make 
use of global commodity markets to trade resources for weapons that in turn, are 
utilised to secure access to and control valuable commodities.  “Possible courses of 
action, although these entail taking considerable risks, would be to recapture key 
commercial targets, deny warring parties access to their major sources of 
sustainability, as well as to capture or remove warlords.  Of necessity, this level of 
outside coercion will involve much more than conventional military power, but also 
the active participation and tight integration of specialised military units, as well as 
intelligence and police services” (Gueli et al, 2006c:71).   
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Essentially, the concept of DPMs is rooted in the following assumptions (Gueli et al, 
2006c:22): 
 
 speed and momentum do matter in peace missions; 
 effective peace missions require integrated efforts; 
 security and development are intimately linked (however, the one is not 
necessarily a precursor for the other); 
 launching development and reconstruction work as soon as possible (even 
when conflict is continuing) can be a major incentive for peace; 
 the window of opportunity to avert a return to conflict is very narrow; and 
 effective targeting of this „window‟ or „reconstruction gap‟ requires that 
civilian reconstruction experts deploy alongside security forces. 
 
DPMs should therefore be defined not only as peace interventions, but in effect, as 
„reconstruction interventions‟ that aim to achieve sustainable levels of human 
security through a combination of initiatives by the military and civilian components 
that is aimed at accelerating capacity-building and socio-economic development.  
An important feature of DPMs is that it does not distinguish between peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding as sequential processes, but that these processes should be 
executed simultaneously.  This view implies that peacekeeping, peace enforcement 
and peacebuilding are thus integrated into one process.  This would mean that post-
conflict reconstruction practitioners and resources are deployed alongside 
peacekeepers irrespective of the existence of cease-fire agreements (Madlala-
Routledge and Liebenberg, 2004:128).  This implies that the military must establish 
a „window of opportunity‟ for peacebuilding personnel in environments where the 
mix between conflict and peace is likely to shift back and forth.  For civilians, it 
implies taking risks in order to ensure the provision of basic services and repair 
damage to critical infrastructure at the earliest possible stages of the mission – thus 
enhancing the overall credibility, legitimacy and sustainability of the mission (Gueli 
et al, 2006c:9).  
 
The military component of peace missions should thus be augmented with civilian 
reconstruction elements as early as possible.  The concept of DPMs proposes ways 
for policy-makers to plan and organise for civil-military operations that bridge the 
traditional „gap‟ between peacekeeping and peacebuilding and to mainstream 
developmental principles into conflict prevention and resolution.  Colonel Garland 
Williams, who commanded a US Army Engineering Battalion in Kosovo and helped 
to direct NATO reconstruction efforts in Bosnia, argues that the „reconstruction gap‟ 
that is sometimes experienced between the peacekeeping and peacebuilding phases 
of the peace mission, often leads to renewed outbreaks of violence among 
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belligerents.  He emphasises the notion that “all efforts should be made to blitz the 
country‟s infrastructure repair and reconstruction efforts sooner rather than later 
during peace missions” (Williams, 2005:xiii).  Failure to do so will lengthen the 
deployment times of peacekeepers, and will mean that the international community‟s 
efforts will continue to be reactive rather than preventive. 
 
The underlying causes of conflict are complex. In answer to this, DPMs can be 
utilised, in theory, to establish sustainable human development through the 
integrated application of security and developmental efforts.  As a result, after the 
military intervention, right after the cessation of hostilities in a protracted conflict, a 
peace support operation‟s host nation typically finds itself in a precarious position: 
not only must it reconstitute its governmental and administrative apparatus, but it 
must also rebuild much of its basic infrastructure that was destroyed during the 
conflict: roads must be rebuilt, public utilities must be restored and land mines must 
be removed.  If these issues are not effectively addressed, such a chaotic situation 
can easily sustain the conditions and garner resentments that led to the conflict in the 
first place.  
 
However, although the theoretical foundation of the concept of DPMs is easy to 
understand, it remains very difficult to implement: the maintenance of safe and 
secure environments for peacebuilding cannot solely rest on the deployment of 
military peacekeepers, but should also include civilian experts that can fast-track the 
reconstruction of essential services and ensure a seamless transition from short-term 
responses to long-term assistance.  According to Gueli et al (2006c:3), what 
distinguishes this sort of civilian capacity from humanitarian aid is that it begins 
immediately at the cessation of major combat operations, and it goes beyond saving 
lives to providing the foundation of reconstruction.       
 
The above coincides with the view of the former UNSG, Kofi Annan, who noted in 
1998 that peacekeeping and peacebuilding should be simultaneous activities used in 
combination, and as complements to one another (Annan, 1998:8). This is why it is 
essential to have a multi-lateral systems-approach towards solving conflict, which 
will contribute to more integrated and co-ordinated actions in establishing peace. 
This notion is supported by Barungi and Mbugua (2005:31) who point out that 
“experience from across Africa show that there is a need to broaden the intervention 
strategy from peacekeeping and security agreements to Post Conflict Reconstruction 
(PCR) activities that address the root causes of conflict, confidence-building 
measures between divided parties and people, and changing the pervasive culture of 
violence and conflict”.      
 
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Supplementa 3, 2009. doi: 10.5787/0-0-75
 70    
According to Gueli et al (2006c:31), several specific issues need to be addressed in 
order to effectively conduct DPMs: 
 
 the ability and feasibility of embedding systems-thinking methods, tools 
and techniques in the policy arenas in order to develop viable and 
sustainable responses to conflict, specifically the need to model and 
simulate conflict as part of an integrated decision-support system; 
 translating a systems-based understanding of conflict into a strategic 
framework, policies, doctrine and appropriate structures; 
 identifying and mobilising the technical implementation requirements 
relating to funding, institutional structures, skills, capacity and inter-
operability;  
 mobilisation of support for the implementation of DPMs interventions by 
the international community with special reference to the UN, AU and 
other regional structures; 
 providing the means to accelerate short-term capacity-building, service 
delivery, equitable re-distribution of natural resources in accordance with 
long-term development goals in an unstable, volatile and non-consensual 
environment; 
 the feasibility of deploying civilian reconstruction capacity alongside the 
military forces in hostile environments; 
 operationalise development approaches into security efforts in such a way 
as to advance the achievement of the UN Millennium Development Goals; 
 defining the requirements of a suitable conflict transformation, conflict 
termination and exit strategies; and 
 accurately assess Africa‟s capacity to implement DPMs in support of its 
own strategic objectives. 
 
The above-mentioned issues are all very complex and diverse, and it has become 
evident that the only manner in which these issues can be integrated and executed in 
a meaningful way, is to apply a systems-thinking approach by means of which all 
the aspects can be integrated in a meaningful way.     
 
The rationale for the adoption of a DPMs approach is that it would replace existing 
ad hoc institutions and disjointed approaches with a permanent capacity that is 
endowed with sufficient authority to bring all the relevant public and private 
agencies, including the military, on board and under control when a crises emerges.  
DPMs can effectively be utilised to attain greater depth of co-ordination between 
diverse military and civilian agencies involved in peace missions (Gueli et al, 
2006c:1).  The development of this sort of capacity will require better inter-
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departmental cooperation and strong political leadership, partnering with the private 
sector to develop appropriate reconstruction platforms and technologies.  The notion 
of more active involvement by the private sector in reconstruction activities during 
peace missions was also confirmed in a report by the South African Department of 
Foreign Affairs (DFA), in which they assessed the trends and challenges of 
multidimensional and integrated peace operations.  This report stresses the fact that 
the private sector in Africa should take proactive stance on providing critical 
infrastructure and enhancing service delivery in conflict affected states.  In this 
regard, “the development of a private-public partnership is critical for the realisation 
of developmental peacebuilding” (DFA, 2007:11).     
 
3.7. DPMs and a systems-thinking approach 
 
DPMs as a concept, as modern conventional operations, strongly draws on systems-
thinking for its conceptual base and utilises systems-thinking tools and techniques to 
identify and understand the underlying structure and framework of conflict (Gueli et 
al, 2006c:21).  De Coning (2002:46) argues that conflict systems continue to change 
and adapt to the geo-political environment and economic context within which they 
are grounded.  Thus, “by studying the changes that occur in the conflict systems that 
we try to influence, and by analysing the international trends in conflict resolution 
and peacekeeping which occur in response to these changes in the conflict systems, 
we should be able to extrapolate some major trends and issues that could shape the 
path that African peacekeeping may take in the near future” (De Coning, 2002:46).  
However, as far as identifying and understanding the root causes of conflict are 
concerned, there is surprisingly little consensus on what the causes and conditions 
are.  As a result, it is extremely difficult to plan and implement a peacekeeping 
capacity-building programme in Africa, where nobody can say for sure what kind of 
capacity we need, and how or where we will need it. Holsti (1998:5) purports “that 
the reason for this (limited understanding) could be ascribed to the fact that there is a 
disturbing lack of integrative knowledge on the subject of conflict”.  As a result, 
academics from various disciplinary boundaries have attempted to understand 
conflict by studying isolated events and their causes that usually arise in situations of 
conflict, without trying to examine how the mutual interactions between events 
actually create the ideal conditions for, and determine the nature of conflict (Gueli et 
al, 2006c:20).  This results in a situation where contradictory and sometimes 
mutually exclusive conflict theories have been proposed.  Many of these theories are 
still based on current UN conflict resolution approaches that usually focus on 
responding to the symptomatic, more obvious problems of conflict, and solving 
these events in a linear or sequential and compartmentalised manner, for example, 
focusing on security efforts, followed by developmental initiatives (Porto, 2002:1). 
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De Coning (2002:50) points out that there has been a growing realisation that multi-
dimensional peacekeeping operations should be understood as complex systems.  All 
the mission components are inter-connected and interact with each other and outside 
elements, in a complex relationship in order to achieve the overall objective.  “All 
functions overlap in time and space, so that the actual activities of a modern multi-
dimensional peace operation will have, in varying degrees, tasks that represent 
activities such as preventative diplomacy (conflict prevention), negotiations 
(peacemaking), stabilisation and security operations, humanitarian relief, 
disarmament, demobilisation, de-mining, electoral assistance, civilian police 
assistance, human rights monitoring, and reconstruction and development assistance 
programmes (peacebuilding).  These activities all combine, interact and influence 
each other in self-organising patterns that are typical of any complex system” (De 
Coning, 2002:50). 
 
Furthermore, systems-thinking in terms of conflict resolution initiatives is based on 
the argument that symptomatic solutions to conflict tend to have only short-term 
benefits at best.  This can be ascribed to the fact that, by merely identifying the 
symptoms of conflict, rather than analysing the fundamental root causes of the 
conflict, the chances of finding lasting solutions to conflict are significantly 
diminished.  According to Gueli et al (2006c:20), the systems-thinking approach 
underscores that to impose artificial linear solutions to a complex social problem 
such as conflict, ignores the reality that conflict is created by a multitude of 
interdependent and interweaving forces.  As a result, management tools and 
techniques that rely on conventional methods of analysis are thus of limited use in 
complex and seemingly unpredictable conflict environments (Gueli et al, 2006c:21).  
Consequently, peace mission campaign plans should not be approached as a linear or 
binary progression of actions aimed at reaching an end state as defined by time.  
Rather, it should be viewed as an intervention that is aimed at influencing a system 
that is developed around a set of multi-dimensional benchmarks, which monitor the 
conflict system across the spectrum (De Coning, 2002:50).  In addition, feedback 
mechanisms need to be established in order to carefully monitor progress, both 
across the spectrum and at the overall system level.  In so doing, the intervention can 
be continuously adjusted according to the changes within the conflict system.  A 
systems-thinking approach to understanding the complex and non-linear processes 
of conflict therefore provides for new tools, analytical methods and concepts such as 
DPMs to effectively address conflict.   
 
The concept of DPMs proposes to do just that – in bringing significant changes to 
the methodology and processes that are currently used to plan and conduct peace 
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operations, as DPMs are based on a systems-approach in which many stages and 
processes are integrated and simultaneously executed (Gueli et al, 2006b:22).  In this 
regard, the concept of DPMs suggests that peacekeepers and peacebuilders deploy 
simultaneously at the onset of a mission.  This assumption forms the basis for the 
concept of DPMs and is in accordance with South Africa‟s current White Paper on 
Participation in International Peace Missions, tabled in Parliament on 24 February 
1999. 
 
3.8. UN Complex Peace Operations Model, the IMPP and DPMs 
 
Significant changes have recently taken place in terms of the UN approach to peace 
missions and one of the solutions is to have a more integrated approach in terms of 
the planning processes pertaining to peacekeeping and peacebuilding.  In order to 
manage the inter-relationships among the diverse range of functions pertaining to 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding more effectively, the UN developed the Integrated 
Missions Model (IMM) that is essentially aimed at enhancing the coherence between 
the UN Country Team that is humanitarian and developmental in focus, and the UN 
peacekeeping operation, that is essentially peace and security focused (De Coning, 
2006:4).  The current missions in Burundi, Côte d‟Ivoire, the DRC, Haiti, Kosovo, 
Liberia and Southern Sudan all have Integrated Mission management structures (De 
Coning, 2006:4). This more integrated approach has been encapsulated in the UN 
IMPP as part of a broader UN peacebuilding strategy in the form of guidelines that 
were endorsed by the UNSG on 13 June 2006.  These guidelines serve to promote a 
more comprehensive and inclusive UN systems-approach to the planning of 
integrated peace support operations (hereafter called „integrated missions‟).  
However, while structural reforms have been made, and approaches to and processes 
of peace missions have been altered to accommodate integrated planning processes, 
these reforms still do not explicitly explain how and when to integrate peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding on „grass roots‟ level – thus how to effectively address the 
military-civilian interface on the execution level.   
 
In view of this, the concept of DPMs, proposes a way for policy-makers to 
effectively organise, plan and co-ordinate the integration of civil-military operations 
that bridge the traditional gap between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, as well as 
to mainstream development principles into conflict prevention and resolution (Gueli 
et al, 2006d:4).  It is important to note that the concept of “integration” as it relates 
to peace missions, is aimed at planning processes, and not focused on the integration 
of the actions by the various role-players during the execution of their respective 
tasks on tactical level.  Malan (2007:3) points out that the role and functions of 
humanitarian organisations should not include humanitarianism within the scope of 
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the military strategy.  He argues that humanitarian aid boils down to far more than 
the mere provision of basic human resources.  Humanitarian aid should be provided 
in the true spirit of humanitarianism: adhering to the “„core principles‟ of 
humanitarianism – humanity, impartiality and independence and that these should be 
used to guard against the use of humanitarian assistance to induce compliance with 
political demands, and upholding the principles demands constant vigilance against 
cooptation of the language of humanitarianism by political and military actors” 
(Malan, 2007:3).  In light of the above, it is important to note that there should be a 
clear differentiation in terms of the line-functions of the respective humanitarian, 
political and military role-players on the tactical or execution level. 
 
However, in many instances, humanitarian interventions are called for as a direct 
result of the crises that were created by the failures of political actors.  As result of 
the complex nature of these crises, it will essentially require the combined efforts of 
the military, political and humanitarian role-players to solve the problem.  Malan 
(2007:3) argues that not many scholars and observers would contest the need for 
these three components to collaborate in the field.  However, he also points out that 
the differences in philosophy and operational priorities mean that these three types 
of responses do not naturally co-exist.  He concludes: “there can at best be good 
liaison and perhaps coordination between humanitarian, developmental and military 
actors – but not integration.  Even within UN peace operations, which are reliant on 
relatively weak voluntary troop contributions, there has been stiff resistance from 
humanitarians to the concept of „integrated missions‟ in the field” (Malan, 2007:3).  
The term „integration‟ as far as peace missions are concerned, should therefore be 
understood in terms of planning processes, and not in terms of the execution of tasks 
in the field by the respective role-players.   
 
The UN developed the IMPP as part of a broader UN peacebuilding strategy 
(UNSG‟s Guidelines on Integrated Missions, 2006).  The UN adopted the IMPP as 
the “authoritative basis for the planning of all new integrated missions, as well as the 
revision of existing integrated mission plans, for all UN departments, offices, 
agencies, funds and programmes” (UN, 2006:K-2).  Following the endorsement of 
the UN IMPP Guidelines by the UNSC on 13 June 2006, the Draft ASF Doctrine 
Handbook (Chapter 7) was presented.  This chapter encompasses the Planning of 
Multi-dimensional Peace Support Operations for the AU, which has drawn 
extensively on the existing UN IMPP Guidelines.  The IMPP is presented as a 
process by means of which structure is derived from an in-depth understanding of 
the specific country setting, of the evolving imperatives facing the security, political, 
humanitarian and development pillars in that particular country, and of the particular 
mix of assets and capacities available and/or required to achieve the desired impact 
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Supplementa 3, 2009. doi: 10.5787/0-0-75
 75    
(UN, 2006:K-3).  The UNSG‟s IMPP Guidelines noted that: “integration is the 
guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN operations in 
post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimensions of peacebuilding, 
political development, humanitarian aid, human rights, rule of law, social and 
security aspects into a coherent support strategy” (UN, 2006).  An integrated 
mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the 
priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at 
various stages of the recovery process.  Through this integrated process, the UN 
system seeks to maximise its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict 
by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner. 
 
The IMPP approach is in line with the UN‟s current IMM, and is more focused on 
fusing the planning of security and development efforts by military and civilian 
elements from the start of a mission, rather than only shifting the focus to 
peacebuilding and post-conflict environments during the later stages of a mission as 
was the pattern when utilising the IMM.  This process is directly in line with the 
aims of and approach to DPMs.  The IMPP can thus very effectively be applied to 
plan DPMs in bringing security closer to development, as the IMPP aims to ensure 
that the right people are at the table, that the right issues are being considered, and 
that the appropriate authorities and accountabilities are in place to motivate flexible, 
creative and integrated strategic and operational thinking and planning (UN, 
2006:K-2).  The IMPP thus promotes simultaneity and integration of planning 
processes and role-players (military and civilian) right from the start of a mission, 
thus meeting one of the key prerequisites of effectively implementing DPMs.  The 
IMPP also addresses security and development issues in an inter-related and 
contextually relevant way – as opposed to a primarily sequential, sectored approach 
that has been applied in terms of the UN‟s earlier Complex Peace Operations Model 
(Midlarsky, 1997:1). 
 
De Coning (2006:5) points out that, as is the case with most new innovations, the 
adoption of the IMPP has not been without its detractors. There are still various 
technical, administrative, organisational and budgetary challenges that need to be 
resolved, before all the aspects of the model can be fully implemented.  
 
Earlier peace mission planning processes proved that there was, generally, a lack of 
strategic vision, and that planning occurred along functional „stovepipes‟, which in 
turn lead to potential contradictions.  The lack of awareness of specific processes 
lead to partial application and there was no common approach between missions, 
that all the role-players were not included and that there was insufficient information 
and data on the situation in the battle space (UN, 2006:K-2). 
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The current IMPP is guided by specific planning principles and assumptions and 
requires the full engagement of the key UN actors, both at headquarters and the 
country level, as well as consultations with the national authorities and other 
relevant external actors.  However, it is emphasised that the IMPP should be 
implemented in a flexible manner, taking into account varying circumstances and 
timeframes, while ensuring that adequate planning standards, outputs and the key 
decisions points are respected.  The IMPP proposes differentiated time frames for 
each level and provides for the fact that planning according to minimum timeframes 
necessarily involves tradeoffs (UN, 2006:K-2).   
 
It is evident that planning for integrated missions must be inclusive from the outset 
and that both the process and mission structures must be effectively established so as 
to avoid the ad hoc approach of the past and ensure that system-wide strategic 
objectives are clearly established and supported by the functional planning of the 
respective mission and UN components (UN, 2006:K-3).  The development of the 
IMPP that is focused on the concept of the integration of processes and activities is 
the result of a realisation that, when responding to conflict, speed and momentum do 
matter in peace missions and that effective missions require integrated efforts, and 
not separate tracks that do not converge (Gueli et al, 2006c:1). 
 
The integration and coordination of processes and approaches towards the resolution 
of conflict and the streamlining of different national interests into a common and 
cohesive strategy shared by all the countries involved, remains a major challenge for 
political and military role-players working for conflict management, especially in 
the regional context (DFA, 1999:9).  Hence, coordination of different national 
interests and their synthesis into a common strategy by all countries concerned are 
imperative (Williams, 1999:15).  This interface between political and military affairs 
also emphasises the importance of clear mandates and rules of engagement. 
 
3.9. DPMs and the security-development nexus 
 
Current peacekeeping approaches are characterised by extended time lapses before 
developmental and peacebuilding interventions can be implemented in war torn 
zones.  This leads to an inadequate capacity to dismantle war economies, as well as 
an inability to absorb ex-combatants and to destroy conflict systems (Madlala-
Routledge and Liebenberg, 2004:127).  The result is a concept that is based on the 
premise that security can only achieve permanent benefit if its vital development and 
peacebuilding activities are rolled-out within a reasonable time.  By reasonable, is 
understood the process of providing critical humanitarian assistance and 
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reconstruction capabilities immediately after military operations so that security can 
dynamically reinforce and influence the effectiveness of development (i.e. the one 
activity must be applied without loosing sight of the other) (Gueli et al, 2006c:1). 
 
The underlying causes of conflict are so complex, that the alternative approach of 
DPMs provides, as a concept, sustainable human development through the 
integrated application of security and developmental efforts.  As a result, after the 
military intervention, right after the cessation of hostilities in a protracted conflict, a 
peace support operation‟s host nation typically finds itself in a precarious position: 
not only must it reconstitute its governmental and administrative apparatus, but it 
must also rebuild much of its basic infrastructure that was destroyed during the 
conflict: roads must be rebuilt, public utilities must be restored and land mines must 
be removed (Gueli et al, 2006c:18).  Otherwise, such a chaotic situation can easily 
sustain the conditions and garner resentments that led to the conflict in the first 
place.  In addition, military forces are often repeatedly deployed in peace operations, 
usually with a UN mandate, to put an end to hostilities, but are then retained in the 
theatre of operations for an indeterminate amount of time without a clear exit 
strategy and without a clear mandate to execute peace-operation tasks other than that 
of providing security and stability.  There is usually no well-established strategy to 
make the transition quickly from the military‟s peacemaking and peacekeeping 
mission to civilian IGOs and NGOs longer-term mission of peacebuilding – that is 
fortifying a post-conflict society‟s institutions to prevent it from lapsing back into 
conflict – and reconstructing a war-torn nation. 
 
Omar Bakhet, the Director of the UNDP‟s Emergency Response Division, 
commented that: “UN efforts in East Timor, Kosovo and Sierra Leone all 
demonstrate the clear need to integrate development into peace operations from 
early on” (Bakhet, 2001:14).  Bakhet emphasises the fact that development is the 
key building block that is required to consolidate and build lasting peace.  In a 
similar vein, the former South African Deputy-Minister of Defence, Nozizwe 
Madlala-Routledge, has been contending since 1999 that conflict in Africa is 
ultimately a failure of development, and that a solution to conflict fundamentally 
requires a developmental approach.  Madlala-Roudledge argues that the UN‟s 
preoccupation with establishing the military security of a war-torn country is 
currently being overplayed, whereas it should in fact run concurrently with an 
equally vital aspect of an overall peace plan, which is the commitment to human 
security (Madlala-Routledge, 2004a:2). 
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3.10. Critical success factors for DPMs  
 
The following factors can be viewed as critical success factors for the successful 
implementation of DPMs:   
 
 the planning processes of peacekeeping and peacebuilding should be 
integrated with the aim of mutually supporting each other; 
 development and security imperatives should be fused into a holistic 
systems-approach to effectively deal with the full range of inter-related 
issues that threaten peace and security; 
 the window of opportunity or „reconstruction gap‟ between 
peacekeeping/military action and development work is very narrow and, 
as a result, the first few weeks after the signing of a ceasefire agreement is 
the most critical period for creating an environment that is conducive for 
establishing a sustainable peace; 
 it is essential for all role-players to establish a clear understanding of the 
reinforcing processes that originally gave rise to the conflict in order to 
effectively address the processes that would sustain the conflict; 
 the various stakeholders and role-players that are involve in a mission 
must plan and work together under a common strategic framework; 
 lead agencies that can provide clear strategic direction and identify gaps 
and clarify roles and responsibilities for responding to conflict and 
assisting with reconstruction must be established (Gueli and Liebenberg, 
2006b:23); and 
 lead agencies should be endowed with sufficient authority to bring 
together and task all the relevant military and civilian agencies when a 
crisis emerges. 
 
3.11. Challenges for the successful implementation of DPMs 
 
The UN, following the findings of the Brahimi Report has gradually begun to 
explore the possibility and advantages of incorporating peacebuilding work into 
peacekeeping operations as a way to address the root causes of the conflict during 
the early stages of a complex peace operations.  The Brahimi Report recommends 
that future complex peace operations should include, amongst others: „quick impact 
projects‟ and initial work on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
(DDR) processes into peacekeeping operations (UN, 2000:4).  Both are intended to 
demonstrate immediate results and improve the credibility of a new mission, 
strengthen the capacity for peacebuilding and to serve as a basis to attract 
humanitarian, development and reconstruction workers (UN, 2000:5).  The greatest 
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challenges with these initiatives are that they rely on voluntary contributions that are 
to be completed and essentially pursued as „quick-fix‟ strategies – that is, they are 
not designed to form part of a larger framework for long-term development and 
reconstruction (Gueli et al, 2006c:17).     
 
What has become clear in terms of effective reconstruction and development 
initiatives is that the divide between budgeted and voluntary contributions for DDR 
and other peace initiatives continues to be an impediment to the seamless support 
that is needed to move from „disarmament and demobilisation‟ to „reconstruction‟.  
Both reconstruction and nation-building are essentially long-term and very 
expensive processes (Gueli et al, 2006c:17).  The availability of funding for DPMs 
will thus be one of the key determinants of the successes of peace missions.  
Furthermore, in the face of the continuing availability of lucrative resources, the 
success of reconstruction may depend on the provision of new forms of civilian 
economic opportunity and supporting programmes so that the temptations to 
continue participation in the war economy can be undercut.  “This means that the 
standard donor proactive of treating „Disarmament and Demobilisation programmes‟ 
in peacekeeping as prior to „Reconstruction Programmes‟ in peacebuilding should 
be collapsed into mutually reinforcing processes and introduced at the earliest 
possible stages of a mission” (Gueli et al, 2006c:18).   
 
In answer to all these challenges, the UN has embarked on a process of reviewing 
the processes as prescribed in the UN Complex Peace Operations Model.  A study, 
commissioned by the UN, entitled, Report on Integrated Missions: Practical 
Perspectives and Recommendations, proposes that developmental work should be 
embedded at the start of peacekeeping, and that long-term success of peacebuilding 
is dependent on effective developmental initiatives implemented at the start of 
operations (Eide et al, 2005:52).  
 
In addition to the lack of efficient processes to effectively address the multiple 
challenges that are associated with complex emergencies, the greatest other 
challenge is the lack of resources and funds.  The Economic Community of West 
African States Mission to Côte d‟Ivoire (ECOMICI), for instance, provided valuable 
lessons in terms of other aspects of peace missions, specifically in the fields of 
logistics and financial support.  According to Gberie and Addo (2004:33), there was 
a great deal of financial uncertainty, and there was a total absence of an integrated 
logistic plan for the mission.  The Force Commander of ECOMICI did not have any 
control over the future of the mission‟s finances, and he was sometimes compelled 
to operate without any fund for periods up to two months.  The lack of integrated 
logistic support resulted in a laborious build-up of the force, which had to be stopped 
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on several occasions to get the communication equipment operational and to wait for 
the arrival of more radios from France.  There was also incoherence in force 
generation and donor support.  ECOMICI, for instance, had to wait for the 
contingent from Benin, who was in turn waiting for the Belgians to provide the 
logistics support it had had promised. 
 
The ECOMICI experience clearly points to the fact that the lack of a proper and 
well-integrated logistics system was a major hurdle to successful operations.  It also 
identified deficiencies in the chain of command and emphasised the problems 
created by language barriers.  It was evident that ECOMICI could not be deployed 
and sustained without adequate visibility for its financing and a proper command 
structure to give the necessary directive and guidance, as well as to carry out its 
responsibilities for mission management.  It was found that the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), as the regional co-ordinating 
mechanism, should generate its own mission planning and management capabilities 
and that it should encourage troop contributing countries to deploy with their own 
equipment by signing MOUs in terms of scales of equipment and reimbursement 
rates as per the UN.  It was also suggested that ECOWAS should encourage the 
future development of joint training at operational and tactical levels, and that future 
missions should have only one finance cell, which would be manned by finance 
officers from ECOWAS and the respective donor countries (Gbrie and Addo, 
2004:33).  Gueli and Liebenberg also suggest the establishment of a central finance 
cell in their arguments on DPMs (Gueli et al, 2006b:27). 
 
This dependence on donor support from developed countries will continuously have 
great impact on the time – and logistics planning processes of African peace 
missions.  Malan (2000:179) points out that “in the absence of a well-funded, vibrant 
and internationally focused civil society in Africa, the bulk of the „civilian 
component‟ and finances of multi-national peace missions in Africa will continue to 
be provided by the North”.  The key role players in respect of humanitarian 
assistance, human rights action, and economic and social action are not national or 
regional actors from Africa or the South, but IGOs and NGOs from the northern 
hemisphere (Malan, 2000:179).    
 
The reality is that “African peacekeeping will remain under-funded, and that the 
functional devolution by the UN will fail to be matched by resource devolution” 
(Malan, 2000:179).  African peacekeepers will thus have to be trained to be able to 
perform their tasks with limited resources and accept the reality that the prospects 
for improved resource availability for future peace missions are limited.  In order to 
improve the chances for successful African peace missions by African peacekeepers, 
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there is a clear need to establish common ground and principles to ensure that all the 
role-players in the region are moving in the same direction in regard to their 
approach to peace missions – if only in terms of the military component‟s 
contribution to DPMs. 
 
The civilian component of peace mission should be strengthened to improve rapid 
response capabilities.  In this regard, the UNDPKO is currently exploiting ways of 
improving in-house rapid deployment for mission start-up and reconstruction, inter 
alia through the development roster of approximately 1 000 to 1 500 career officials 
that would provide the UNDPKO with a reliable pool of experienced personnel, able 
to deploy at short notice to fill core mission positions.  The drive for improved rapid 
deployment also includes attempts to draw experts from member states and agencies 
to complement UN staff in the field.  The need for civilians to match military 
capability and deployment in time should be accompanied by the need to correctly 
sequence and synergise military and civilian tasks.  Different agencies and 
institutions will invariably play different roles and take priority across the spectrum 
of conflict.  The armed forces would, for instance, play the required role in 
providing initial security and as the security situation improves, civilian agencies 
will progressively move to the forefront of the reconstruction process. 
 
3.12. Conclusions 
 
It has become evident that the high failure rate of international peace interventions 
demands a redefinition of current peace operations practices and approaches.  In 
response to the limited successes achieved with the traditional approach to UN peace 
missions in Africa, the concept of DPMs is presented as an alternative (African) 
paradigm that aims to ensure that future peace operations on the continent are 
implemented in an effective and sustainable manner.  This ultimately implies that 
the planning processes of peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding 
should be integrated with the aim of mutually supporting each other, rather than 
viewing each concept as an intermediate end state that is implemented in a phased 
and linear fashion.  It ultimately implies the adoption of a systems-thinking approach 
to address the inter-related problems experienced by war-torn states during complex 
emergencies by executing the processes of peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
simultaneously. 
 
Despite the general realisation that, in terms of peace operations, security can no 
longer be regarded as a precursor for development, the need to efficiently link 
security and development as twin imperatives through integrated policies and 
programmes from the start of peace operations, are still to be formalised by the 
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various role-players (Gueli et al, 2006b:55).  Security can only achieve permanent 
benefit if early and well-placed socio-economic resources are available within 
reasonable time.  Despite this realisation, very limited in-roads have been made in 
explicitly formalising the methods of fusing developmental initiatives with security 
efforts in order to deal holistically and simultaneously with the full range of inter-
related issues that threaten peace and security. 
 
It is not possible to determine exact time scales for the duration of developmental 
assistance and peacebuilding, as the duration of development initiatives will depend 
on the nature of each specific crisis.  However, experience has shown that the 
window between military action and development work, i.e. the „reconstruction 
gap‟, is very narrow and that the first few weeks after a ceasefire agreement are 
perhaps the most critical period for establishing a sustainable peace and the 
credibility of the peacekeepers (Gueli et al, 2006c:6).  Furthermore, credibility and 
political momentum that is lost during this short period is usually difficult to regain. 
 
The DPMs approach rests on an in-depth systems-analysis of the inter-related issues 
of conflict (including both military and human security) in the target-region in order 
to determine its underlying structural source and logic.  This requires a clear 
understanding of the reinforcing processes that originally gave rise to the conflict 
and the balancing of the processes that sustain it.  Understanding conflict through a 
systems-paradigm can thus assist decision-makers to determine what needs to be 
done, by whom, how and when during a mission (Gueli et al, 2006c:22).  The 
complex challenges posed by violent conflicts in Africa furthermore require a high 
level of policy coordination.  Coordination is necessary to ensure a clear division of 
labour, to set priorities and requirements, as well as to develop platforms of 
principles to guide planning and implementation activities.  Coordination is also 
critical to establish a shared strategic vision among military and civilian planners, 
which in turn, is essential to ensure unity of efforts.   
 
Of utmost importance, is the fact that the various stake-holders and role players 
involved a mission, must plan and work together under a common strategic 
framework to ensure that combined security and developmental efforts are started as 
soon as possible, and that these efforts form part of a larger framework for long-term 
developments and reconstruction.  In order to achieve this, the AU should work for 
the entrenchment of a developmental peace doctrine and PCRD that would 
contribute to the reconstruction of the African continent.  There is thus a need for 
effective coordination in hybrid arrangements, especially those involving a division 
of labour such as the AU and its international partners at strategic and operational 
levels.  This approach is focused on fusing security and development efforts 
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throughout the course of a mission and on addressing the security-development 
nexus in an inter-related and contextually relevant way. 
 
The development of a group of civilian „first-responders‟ will be crucial for planning 
as they will be able to inject greater „grassroots reality‟ into needs assessments or 
resource requirements.  One of the key tasks of this group will be to determine the 
length of the time interval between initial military response and full-scale 
developmental assistance.  In the event that the interval between the two aspects is 
too short, the lives of civilian reconstruction teams could be placed in severe danger; 
if the interval between the military response and developmental activities is too long, 
the benefits that could be derived from the initial military response, could be 
negated. 
 
Gueli et al (2006c:4) concludes that the cornerstone of the DPMs approach is to 
replace existing ad hoc institutions and approaches in government with a permanent 
capacity endowed with sufficient authority to bring all relevant public and private 
entities (including the military) on board and under control when a crises emerges, 
and with a view to facilitating a greater depth of planning and coordination between 
the military and civilian components of a mission.  The development of this sort of 
capacity will require, among others, partnering with the private sector to develop 
appropriate reconstruction platforms and technologies, and reversing the 
underplayed role and untapped potential that (South African) universities, science 
councils, and other centres of excellence can bring to address the complex 
challenges posed by reconstruction and development in war-torn regions or states. 
 
Against this background, the peace interventions in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and the 
DRC will be explored to determine whether and under which circumstances the 
concept of DPMs could successfully be implemented during peace missions to 
improve the chances of establishing lasting peace and sustainable development. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONTEMPORARY PEACE MISSIONS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: KOSOVO 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
During a plenary session of the International Commission on Kosovo that took place 
in Johannesburg in 2000, Judge Richard Goldstone stated that “in a world sadly 
inured to incidents of gross human rights violations, and accustomed to the various 
reactions of righteous governments and hamstrung IGOs, it is seldom that a single 
event should spark worldwide debate and polarise international opinion.  The 1999 
military intervention by the NATO in Kosovo in response to serious human rights 
violations, was one of these rare occurrences” (Goldstone, 2001:vii). 
 
The arrival of the international administration in Kosovo was a historic opportunity 
in which newly formulated international ideas about reconstruction and stabilisation 
of post-war societies were tested for the first time (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:26).  
The simultaneous deployment of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) emphasised the shift away from the 
traditional linear approach to UN peace missions, as peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding activities were carried out simultaneously, and not sequentially. A 
high premium was placed on efforts to ensure that the international civil and security 
components in Kosovo acted in a fully integrated manner in order to focus their 
efforts towards the achievement of a single goal – setting the scene for sustainable 
peace and development in Kosovo.  In other words, the humanitarian intervention in 
Kosovo was conducted in accordance with the new approach to UN peace missions 
that was adopted in the early 1990‟s in which peacebuilding is brought „closer‟ to 
peacekeeping – thus effectively addressing the reconstruction gap that is so often 
presented as the cause or the reason for the relapse into violence in states that have 
been plagued by intra-state conflicts.  The jury is still out in terms of the successes, 
failures, justification and legality of the intervention and these uncertainties have 
generated fierce disputes among political figures, military leaders and academics.  
Furthermore, the political issue of Kosovo‟s independence have not been resolved, 
and this situation was exacerbated by Kosovo‟s unilateral declaration of 
independence on 17 February 2008.  What is, however, very clear, is the fact that the 
events in Kosovo “ushered in a sea-change in the arena of humanitarian 
intervention” (Goldstone, 2001:vii). 
 
The NATO intervention in Kosovo was significant in many ways and one of the key 
issues highlighted as a result of the intervention, is the issue of state sovereignty and 
the conditions or circumstances that would legitimise a humanitarian intervention 
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within the borders of a sovereign state.  According to Sidiropolous (2001:xi), the 
NATO campaign against Serbia in March 1999, casted a dramatic spotlight on the 
tension between respect for state sovereignty and the international trend towards 
intolerance of human rights violations.  The absence of a legitimating UN mandate 
for the NATO operations in Kosovo raised the concern that militarily and 
economically powerful states could take arbitrary action against smaller and weaker 
states without obtaining the required UN mandate prior to an intervention. 
 
These events must be viewed against the introduction of a new dimension to the 
responsibility of the international community to intervene in internal conflicts 
involving gross violations of human rights which threatens to generate wider 
instability or unacceptable human suffering (Muguruza, 2003:238).  The decision to 
intervene in Kosovo highlighted questions regarding sovereignty, mandates, rules of 
engagement, force levels and the need for robust UN international peacekeeping.  
The UNSC, in a series of resolutions that were adopted since 1991, based on the 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, as set 
out in Article 24 of the UN Charter, has clearly recognised that massive and 
systematic breaches of human rights law and international humanitarian law 
constitute threats to international peace and security and therefore demand its 
attention and action (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).  As a consequence of this development, 
humanitarian interventions, instead of being a matter of self-help by states as it was 
during the Cold War, is now mainly a collective response with the purpose of 
implementing UNSC Resolutions.  Ultimately, „intervention‟ is no longer 
understood to refer only to the use of force, but it is now more about considering 
what kind of intervention is required and determining the relationships between 
humanitarian assistance, military intervention, rehabilitation and reconstruction 
(Rambsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996:70).  This closer connection between 
humanitarian crises and threats to international peace and security points to the 
phenomenon that static non-intervention norms seem to be giving way before the 
new international consensus whereby minimum humanitarian standards within states 
would be enforced by the international community.  This development opens the 
way to view state sovereignty as a matter of responsibility and not just power 
(Annan, 1999b:57). 
 
Another key issue that came to the fore was the role that regional organisations 
should play in supporting humanitarian interventions in member states.  In the case 
of Kosovo, a number of bilateral and regional initiatives, such as the Kinkel-Vedrine 
Initiative of November 1997 and the Turkey-inspired imitative to create a 
Multinational Rapid Intervention Force were also agreed upon (Wolff, 2003:79).  
Individually, the governments of Russia, the USA, and, to a lesser degree, Germany, 
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Italy and Greece all played a part in the international community‟s response to the 
evolving and subsequently escalating conflict in Kosovo.  What has become evident, 
is that as long as UN standards and rules of engagement are followed in terms of 
how and when to intervene in humanitarian crises, regional organisations and groups 
of states or even single states have a crucial role to play in the provision of security. 
 
Ultimately, when analysing the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, the questions 
remain: Why is the Kosovo War important?  What are the experiences gained 
regarding the military component‟s role and function during humanitarian 
interventions, and how did the Kosovo war impact on the roles of regional and IGOs 
during humanitarian interventions? Furthermore, what experiences have been gained 
from Kosovo, specifically in terms of the implementation of the concept of DPMs, 
by simultaneously conducting peacekeeping, as well as peacebuilding activities, and 
how do these questions‟ significance transcend the case of Kosovo? 
 
The simultaneous execution of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities in 
Kosovo, was one of the primary reasons why the intervention in Kosovo was chosen 
as a case study for assessing the feasibility of successfully implementing the concept 
of DPMs – which is based on the integration and simultaneous execution of 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes.  The aim of this chapter is thus to 
analyse the approach to and nature of the intervention, as well as to assess the results 
and impact of the international response to the crisis in Kosovo.  The analysis also 
addresses the course of events that led up to the intervention that took place in 
Kosovo, as well as an analysis of the experiences gained from the intervention that 
could be used to inform future peace missions – specifically in terms of the 
feasibility and requirements for successfully implementing the concept of DPMs 
during humanitarian or peace interventions. 
 
4.2. The background to the conflict and NATO intervention 
 
Kosovo is a territory with a long history of contested and ambiguous status, and a 
history of coexistence – sometimes peaceful, sometimes violent – between a variety 
of ethnic, linguistic and religious groups of people (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:7).  
The territory of Kosovo covers an area of about 11 000 square km with a population 
of 2 million.  The ethnic composition of the population is made up of 88% Albanian, 
7 % Serb and 5 % others, mainly Slavic Muslim (1,9%), Roma (1,7%) and Turkish 
(1%).  Over 60% of the population live in rural areas (World Bank, 2005). 
 
The widespread conflict that erupted in Kosovo during the 1990s caught many of the 
primary role-players in Europe, as well as the international community, off-guard.  
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Although the confrontation between the Albanian leadership and the Serbian regime 
had been simmering throughout the 1990‟s, most Western policy-makers were 
caught unprepared when the conflict erupted (Troebst, 2003:xiii). 
 
The decision to intervene in the conflict or not, was thrust upon Western decision-
makers in 1998 when the escalating conflict between the Yugoslav security forces 
(Serbs) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (Albanian) threatened to develop 
into a full-fledged war.  This escalation opened the window of opportunity for 
international mediation, but Kosovo‟s neighbours, as well as the rest of the 
international community, was slow to take the initiative.  When the EU failed to act 
upon the urgent appeal by the European Parliament of 18 April 1996 to open a 
permanent office in Pristina, the USA did.  Various other international role-players, 
(Russia, France, Germany, Italy and Great Britain) subsequently indicated that they 
were also prepared to intervene, as the American involvement in the mediation 
process raised the stakes for other Western governments (Troebst, 2003:xiii). 
 
Despite the momentum that had been brought about by the beginning of the 
internationalisation of the conflict, the international community did not follow up 
the momentum by means of any action for more than a year.  Instead, the diplomatic 
formula of „deep concern‟ was coined and stereotypically repeated.  Many political 
commentators remarked that „concern is not a policy‟ and when the situation 
escalated again in the fall of 1997, it was too late for therapeutic conflict 
intervention or any type of conflict prevention at all (International Helsinki 
Federation, 1998:3).  “By early 1998, both sides to the conflict were determined to 
solve it by violent means.  The relatively low intensity war of 1998 “turned out to be 
the „1st Act‟ of a much fiercer „Act Two‟ in 1999 when both sides applied an all-or-
nothing strategy:  Slobodan Milosevic supported the total ethnic cleansing of 
Albanians from Kosovo, whilst the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) applied the 
high risk tactic of provoking a superior military adversary to over-react: which 
would subsequently trigger international outrage and military intervention on their 
behalf” (Troebst, 2003:xiii).  This strategy proved to be successful – some 10 000 
civilians and combatants were killed and up to 900 000 Kosovar Albanians were 
temporarily displaced (Troebst, 2003:xiv). 
 
4.2.1. Reasons for the conflict: A Serbian perspective 
 
The crisis in Kosovo was rooted in a centuries-long history of Balkan strife.  The 
Serbs settled in Kosovo during the 7th and 10th century (Ilic, 1995:2).  They were 
mainly crop farmers and thus inhabited only the plains and river valleys of present-
day Albania – leaving the mountains to the early Balkan shepherds – the Vlachs and 
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the ancestors of modern Albanians.  Kosovo was subsequently incorporated into the 
Serbian medieval empire in the 12th century and by this time Kosovo was known as 
the „heart of Serbia‟ – the state, economic and cultural centre of the Serbian nation 
(Bieber and Daskalovski, 2003:15).  However, by 1385, the Serbian medieval 
empire was mostly broken into pieces – falling under Turkish domination.  Serbia 
itself, much divided among feudal lords, clashed with the Ottoman armies at the 
battle of Kosovo Polje on 28 June 1389 in a battle that is described by Serbians as 
the battle which “of all Kosovo battles is the only one that counts in the formation of 
the psyche of a Serb” (Dragnich and Todorovic, 1984:3).  Thus, for some Serbian 
historians “Kosovo is not a myth, but an historical idea, which helps a nation to 
forge a link with its real historical past” (Bieber and Daskalovski, 2003:15).  For the 
Serbs, the legend of the „lost Kosovo‟, regardless of how it actually happened was 
another indispensable factor that kept the Serbian national consciousness alive and 
contributed to the successful end of the struggle for independence (Djordjevic, 
1992:18). 
 
After Joseph Tito‟s death in 1980, the manifestation of Albanian nationalism 
became more frequent and many Albanians assaulted Serbs and attacked property 
(Daskalovski, 2003:17).  A pattern was emerging – that of systematic pressure on 
the Serbs and Montenegrins to leave Kosovo, to sell everything they owned and 
leave for Serbia  (Dragnich and Todorovic, 1984:24).  The percentage of the Serbs 
in Kosovo fell from 23,6% in 1961 to 13,2% in 1981 (Daskalovski, 2003:17).  These 
secessionist tendencies of the Albanian population culminated in the „March Riots‟ 
in 1981 and the central message of these mass protests was the demand for Kosovo 
to firstly become a republic of Yugoslavia and finally to achieve unification with the 
mother-state of Albania.  As a result of the riots, a state of emergency was declared 
and the Yugoslav People‟s Army had to crush the revolt and restore order 
(Daskalovski, 2003:17). 
 
Serbian historians claim that by 1990, some 400 000 Serbs had been forced to leave 
Kosovo during the period 1970 to 1990.  The plight of the Serbs were ignored by the 
federal government and as a result, resentment for the state that could not and did 
not want to protect its own citizens was rising.  This created an atmosphere that was 
conducive to the rise of Serbian nationalism (Daskalovski, 2003:17).  Slobodan 
Milosovic, an emerging figure on the political scene, used these emotions to gain 
political power.  Milosevic supported what most of the Serbian people wished for: 
the centralisation of the Serbian Republic. 
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4.2.2 Reasons for the conflict: A Kosovo-Albanian perspective 
 
From an Albanian perspective, the ethnic and cultural continuity between the early 
Illyrians and medieval Albanians is a legitimate and well-established fact.  The 
Albanians are quick to point out that the Serbs only showed their presence in the 
area only from the 12th century and onward – whereas the Albanians were in the 
region long before that (Stipcevic, 2002:1).  The Albanians believe that the aim of 
the Serbs was to occupy the land of the Illyrians-Albanians and view the presence of 
the Serbs in Kosovo not as „liberation‟ of the Serb lands, but as an annexation and 
occupation of Albanian territories (Pulaha, 1997:2).   
 
After World War II, the Albanians of Kosovo and other parts of Yugoslavia were 
prevented from uniting with Albania.  Due to the persecutions, terror, violence and 
genocide inflicted on them, many Albanians, between 3 000 and 4 000 people, were 
forced to flee abroad.  At the end of January 1953, the President of Yugoslavia, 
Joseph Tito, and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Fuad Kuprili, bowed for a 
gentlemen‟s agreement between Yugoslavia and Turkey: the agreement provided for 
the expatriation of Kosovar Albanians to Turkey and indeed, more than 400 000 
Albanians were forced to leave their homes and emigrate to Turkey between 1950 
and 1966.  Serbian domination of the Kosovo province continued after 1966, despite 
Yugoslavia‟s constitutional changes in 1974 that upgraded the status of Kosovo into 
autonomy (Daskalovski, 2003:20). 
 
Under Milosevic, Serbia wanted to change its constitution and abolish Kosovo 
authority.  The Albanians of Kosovo did not accept these proposals for abolishment 
of their autonomy, and in fact, advocated its expansion (Dragnich and Todorovic, 
1984:47).  However, on 23 March 1989, the then President of the Assembly of 
Kosovoa (a Serb), proclaimed the approval of the constitutional amendments 
without public discussion or consultation.  At the time of the voting for the Serbian 
constitutional changes, tanks, military police and members of the secret police 
surrounded the building of the Assembly of Kosovo.  Thus, many view the 
constitutional changes that were approved on 28 March 1989, as illegal 
(Daskalovski, 2003:21). 
 
Despite the repressive regime in the 1990s, the struggle against the Serbian 
occupation continued.  After the Dayton Agreement in 1995, radical Kosovar 
Albanians started to advocate a military solution to their demands.  They were 
disappointed with the slow pace of their community‟s struggle for independence and 
in early 1997 they subsequently started an armed rebellion against the institutions of 
the Serbian state.  The conflict lead to the loss of about 2 000 lives and created 
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thousands of refugees that poured into Albania and Macedonia and caused 
unprecedented material damage (Daskalovski, 2003:21). 
 
4.3. The road to war 
 
Bieber and Daskalovski (2003:xiii) point out that the Dayton Peace Agreement 
neglected to adequately address the Kosovo issue.  The first assassination attempts 
on Serbian army and police officers in April 1996 by militant Kosovar Albanian 
groups immediately raised the levels of frustration among the ethnic groups, which 
subsequently led to widespread outbreaks of violence.  The “moderate leadership of 
Fehmi Agani and Ibrahim Rugova‟s pacifist Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), 
was not able to contain the situation” (Troebst, 2003:xiii). 
 
The causes of the conflict in Kosovo were complex, and the implications of the 
conflict were broad and impacted upon many role-players.  Despite the fact that the 
methodology of the war-fighting significantly shaped the ultimate outcome of the 
NATO intervention, the Kosovo War ultimately did not exhaust itself in military 
terms.  In fact, the NATO military intervention was only partially successful in 
halting the suffering of the Kosovar Albanians (Troebst, 2003:xiii).  Approximately 
1 000 000 Albanians had become refugees and about 10 000 had lost their lives by 
the time that the Yugoslav troops withdrew.  In addition, “NATO and the Kosovo 
International Security Forces (KFOR) were unable to stop Albanian retaliations 
against the Serbs and by the end of 1999, only 50% of the original 200 000 Serbs 
remained in Kosovo” (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000:97). 
 
The difficulties that the international community experienced in formulating and 
implementing a consistent and effective policy approach towards the conflict in 
Kosovo can be ascribed to the complex nature of the reasons for the conflict.  The 
causes of the conflict could be found within Kosovo, as a land-locked country itself, 
within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, within the wider region, as well as 
within the complex framework of relations between the main actors in the 
international arena.  From the onset, the combination of these factors limited the 
range of possible policies, resulting in international governmental actors failing, 
individually and collectively, to prevent and effectively settle the conflict (Wolff, 
2003:80).  For all these reasons, Kosovo serves as an important example to illustrate 
the ambiguities of humanitarian intervention and its wide-ranging implications for 
peace and political stability, as well as sustainable economic development. 
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4.4. Air War in Kosovo: the military contribution to the intervention 
 
As mentioned before, NATO‟s Air War for Kosovo received widespread reaction 
and has been the origin of many discourses as to how it has impacted on war-
fighting in general, as well as in terms of the role and contribution of the military 
component during peace missions and humanitarian interventions.  After the failure 
of the last-ditch negotiation in Rambouillet, near Paris, NATO began a 78-day 
bombing campaign against Yugoslavia.  NATO, led by the USA, conducted the Air 
War against the government of Yugoslavia and its elected president, Slobodan 
Milosevic, in an effort to halt and reverse the human rights abuses that were 
committed by armed Serbs against the ethnic Albanian majority living in 
Yugoslavia‟s Serbian province of Kosovo (Lambeth, 2001:v).  The NATO campaign 
was finally suspended on 10 June 1999 (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:10). 
 
NATO has presented Operation Allied Force as a success for two reasons. Firstly, 
the refugees and displaced persons have returned to Kosovo, which was one of the 
objectives that the international community wanted NATO‟s air campaign to 
achieve.  Secondly, there is peace, or at least an absence of large-scale violence, 
which was NATO‟s overall objective after the war.  But NATO‟s overall success is 
doubtful, not only because it took 78 days for the Kosovo war to end which, for the 
world‟s strongest military alliance pitted against a relatively insignificant military 
opponent, is a very long period, but also because many of the objectives that it set 
out to achieve, were not achieved by the time the military activities were halted 
(Cohen and Shelton, 2000:126). 
 
Despite several shortcomings, Operation Allied Force was ultimately deemed a 
military success, as Milosevic was defeated and an end was brought to the Serbian 
ethnic cleansing campaign (Operation Horseshoe – Potkova) that was aimed at 
forcing the Albanians out of Kosovo (Lambeth, 2001:68).   However, although many 
analysts insist that Milosevic‟s capitulation can be ascribed to the Air War alone, 
there is ample reason to be wary of any intimation that NATO‟s use of air power 
produced this ending, without any significant contributions by other factors 
(Lambeth, 2001:68).  These „other‟ factors include the fact that NATO, despite 
severe criticism by the international community, remained unified in its efforts; the 
fact that Russia joined hands with NATO in the diplomatic end game; as well as the 
fact that the Alliance began to develop a credible threat of a ground invasion 
(Lambeth, 2001:69).  The combination of all of these factors contributed to the 
creation of an end state in which Milosevic was unable to find doors through which 
he could escape. 
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Ultimately, the bombing had two primary determining effects: “firstly, it convinced 
Milosevic that NATO not only would not relent, but that it was determined to 
prevail and had both the technical and political wherewithal to do so.  Secondly, 
given the incapacity of the Serbian Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) to shoot 
down significant numbers of Allied aircraft, it further convinced him (Milosevic) 
that his own defeat sooner or later was inevitable” (Hedges, 1999).  NATO finally 
showed that it would not be moved by the public outcry over collateral damage and 
could sustain the bombing indefinitely, at a negligible cost in terms of friendly 
losses (Lambeth, 2001:84). 
 
In order to make any judgement on the military successes or failures of the NATO 
intervention, the „cost of actions‟ (sins of commission) should be measured against 
the „costs of inaction‟ (sins of omission) (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:9).  If one is to 
judge the operation by the criteria of human cost only, the death toll as a result of 
Operation Allied Force cannot be compared to the losses incurred with the 10-year 
long Serbian rule in Kosovo.  While the death toll incurred by NATO varied 
between 500 and 2000 mainly Serbian military personnel, the toll of the last year of 
Serbian rule in Kosovo is estimated to amount over 10 000 victims of which the vast 
majority were civilians (Malazogu, 2003:125).  However, Human Rights Watch 
estimated that about 500 civilians were killed by NATO‟s bombing campaign 
(Llamazares and Levy, 2003:9).  On the other hand, as far as refugees and displaced 
people are concerned, the opposite result was achieved:  the Serbian military 
repression displaced up to 300 000 Albanians from their homes, whereas the NATO 
air campaign that started on 24 March 1999, was accompanied by escalating 
violence and a large refugee outflow that included organised expulsions.  Within 
nine weeks of the beginning of the air strikes, nearly 860 000 Kosovar Albanians 
fled or were expelled to Albania (444 600), Macedonia (344 500) and Montenegro 
(69 900) by the Serb forces (UNHCR, 2002). 
 
In terms of the impact that it had on the economy in Kosovo, the results of the Air 
War were devastating.  By the time that Operation Allied Force was launched, the 
nation‟s economy had already been weakened by almost four years of international 
sanctions imposed for Serbia‟s earlier role in the war in Bosnia.  By the time the 
Allied Force had reached its halfway point, the bombing of infrastructure targets had 
halved the remainder of Yugoslavia‟s economic output and deprived more than 100 
000 civilians of jobs.  Local economists reported that the effect was more damaging 
than that of the successive Nazi and Allied bombing of Yugoslavia during World 
War II, when the country was far more rural in its economic makeup (Lambeth, 
2001:42).  Mladjan Dinkic, a respected economist at Belgrade University who 
coordinated a group of economists from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
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the World Bank, called the results of the bombing an “economic catastrophe”, 
adding that, while the Serb population would not die of hunger, “our industrial base 
will be destroyed and the size of the economy cut in half” (Erlanger, 1999:23). 
 
Therefore, as far as the military component‟s contribution to finding a political 
solution to the humanitarian crises in Kosovo is concerned, the comparison between 
acting or not acting should be measured in terms of what would have resulted, had 
NATO not attacked.  Hundreds of thousand of refugees remained in the mountains 
of Kosovo without any food or health care whilst being chased by the Yugoslav 
Army and para-militaries.  The last 200 refugees who fled Kosovo, just one day 
before Milosevic signed the accord, were in the worst condition of all the refugees 
who had crossed the border until then (Malazogu, 2003:124).  Around 300 000 IDPs 
faced rapidly deteriorating circumstances, facing death, not only from the Yugoslav 
Army, but also from starvation, exhaustion and various diseases.  “By mid-2000, 
over 4 000 bodies had been recovered from the war and judging from the lists of 
missing people, at least 6 000 could be unaccounted for” (Malazogu, 2003:125). 
 
In terms of the military component‟s contribution to the peace process in Kosovo, it 
is still to be determined whether the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia ultimately 
contributed to finding a solution to the situation in Kosovo on a political, and or 
economic level.  Was it a positive contribution, or did it merely marginalise the 
opposition and created some deep suspicion towards Western policy?  Or, did this 
action, in fact, possibly delay the transition to democracy?  After the semi-
negotiated revolution of 5 October 2000, the main energy of the new authorities has 
been directed toward economic reconstruction and the political issue of Kosovo 
subsequently disappeared from the main political agenda in terms of Serbia.  In 
terms of addressing war crimes, the subject of determining who was responsible for 
the crimes in Kosovo, remained largely taboo and Serbian politicians have been 
reluctant to discuss the long-term relations between Serbia and Kosovo (Graham, 
2000). 
 
Operation Allied Force was the most intense and sustained military operation to 
have been conducted in Europe since the end of World War II.  It represented the 
first extended use of military force by NATO, as well as the first major combat 
operation conducted for humanitarian objectives against a state committing atrocities 
within its own borders.  Because of its size and cost (more than $3 billion), it turned 
out to be an unprecedented exercise in the discriminate use of force on a large scale 
(Graham, 2000). 
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Another factor that contributed to the significance of the intervention in Kosovo is 
the fact that the military component (KFOR) was deployed in unison with the 
civilian peacebuilding component (UNMIK).  The simultaneous deployment of 
UNMIK and KFOR in Kosovo emphasised the shift away from the traditional linear 
approach to UN peace missions, as peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities were 
carried out simultaneously, and not sequentially.  However, despite the scale and 
intensity of the intervention, Kosovo had not yet become a stable area by the end of 
the war.  The conflicts in its vicinity (even after the democratic changes in areas 
such as Presevo, Bujanoca, Medvedja and Macedonia), is evident of the continued 
instability of the region (Malazogu, 2003:129). 
 
It is therefore difficult to accurately define the successes or failures of the military 
component towards finding a solution to the political, economic and humanitarian 
crisis in Kosovo.  It is, however, important to understand that the military 
component contributed significantly to setting the scene for the signing of the 
ceasefire agreement, as contributing to the creation of a stable platform for the 
peacebuilding process in Kosovo – thereby emphasising the close relationship 
between security and development.  The chances of successfully embarking on the 
peacebuilding process were increased by the fact that peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding activities were conducted simultaneously – thus significantly 
shortening the „reconstruction gap‟ which, if not addressed in time, often leads to a 
resumption of large-scale violence as soon as the peacekeepers return to their 
respective troop contributing countries. 
 
4.5. The peace process in Kosovo 
 
It has already been explained that, before 1989, peacekeeping was essentially a 
military affair in terms of the nature of tasks and the composition of role-players.  
Currently, most contemporary multi-national peace processes are civilian operations 
with military and humanitarian components working closely together.  In Kosovo, 
the UN – in its own assessment – has taken up an undertaking that, for any 
international institution, is unprecedented in complexity and scope.  Moreover, no 
other missions have ever been designed in which other multi-lateral organisations 
are full partners under UN leadership (UNMIK and OSCE, 1999).  Neethling 
(2000:30) points out that, in this sense, peace missions should be regarded as 
political-diplomatic strategies being pursued by the international community or 
certain regional role-players.  He concludes that peace missions should be viewed as 
“long-term endeavours that aim at political and development solutions for the 
achievement of lasting peace”.  This argument is in line with the White Paper on 
South African Participation in International Peace Missions, which asserts that 
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“peacebuilding includes activities such as the identification and support of measures 
and structures that will promote peace, build trust and facilitate conflict resolution to 
prevent a relapse into conflict” (DFA, 1999:10). 
 
4.6. Undertaking peacebuilding in Kosovo 
 
The intervention in Kosovo heralded the general change in approach to peace 
missions in which newly formulated international ideas about reconstruction and 
stabilisation of post-war societies were tested for the first time.  The simultaneous 
deployment of UNMIK and KFOR emphasised the shift away from the traditional 
linear approach to UN peace missions, as peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities 
were carried out simultaneously, and not sequentially.  This approach is in line with 
the concept of DPMs, which is based on the integration of the planning processes 
regarding peacekeeping and peacebuilding.  The intervention in Kosovo also 
accorded with other critical success factors relating to DPMs, namely the fusion of 
development and security imperatives into a holistic system that addresses the full 
range of inter-related issues that threaten peace and security.  It furthermore 
complied with another critical success factor for the successful implementation of 
DPMs in that all the role-players established a clear understanding of the reinforcing 
processes that originally gave rise to the conflict in Kosovo and the fact that the 
various stakeholders and role-players who were involved in the overall mission plan 
worked together under a common strategic framework.  To this effect, both KFOR 
and UNMIK successfully carried out their respective parts as part of the overall 
plan. 
 
4.6.1. Role of KFOR 
 
The peace process in Kosovo commenced on 10 June 1999 after Operation Allied 
Force was terminated (Lambeth, 2001:v).  In addition to the international civil 
presence in Kosovo, the UN, in terms of the UNSC Resolution 1244 of 1999, 
decided that NATO and Russia would integrate their forces into an international 
security presence in Kosovo, known as KFOR.  Thus began „Operation Joint 
Guardian‟ – a development that promised to be a new phase in the international 
community‟s involvement in Kosovo (Fursdon, 1999:24; UN, 1999).  Within days 
of the arrival of the first contingents of the 40 000 strong KFOR, tens of thousand of 
refugees started to head home (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:10).  The primary 
responsibilities of KFOR, in terms of the UN Resolution 1244 (1999), included the 
following (UN, 1999): 
 
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Supplementa 3, 2009. doi: 10.5787/0-0-75
 96    
 deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary, enforcing 
a cease-fire and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into 
Kosovo of the Yugoslav military force; 
 demilitarising the KLA and other Kosovar Albanian groups; 
 establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons 
could return home in safety and humanitarian aid could be delivered; 
 ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence could 
take responsibility for this task; 
 supervising de-mining until the international civil presence could take 
responsibility for this task; 
 supporting, where appropriate and co-ordinating closely with the work of 
the international civil presence; 
 conducting border monitoring duties as required; and 
 ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of the force itself, the 
international civil presence and other IGOs. 
 
Neethling (2002:30) summates, in view of the above, that KFOR‟s immediate task 
was to conduct robust peacekeeping activities in the peace process in order to 
combat the violence that had become so prevalent in Kosovo.  Ultimately, KFOR‟s 
role was also to create the conditions necessary for the rebuilding of Kosovo and to 
assist in the establishment of a democratic and legitimate political dispensation 
(Fursdon, 1999:24). 
 
As KFOR advanced, thousands of Serb civilians fled Kosovo and many Serbs who 
stayed in the province along with minorities such as Roma, who were suspected of 
being collaborators, became the targets of revenge attacks.  After the summer of 
1999, only about half of the pre-war Serb population of 200 000 people remained in 
Kosovo, isolated in KFOR-guarded enclaves (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:11). 
 
4.6.2. Role of UNMIK 
 
The UNSC, through Resolution 1244 of 1999, authorised the UNSG to establish an 
international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration 
under which the people of the province could enjoy substantial autonomy.  To this 
extent, UNMIK was formally approved on 10 June 1999.  UNMIK was therefore 
handed the task of building institutions of democratic self-governance in Kosovo 
while administering the territory in the interim (UN, 1999).  In effect, the UNSC 
vested authority over the territory and the people of Kosovo in UNMIK.  The 
Special Representative of the UNSG (SRSG) was appointed as the highest 
international civilian official in Kosovo and as the head of UNMIK in order to 
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facilitate the political process designed to determine Kosovo‟s future status (Annan, 
1999a).  In what constituted a fairly non-democratic form of governance, the SRSG 
effectively holds a veto power over all the provisional institutions of self-
governance, whether they have been established by the international administration 
or elected by the people of Kosovo (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:11).  In terms of 
Resolution 1244, the primary responsibilities of UNMIK were to: 
 
 promote the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial 
autonomy and self-government in Kosovo; 
 perform basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as 
required; 
 organise and monitor the development of provisional institutions for 
democratic and autonomous self-government, pending a political 
settlement, including the holding of elections; 
 support the consolidation of Kosovo‟s local provisional institutions and 
other peacebuilding activities; 
 facilitate a political process designed to determine Kosovo‟s future status; 
 oversee the transfer of authority from Kosovo‟s provisional institutions to 
institutions established under a political settlement; 
 support the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic 
reconstruction; 
 support, in conjunction with international humanitarian organisations, 
humanitarian and disaster relief aid; 
 maintain civil law and order, including the rebuilding of the local police 
forces, and the interim deployment of international police personnel to 
serve in Kosovo; 
 protect and promote human rights; and 
 assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons 
to their homes in Kosovo. 
 
In view of the above, it is evident that the situation regarding the role of the military 
in peace missions has changed significantly.  Whereas peacekeeping was primarily a 
military affair before 1989, most current peace missions are led by a civilian 
representative of an international organisation – most commonly a SRSG, supported 
by an experienced staff component.  As a result, a large number of civilians are 
normally engaged in a wide range of responsibilities in support of the broad political 
objectives of peace processes.  One of the most significant features of the peace 
process in Kosovo was the joint, but in fact, separate international civil and security 
components under UN leadership in the area (Neethling, 2000:36).  The co-
ordination and liaison between UNMIK and KFOR were essential to the overall 
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success of the peace process.  To this effect, UNMIK and KFOR have, since the 
beginning of their activities, worked towards the establishment of a close working 
relationship and have put a comprehensive structure of co-ordination mechanisms in 
place.  This commitment lies at the centre of the concept of DPMs and the respective 
contributions of KFOR and UNMIK showed that DPMs could, in fact, be 
successfully implemented.  A plethora of NGOs also committed personnel and 
resources to meet the relief needs of the people of Kosovo in the immediate 
aftermath of the conflict.  These organisations all received vital support and 
protection from KFOR.  In this regard, specifically human rights monitors worked 
closely with KFOR on actions to protect and promote human rights (Annan, 1999a).  
Ultimately, it has become clear that peace missions have evolved from being an 
essentially military affair and developed into a complex, integrated, holistic 
endeavour, involving role-players from the security, as well as the civilian sector 
involved in the intervention. 
 
A high premium was thus placed on efforts to ensure that the civil and security 
components in Kosovo act in a fully integrated manner and work towards a single 
goal.  Accordingly, the UNSG reported in a letter to the president of the UNSC, 
dated 8 July 1999, that: “KFOR continues to provide a secure environment and is 
establishing coordination mechanisms with UNMIK” (Annan, 1999a).  The UN 
involvement in Kosovo is a clear case of how multi-functional peace processes are 
currently being managed and perceived (Neethling, 2000:32).   
 
The SRSG in Kosovo, Dr Bernard Koucher, arrived at Pristina on 13 June 1999 – a 
day after the initial deployment of KFOR.  UNMIK and other partner organisations 
such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) decided 
to categorise tasks and activities into four main components (Annan, 1999a): 
 
 a civil administration component; 
 an institution-building component; 
 a humanitarian component; and 
 a reconstruction component. 
 
4.6.2.1. Civil administration component 
  
The civil administration component was tasked to establish the multi-ethnic 
governmental structures that were needed for the sustainable delivery of public 
services.  To this effect, the UN mandated UNMIK on 10 June 1999 to begin the 
long process of building peace, democracy and self-government in Kosovo.  To 
achieve this goal, UNMIK acted as the transitional administration for the region.  
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UNMIK representatives worked closely with Kosovo‟s leaders and citizens and the 
mission performed a whole spectrum of essential administrative functions and 
services, covering aspects such as health and education, banking and finance, post 
and telecommunications and law and order.  UNMIK set up a regional structure with 
five Regional Administrators and 30 Municipal Administrators.  It established 
central departments to administer public services (education, health, garbage 
collection, etc), which were subsequently converted into Kosovo-wide 
administrative departments in the Joint Interim Administrative Structure.  One key 
department, the Central Fiscal Authority prepared the Kosovo Consolidated Budget.  
The police department was tasked to define UNMIK‟s law and order strategy in 
Kosovo in accordance with two main goals: the provision of interim law 
enforcement services and the rapid deployment of a credible, professional and 
impartial Kosovo Police Service (Annan, 1999a).  The internationally recruited 
UNMIK Police, later in conjunction with the newly founded Kosovo Police Service, 
sought to maintain law and order.  A Kosovo Protection Corps was created to 
provide emergency response and reconstruction services.  This Corps absorbed some 
of the manpower of the former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which had 
meanwhile been disarmed and demilitarised under the supervision of KFOR.  In 
addition to the above, a judicial affairs department was established in the context of 
the urgent need to build genuine rule of law in Kosovo, including the immediate 
establishment of an independent, impartial and multi-party judiciary (Neethling, 
2000:32). 
 
4.6.2.2. Institution-building component 
 
The institution-building component was tasked to strengthen and enhance the 
capacity of local and central institutions and civil society organisations, as well as 
the promotion of democracy, good governance and respect for human rights – 
especially in a country where intolerance among ethnic minority groups have 
resulted in the deaths of thousands.  This also entailed the organisation and 
management of elections (Pula, 2003:208).  In addition to the latter, UNMIK was 
tasked to undertake programmes to facilitate the conditions that would be conducive 
to political diversity and a healthy democratic political climate.  UNMIK was also 
tasked to promote the emergence of independent media in Kosovo, as well as the 
establishment of a broad-based media culture that is based on democratic principles 
(Pula, 2003:207). 
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4.6.2.3. Humanitarian component 
 
The humanitarian component of UNMIK was placed under the leadership of the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and humanitarian assistance and de-
mining activities were listed as special tasks of this component.  The primary aim of 
the humanitarian assistance component was to ensure the provision of adequate 
shelter, food, water and medical assistance to meet the needs of internally displaced 
persons and the growing number of people returning to Kosovo (Annan, 1999a).  All 
refugees and displaced persons from Kosovo had the right to return to their property 
and personal possessions.  The competent institutions in Kosovo were tasked to take 
all measures necessary to facilitate the safe return of refugees and displaced persons 
to Kosovo and to co-operate fully with all efforts by the UNHCR and other 
international and local NGOs concerning the return of refugees and displaced 
persons (UNMIK and OSCE, 1999:4).  Humanitarian programmes were also aimed 
at targeting urgent and essential infrastructure repairs and short-term rebuilding 
efforts (Neethling, 2000:33). 
 
4.6.2.4. Reconstruction component 
 
The reconstruction component was tasked to promote peace and prosperity in 
Kosovo and to facilitate the development of a sustainable economy in Kosovo.  It 
was decided that the EU would manage the reconstruction component of the mission 
(Annan, 1999a).  As a consequence of its role within the Stability Pact and within 
UNMIK, where it was in charge of the economic sector, the EU had a central 
responsibility in the reconstruction and development of Kosovo, as well as the 
region as a whole. 
 
The EU was the single biggest donor of assistance for reconstruction.  In 1999, the 
EU, not counting the bi-lateral contributions by its member states, provided a total of 
€505 million for people throughout the region affected by the Kosovo intervention 
(Muguruza, 2003:245).  The financial allocation for the period 2000 to 2006 was 
envisaged to be €5,5 billion for the region.  If one is to include the €6 billion in pre-
accession assistance for Romania and Bulgaria, the assistance to south-eastern 
Europe amounts to a total of €11,5 billion.  The primary functions of this component 
included the planning and reconstruction of the infrastructure in Kosovo, as well as 
the planning, development and evaluation of policies pertaining to economic, social 
and financial fields and to co-ordinate between various donors and international 
financial institutions in order to ensure that all financial assistance was directed in 
accordance with the planned priorities (Neethling, 2000:34).  The EU took the lead in 
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the funding and reconstruction activities in Kosovo.  The EU provided about 70% of 
all reconstruction assistance. 
 
The EU also set up a European Agency for Reconstruction to respond to urgent needs 
for special measures to tackle the post-war-reconstruction.  This agency was tasked 
to enhance the effectiveness, speed and visibility of European operations, allowing 
them to be both decentralised and closely coordinated with UNMIK.  In addition to 
the comprehensive public reconstruction programme, so as to better target donor 
resources in support of the mission‟s priorities for reconstruction, the EU presented 
an ambitious plan for privatising Kosovo‟s medium and large-scale enterprises and 
for introducing the legal underpinnings and need for a market economy (Muguruza, 
2003:245).  The EU‟s expected contribution for the period 2000 to 2006 represented 
over half of the World Bank assessment of what was still required.  However, these 
statistics only reflect the contribution of the EU and does not include contributions 
by member states.  Independent evaluations predicted that some €26 billion would 
be required over a period of four years, and that, in the long run, about €79 billion 
should be envisaged for a period of 12 years (Vukadinovic, 2000:151).  “If the EU 
wants to bridge the gap between rhetoric and reality, the member states should 
contribute at least the same amount” (Muguruza, 2003:247).  The high costs listed 
above, emphasise the fact that, in the event that there is political will or a decision to 
intervene, this decision must be sustained by the resources to enforce the decision to 
intervene.  In short: the capability and the willingness to act should to be matched 
with adequate resources. 
 
4.7 Role of international and local NGOs 
 
NGOs played a pivotal role during the intervention in Kosovo.  In fact, international 
NGOs and local NGOs faced a daunting task in the aftermath of the NATO 
intervention.  The war had a devastating effect on the infrastructure of a province 
already damaged by years of under investment and conflict.  About 500 000 people 
lacked shelter in July 1999 (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:11).  More than 500 schools 
were in need of repair, the health care system, civil administration and the banking 
systems had collapsed.  Roads were in ruin, village wells had been deliberately 
polluted and there were no electricity, telephone or mail services.  The European 
Commission and the World Bank estimated that nearly $2,4 billion would be needed 
for preliminary reconstruction (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:11). 
 
UNMIK, as the leading structure of the international peacebuilding community in 
Kosovo, promulgated principles and guidelines that were applicable to all actors in 
the field.  The transmission of these principles and guidelines occurred by means of, 
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amongst other channels, a clear „chain of command‟ that connected policy-making 
offices at headquarters level with regional and municipal offices at local level 
(Llamazares and Levy, 2003:11).  The conceptualisation of peacebuilding strategies 
and aims was embedded into UNMIK‟s criteria for registration of NGOs as legal 
entities.  Strict guidelines regarding both management structures and decision-
making procedures had to be met by local NGOs to be legally recognised (UNMIK 
and OSCE, 1999). 
 
Most peacebuilding literature advocates local ownership of reconstruction processes, 
for both pragmatic and principled reasons.  Large (1997:157) argues that the unique 
resources that local actors bring to the process make it imperative that meaningful 
participation takes place.  She argues that a successful peacebuilding intervention 
should enable “indigenous leadership and activity rather than importing either 
expectations or packaged solutions”.  In this regard, local NGOs have attributes that 
distinguish them from their international counterparts, such as greater access to 
beneficiary communities and a deeper knowledge of the cultural and political 
setting.  However, in reality, when preparing funding proposals, local NGOs have to 
conform to international priorities and use similar terminology to their potential 
donor (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:19).  For example, the UNHCR‟s „Manual for 
Sustainable Return‟ sets out not just general principles, but very specific operational 
guidelines which all organisations wishing to be involved in returns must follow 
(UNMIK and UNHCR, 2003).  It seems that, although most international NGOs in 
Kosovo advocated participatory partnerships with local NGOs, “the power dynamics 
within these relationships means that international definitions of what kind of peace 
to build and how to go about it often prevail” (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:19). 
 
The inter-relationship between international NGOs and local NGOs often glosses 
over what remains an essentially unequal relationship, with a clear division of labour 
between the two categories of actors.  The methods and activities of IGOs are quite 
often pre-determined by their mandate and by their own donors (Llamazares and 
Levy, 2003:19).  Although local NGOs bring distinct attributes to the partnership, it 
is fair to say that most of the decisions about what projects to implement and how 
these projects must be managed ultimately rest with international donors.  “The 
rhetoric of partnership, capacity-building and empowerment often masks a 
relationship of dominance on the one hand and dependency on the other” 
(Llamazares and Levy, 2003:23).  Llamazares and Levy (2003:23) uses the 
metaphor of „colonisation‟ to describe the type of asymmetric symbolic and 
financial power relationship that sometimes characterises international−local NGO 
interaction.  This leads to “outcomes controlled by the international agencies‟ 
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frameworks, assumptions, meanings and practices” (Llamazares and Levy, 
2003:23). 
 
Although most international policy documents and agencies involved in 
peacebuilding agree that local NGOs should play a significant role in the 
peacebuilding processes, this “rhetoric is belied by the reality of the top-down 
imposition of a particular vision of peace.  Often, concerns such as coordination and 
cost effectiveness take precedence over principled approaches to peacebuilding” 
(Llamazares and Levy, 2003:24).  This means that the space for local definitions and 
contributions to peacebuilding is greatly reduced through the essentially 
disempowering partnerships between international NGOs and local NGOs. 
 
The funding frenzy that characterised the immediate aftermath of the war meant that 
many local NGOs emerged due to the demand of international NGOs rather than 
careful assessment of the real needs of their own communities.  Equally, the 
eventual withdrawal and reduction of donor funding for local NGOs was only 
partially reflective of the fulfilment of the needs of communities (Llamazares and 
Levy, 2003:24). 
 
The situation in Kosovo was marked by the strategic renegotiation of the 
relationships between all of the actors involved in peacebuilding – international and 
local, governmental and non-governmental.  The number of international NGOs 
involved in the peacebuilding in Kosovo was approximately 400, although this 
number subsequently decreased.  It was also estimated that the number of local 
NGOs (2 079) that were involved would also dramatically decrease as time passed, 
primarily due to international funds being cut or diverted to local government 
structures (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:24).  The dramatic reduction in direct 
funding for local NGOs from international donors led to the closure and scaling back 
of many NGO operations.  This caused a loss of income for many people formerly 
employed in the NGO sector, and this inevitably had negative knock-on effects in 
terms of local economic activity.  Ultimately, the transfer of funding and support 
from civil society actors to government structures redefined the social contract in 
Kosovo, as local NGOs were required to strengthen and complement, as opposed to 
substitute, local government service programmes (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:24). 
 
In order to effectively transfer peacebuilding in Kosovo from international NGOs to 
local NGOs and civil society, international NGOs were encouraged to network and 
build relationships among local NGOs through the diversification of local partners 
and encouragement of horizontal cooperation among them.  Local NGOs were 
encouraged to develop strong capacities for strategic analysis, planning and 
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evaluation in order to maintain their relevance.  Equally, NGOs were required to 
clearly define their mission and participatory mechanisms for incorporating 
feedback from their beneficiary community.  As the international community 
reduced its operational presence (including funding and personnel), co-operation 
among local organisations became increasingly important for effective programming 
in Kosovo. 
 
4.8. Experience gained from the deployment of NGOs in Kosovo 
 
International NGOs and local NGOs all played a vital role in laying the foundations 
for the road to peace and sustainable development in Kosovo.  It was evident from 
the start of peacebuilding activities that the NGOs were posturing themselves as 
vehicles for civil society to become involved in the peacebuilding activities from 
grassroots level – thus giving impetus to the notion of „peacebuilding from the 
bottom-up‟, rather than relying on frameworks that would be imposed upon civil 
society by external organisations and agencies.  This is in line with the general 
acceptance during the last two decades that civil society has a pivotal role to play in 
consolidating nation-building processes after protracted intra-state wars.  According 
to Mertus and Sajjad (2005:119), the space between the government and the people 
has been rapidly filled with institutions, organisations and movements with 
increasing legitimacy to voice the concerns of those outside the formal power 
structures.  In this regard, the focus is often on the development of NGOs, at times to 
the extent that the term „NGO‟ has often, erroneously, been equated with „civil 
society‟. As a result, grassroots organisations and other alternative forms of social 
arrangement are unfortunately squeezed out. 
 
In this climate, the measure of a healthy democracy has, to a great extent, implied 
NGO-centred infrastructure for elections and the establishment of a civil society 
network that challenges government and fills in the gaps in the provision of public 
services.  Civil society has hence emerged as a crucial component of democracies, 
and has been seen as one of the most essential elements for assisting a society in 
making the transition from conflict into the post-conflict state and consolidating 
peaceful politics.  However, although a healthy civil society is essential to the 
process of nation-building, states should be wary about the fact that a strong civil 
society and vibrant NGO sector has the potential to hinder, rather than enhance, 
civic nationalism, and thus to create a weak state.  This could occur when civil 
society in fact fails the project of nation-building through undercutting the 
legitimacy and the potency of new states.  Weak or failed states should take time to 
consolidate and build their own institutions and to gain legitimacy in the eyes of its 
constituents, rather than rushing the process by accepting and implementing the 
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continuing largely Western dictated formulas for functional and open societies 
(Mertus and Sajjad, 2005:119).     
 
If all goes well, the growth of civil society should support the development of strong 
state institutions, defined in terms of capacity (ability to devise policy and to see it 
through), autonomy (ability to act independently of local and international actors) 
and legitimacy (defined in terms of acceptability of processes and normative 
content) (Mertus and Sajjad, 2005:120).  However, experiences in Kosovo and 
Afghanistan have proven that the emergence of a strong civil society might indeed 
fail to support, and even in some cases, undercut state capacity, autonomy and 
legitimacy.  The problem lies in the fact that civil society is expected to take charge 
of the transformation processes and to transform overnight, despite the destruction, 
and to take the lead in the quest for social reconstruction.  However, many of the 
developmental frameworks provided by NGOs, do not take the socio-political 
nuances of specific societies into consideration, making the aims and end states of 
developmental frameworks largely unsustainable and impractical.  In this regard, 
some commentators point to the fact that: “stunted civil society can act as a causal 
factor in both war and reconstruction reform” (United States Institute for Peace, 
2002:97).  
 
To this effect, large amounts of development aid delivered over long periods have 
the potential to undermine good governance and the quality of state institutions in 
developing countries (Brautigam, 2002:90).  Donor agencies and foreign experts 
often take over many of the critical functions of governance: substituting their own 
goals for an absent leadership vision, using foreign experts and project management 
units in place of weak or decaying public institutions – to an extent humanitarian aid 
then becomes part of the problem, rather than the solution.  The „cycle of 
dependency‟ that emerges in post-conflict states as a consequence of foreign donors 
deciding and controlling agendas for local NGOs, creates a sharp division between 
the local populations and the well-intentional bodies designed to serve them (Mertus 
and Sajjad, 2005:123).  According to Bieber (2002:2) the „dependency trap‟ 
effectively reduces the potential of local grassroots NGOs by creating numerous 
incentives that are based on assessment of Western donors and less on local needs.  
Local organisations are constrained by the necessity of designing projects around 
changing donor agendas, rather that on the building of local constituencies (Bieber, 
2002:2). 
 
The tension between nation-building and civil society is pulling civil society in two 
directions.  One direction is guided by the international community‟s vision for a 
post-conflict society, whilst the other follows the aspirations of the constituents of 
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the society.  This would set the stage for possible fragmentation and cleavages 
within the new state.  One alternative would be for the international community to 
become better state builders and they could guard against the creation of dependency 
relationships and stop imposing western-orientated models, foreign priorities and 
outsider norms. Another alternative would be to temporarily stop endeavours to 
build a strong state.  They could engage in the kind of projects that are required to 
preserve the peace, such as building democratic institutions and quietly nurturing 
future leaders, but should refrain from taking the lead in nation-building endeavours.  
This would entail standing by and supporting a weak state, even when it falters from 
time to time, whilst it slowly finds its own way to establishing sustainable peace and 
development.  Ultimately, when evaluating the impact of civil society on the 
ultimate state building process, one should, rather than focusing on civil society‟s 
relationship with the state, study whether civil society supports the kind of local 
political processes that may be a component of an eventual strong and just state 
(Mertus and Sajjad, 2005:127). 
 
4.9. Role of regional organisations in the Kosovo peace process 
 
The peace process in Kosovo clearly shows that peacekeeping has moved beyond 
the traditional peacekeeping role of the UN, which previously entailed observing the 
parties to a conflict and ensuring that they abided by a negotiated truce.  It also bears 
testimony to the growing importance of regional organisations and alliances in 
international peace initiatives in the post-Cold War era.  Neethling (2002:3) points 
out that: “the ability of the UN to be successful in any peace process and especially 
in post-conflict reconstruction depends in no small measure on the extent of support 
rendered to the over-burdened UN by competent regional role-players”.  Therefore, 
the peace process in Kosovo cannot be seen in isolation from the dynamics of 
economic integration under the EU and its various institutions, and the fact that 
mutual trust has been built historically in that part of the world.  The peace process 
also drew on the support of a number of wealthy industrialised states that are 
members of NATO and the OSCE. 
 
The EU soon realised that Kosovo‟s problems should not be analysed or viewed in 
isolation from the region of which it forms part.  Faced with the emergency, the EU 
foresaw that: “a political solution to the Kosovo crises must be embedded in a 
determined effort, geared towards stabilizing the region as a whole” (Muguruza, 
2003:243).  The EU thus defined its overall objective in the western Balkans as 
being the fullest possible integration of the countries of the region into the political 
and economic mainstream of Europe.  This process entails the development of a 
stabilisation process of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of 
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Yugoslavia, Macedonia and Albania.  However, if success is to be achieved by the 
regional organisations involved in Kosovo, it is essential that political commitment 
be linked to regional cooperation and practical and financial support from the 
international community.  The capability and willingness to act, needs to be matched 
with adequate instruments.  The EU has, to a great extent, finally accepted its 
international responsibilities and has demonstrated the political will to act on behalf 
of the region.  In addition, the EU has the ability to provide adequate resources and 
finances to match its political will.  However, in the event that all these requirements 
are met, success in terms of Kosovo, will ultimately only be achieved when the 
cause of the current situation – the political solution to the independence of Kosovo 
– has finally been addressed (Muguruza, 2003:243). 
 
4.10. Experience gained from the intervention in Kosovo  
 
The experience in Kosovo emphasised the fact that situations involving armed 
conflict and humanitarian crises pose a twofold challenge for the international 
community.  Firstly, there is a growing duty to intervene and save lives and relieve 
the suffering and, secondly, there is a responsibility to assume the consequences of 
the intervention.  In short: the capability and the willingness to act needs to be 
matched with adequate instruments.  Secondly, these emergencies need to be 
addressed in a coherent manner with an appropriate mix of all available policy 
instruments (among others political, economic, social, legal, environmental and 
development measures).  Therefore, the provision of emergency aid must be 
combined with measures to protect human rights in conjunction with rehabilitation 
measures with long-term strategies that address the underlying causes of the 
emergency (Muguruza, 2003:248).  Despite several key issues that are yet to be 
effectively addressed to ensure sustainable peace and development in Kosovo, it is 
clear that “Kosovo has made significant progress in achieving substantial autonomy 
and self-government, as required under Resolution 1244 (1999)” (UNSC, 1999).  
There was, however, concern about the on-going inter-ethnic violence and lack of 
tolerance.  Major challenges in Kosovo had to be addressed, such as the 
strengthening of the rule of law, especially concerning improved security and 
freedom of movement for all.  The transfer of responsibilities from UNMIK to the 
Provincial Institutions also had to be completed.  Most Kosovars ranked the 
economy as their number one concern and unemployment was still running at 
approximately 57%.  On a positive side, the Euro provided for monetary stability 
and Kosovo had a balanced budget that relied on a functioning revenue-collection 
service (UNSC, 1999). 
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Some progress has been made in terms of the political situation in Kosovo, although 
many challenges have not been addressed.  In a report to the UNSC on 28 
September 2007, the UNSG reported that although the ongoing negotiations on the 
status of Kosovo continue to be at the centre of the political process in Kosovo, 
political parties and the population as a whole have become increasingly focused on 
elections.  After careful consultation with relevant stakeholders in Kosovo, 
representatives of the international community, as well as the OSCE, the start of 
technical preparations for elections in the Kosovo was authorised in Pristina on 16 
August 2007 (Ki-moon, 2007b).  After the election process, Kosovo declared 
independence on 16 February 2008. 
 
The NATO campaign against Serbia in March 1999, put the spotlight on the 
significance, maintenance and respect for state sovereignty on the one hand, and the 
international trend towards intolerance of human rights violations and limits of 
sovereignty on the other.  For many, the absence of a legitimating UN mandate for 
the NATO operation also raised the concern that militarily and economically 
powerful states could take arbitrary action against smaller and weaker states 
(Sidiropolous, 2001:xi).  The speed and cost of the NATO intervention in Kosovo 
reinforced this perception of an asymmetry in the West‟s priorities, as did the 
stationing of 45 500 UN troops in Kosovo. 
 
From the above, it is clear that one of the key problems in terms of humanitarian 
intervention is the dilemma of bridging the divide between the idealism of 
intervening to protect human rights with the reality of setting a framework or 
constant criteria that could be applied to achieve consensual multilateral support for 
humanitarian interventions – thus setting the standards for intervention and 
consistency.  “Without the latter, UN action is improbable, increasing the possibility 
of the formation of a „coalition of the willing‟, such as NATO in the Balkans, or 
even unilateral intervention” (Gumbi, 2001:8). 
 
According to Schnabel and Thakur (2001:31), the Air War for Kosovo essentially 
also taught us that violence pays.  They contend that: “non-violence does not pay, at 
least not in attracting international attention to one‟s plight” (Schnabel and Thakur, 
2001:31).  In addition, it was confirmed by the events of the Dayton Peace 
negotiations and the 1999 NATO operation that the international community cares 
and will only act if it is directly and negatively affected by the effects of internal 
conflict, including negative economic effects, refugee movements, environmental 
damage, military spill-overs and political embarrassment. In the absence of such 
direct negative consequences, the international community is unlikely to involve 
itself (Schnabel and Thakur, 2001:32). 
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Furthermore, the operation in Kosovo indicated that the focus of conflict 
management and prevention should also be on regional organisations and non-state 
actors, and not solely on state governments and the UN.  The case of Kosovo was 
too sensitive (because of its location, as well as its nature as a conflict over self-
determination) for concerted UN or UNSC action (Schnabel and Thakur, 2001:32).  
The UN is a good peacekeeper – when there is a solid and locally supported peace to 
be kept.  But ultimately, “the UN is not (and probably should not be) good at 
fighting wars.  If forceful intervention is required in some conflicts, the UN will 
have to delegate such tasks to regional organisations or ad hoc alliances of 
concerned states” (Schnabel and Thakur, 2001:32).  Otherwise, conflicts are left to 
themselves – or to virtually any interested party – with or without the blessing, 
control and monitoring of the UN. 
 
In Kosovo, the regional military organisation took the initiative to intervene and had 
the capability to do so.  In Africa, regional organisations do not have the same 
capacity as the EU and NATO.  As an example, in the absence of a strong case made 
by neighbouring states against the gross human rights violations in Rwanda, nothing 
was done (Sidiropoulos, 2001:xiii).  This emphasises the fact that whilst 
humanitarian interventions are presented as based on moral imperatives, these are 
always placed within a cost-benefit framework, taking into account the broader 
strategic interests (Sidiropoulos, 2001:xiv). 
 
On the whole, it has become evident during the last two decades that military 
interventions in countries where gross human rights violations are being/were 
committed, multi-lateral military intervention does/did not resolve problems or set 
the scene for sustainable development.  Military intervention might be required, but 
it is always an insufficient condition to achieve lasting peace with justice.  Indeed, 
the post-intervention experiences of NATO in Kosovo arguably indicate that 
multilateral intervention and occupation does not resolve problems.  This is very 
evident in the renewed outbreaks of violence that were experienced in Kosovo, when 
Kosovo declared its independence on 17 February 2008.  According to Gumbi 
(2001:8), this explains the call by some leaders to allow belligerents to „fight it out‟ 
to arrive at stable state structures.  This, however, is not only unacceptable from a 
humanitarian perspective, but also unlikely in a modern, media age in which the 
plight of people receives more attention than the fate of states.  Furthermore, the 
chances of progressing to the establishment of stable governmental structures and 
infrastructure will be extremely slim if belligerents are permitted to „fight it out‟ 
during protracted intra-state conflict. 
 
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Supplementa 3, 2009. doi: 10.5787/0-0-75
 110    
According to Gumbi (2001:9), the intervention in Kosovo also pointed to another 
fundamental issue that has to be addressed in terms of humanitarian interventions: 
the achievement of greater commitment to the notion of multilateral engagement 
through UN reform.  This issue focuses on the adoption of a multi-faceted and 
holistic approach to humanitarian interventions which not only focuses on 
security/military aspects, but which also addresses the economic, social, 
development and political aspects of peace missions. 
 
The activities of UNMIK and KFOR exemplified the new relationship that multi-
national peacekeeping has imposed on both civilian and military components in 
recent and current peacekeeping processes.  Contrary to cases where interaction 
between the military and civil components of UN missions was not good, UNMIK 
and KFOR were able to direct their focus and efforts towards one identified centre 
and ultimate end state.  Although they constituted two different operations that took 
place in the same country with different mandates, they were able to achieve 
synergy of efforts and activities (Neethling, 2000:38). 
 
The involvement of UNMIK and KFOR also illustrates the fact that peace processes 
should be viewed in a holistic sense, including simultaneous peacemaking and 
peacebuilding tasks.  All functions are supposed to be streamlined in a concerted and 
organised approach with the view of ensuring lasting stability and a desired political 
end state.  At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the normal military 
operational approaches are not geared to implement long-term developmental 
activities. 
 
Another lesson learned from Kosovo is that post-conflict peacebuilding is at least as 
important as the conflict management itself, as it constitutes second generation 
conflict prevention: the avoidance of the recurrence of past conflict.  Rebuilding a 
working legitimate judiciary, government, economy and society is a long-term effort 
that requires long-lasting commitment and action to settle a conflict (Schnabel and 
Thakur, 2001:33).  Despite the involvement of the UN and all major European 
regional organisations, UNMIK suffered from a lack of funding, equipment and 
supporting commitment by member states, despite the global attention that was 
brought to bear on the Kosovo conflict and the subsequent Stability Pact Summit in 
Sarajevo.  “Since post-conflict commitment quickly evaporates, local populations 
need to seize any post-conflict assistance they can get in order to take initiative, 
responsibility and ownership in rebuilding their war-torn societies” (Schnabel and 
Thakur, 2001:33). 
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Ultimately, one of the primary experiences gained from the NATO intervention in 
Kosovo, is that the „humanitarian intervention‟ has indeed resulted in some 
destructive consequences.  The by-passing of international and legal mechanisms, 
notably the UN, did not remove the deep socio-economic, inter-ethnic and other 
underlying factors that originally caused the conflict.  Moreover, such an 
intervention may in fact, disrupt the basis of intra- and inter-state relations 
(Chernomyrdin, 1999:139).  As a result, even after the cessation of hostilities, the 
prime problem of creating a lasting settlement was only partially addressed and 
many of the problems that initially caused the conflict, remain unresolved.  
Chernomyrdin (1999:139) emphasises that, “in the 21st century, solutions to 
international problems should be handled on a democratic and collective basis”.  He 
maintains that international peacemaking has to be conducted in strict conformity 
with the principles of the UN Charter.  This should also involve, under the aegis of 
the UN, active participation by regional and sub-regional organisations.   Any other 
method, including the use of concepts such as humanitarian intervention and limited 
sovereignty, is illegal and will continually threaten to destablise the system of 
international relations.  Chernomyrdin (1999:141) concludes that, if there is a need 
for a peace intervention, it should ultimately be conducted collectively and on the 
basis of the observance of the norms of the UN and international law. 
 
4.11. Conclusion 
 
The peace intervention in Kosovo sparked a worldwide debate regarding the issue of 
state sovereignty and what conditions or circumstances would legitimise 
intervention action.  The NATO campaign against Serbia in March 1999, without a 
legitimising UNSC mandate to do so, emphasised the tension between the 
sovereignty, independence and equality of individual states on the one hand, and the 
contemporary trend towards collective multinational intervention action in cases of 
egregious human suffering on the other. 
 
From the experience gained from the peace intervention in Kosovo, it is evident that, 
as long as UN standards and rules of engagement are followed in terms of how and 
when to intervene in humanitarian crises, regional organisations and groups of states 
or even single states have a crucial role to play in the provision of security.  
Therefore, although NATO‟s Air War might be questionable in the absence of a 
legitimising mandate, it points to the weakness of the UN in being unable to respond 
adequately and in time to humanitarian crises, which might compel regional 
organisations to take matters into their own hands as far as peace interventions are 
concerned.  There was thus a clear acknowledgement by all parties concerned that 
time was of the essence when embarking on peace missions and that peace 
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initiatives could not be halted until such time as the UN authorised an intervention.  
This commitment to timely action effectively addressed the reconstruction gap, 
which, according to the theoretical underpinnings of the concept of DPMs, so often 
causes a relapse to violence in communities where peace interventions are embarked 
upon.  In this regard, the peace intervention action by NATO was in accordance with 
one of the primary premises for the successful implementation of the concept of 
DPMs – thus proving that DPMs can provide a feasible solution or paradigm to 
humanitarian crises when resourceful role-players such as the UN and EU are 
prepared to make the required funds and resources available in support of peace 
interventions.   
 
In the case of Kosovo, the international community firstly correctly appreciated the 
fact that a successful intervention in Kosovo would be dependent on the timely 
deployment of peacekeepers, and secondly, the international community correctly 
decided to simultaneously deploy a military, as well as a civilian component to 
address the diverse challenges associated with peace interventions – thus bringing 
peacebuilding closer to peacekeeping.  These two decisions are in accordance with 
the theoretical underpinnings of the concept of DPMs and NATO successfully 
operationalised both these aspects during the intervention in Kosovo. 
 
In addition to the debate regarding the legitimacy of the peace intervention in 
Kosovo, NATO‟s Air War in Kosovo also received widespread reaction and has 
been the origin of many discourses as to how it has impacted on war-fighting in 
general, as well as in terms of the conduct of peace missions and humanitarian 
interventions.  Despite many criticisms regarding the operational and tactical 
effectiveness of the Air War, Operation Allied Force was presented as a success for 
two reasons: the refugees and displaced persons returned to Kosovo, and there is 
peace (or at least an absence of large-scale violence) – which was NATO‟s objective 
for the war.  The significance of the military component‟s role in the peace process 
in Kosovo, is to be found in the fact that the reconstruction phase commenced 
immediately after Operation Allied Force was concluded, and the fact that the 
military component (KFOR) and the civilian component (UNIMK) were deployed 
simultaneously.  The military and civilian components worked in unison in order to 
set the scene for sustained peace and development – thus effectively implementing 
the key success factors of DPMs by preventing the development of a reconstruction 
gap, which often leads to a resumption of conflict when peacebuilding activities are 
not rolled-out in time.  In this regard, it is evident that the concept of DPMs is a 
feasible concept for establishing the conditions for sustainable peace and 
development in a conflict-stricken state such as Kosovo. 
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Ultimately, the peace process in Kosovo clearly shows that international 
peacekeeping has moved beyond the traditional peacekeeping role of the UN.  It also 
bears testimony to the growing importance of regional organisations and alliances in 
international peace initiatives in the post-Cold War era – especially in the provision 
of funds and resources for peacebuilding initiatives.  Complex emergencies require 
multi-faceted responses and it implies acceptance of the fact that the military is but 
one of the participants in any particular peace process.  The intervention in Kosovo 
proved that the roles played by international, as well as local NGOs, are as important 
as those performed by the military component during peace interventions.  
Furthermore, the intervention in Kosovo bears testimony to the realisation that 
modern peace missions require an integrated systems-approach in order to 
effectively address the wide variety of inter-related issues that caused the conflict in 
the first place and that the capability and the willingness to act needs to be matched 
with adequate instruments in terms of funds and resources.  Most importantly, the 
peace process in Kosovo emphasises the fact that complex peace missions call for 
the rapid and simultaneous deployment of peacekeeping, as well as peacebuilding 
components – the essence of the philosophical and theoretical basis of the concept of 
DPMs.  In this regard, the intervention in Kosovo proved that the concept of DPMs 
can indeed be a feasible framework for establishing sustainable peace and 
development.  However, the experience in Kosovo also emphasised the fact that 
peace interventions must be supported by role-players that are able to provide the 
funds and resources required to successfully address all the aspects that constitute 
the DPMs construct.  
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CHAPTER 5: PEACE MISSIONS IN THE AFRICAN 
CONTEXT: SIERRA LEONE  
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Africa has faced and is still plagued by a multiplicity of „old‟ and „new‟ security 
challenges (Othieno and Samasuwo, 2007:26).  The problems are compounded by 
the fact that the “new challenges are nourished by the same „old‟ security problems” 
(Aning, 2007:1).  Both old and new security threats have been particularly prevalent 
in the regional security complexes of the Great Lakes, West Africa and the Horn of 
Africa.  The interconnected nature of these security challenges has made it very 
difficult for the UN to deploy successful peace missions.  The nature of these 
peacekeeping missions resulted in a shift away from traditional peacekeeping 
models to more complex models and approaches, especially the manner in which 
new missions are composed, funded driven or controlled and legitimised.  There has 
also been a shift to greater security cooperation and hybrid arrangements involving 
combinations of both regional and global powers, the UN, continental bodies such as 
the EU and AU, as well as regional economic communities (RECs) such as 
ECOWAS and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (Othieno 
and Samasuwo, 2007:26).  
 
In the light of the above-mentioned developments, the term „peacekeeping‟ has 
come to be used to describe almost the entire range of activities that can be carried 
out by international personnel.  According to Macqueen (2002:3), this variety of 
„peacekeeping‟ functions has probably found a broader application in Africa than in 
other parts of the world where UN military missions have been deployed.  These 
activities have ranged from discreet observation and monitoring carried out with the 
lightest of touches to the enforcement of outcomes by large, combat-figured forces. 
 
In order to understand peace missions on the African continent, it is essential to 
understand the factors and influences that shaped the continent.  According to 
Clapham (2000:29), in seeking to understand the international relations in Africa: 
 
It is helpful to start by looking at a map of the continent on which state 
boundaries do not appear, and which is not coloured – not in the 
patchwork of blocks demarcating the formal territories of individual states 
– but in shades which correspond to population density and forms of 
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economic activity, and to the patterns of altitude, rainfall and vegetation 
on which human life largely depends (Clapham, 2000:29).   
 
The link between poverty and conflict is complex, but indisputable.  This is evident 
in the fact that nearly all of the world‟s twenty poorest states have experienced 
violent conflict in the past few decades.  These violent conflicts usually materialise 
in the form of intra-state conflicts – a phenomenon that has plagued the world in the 
post-Cold War era.  In the light of the above, many proposals and frameworks have 
been suggested to find answers to this quest for greater peace and prosperity in 
Africa.  These proposed solutions are intended to effectively and holistically address 
the causes of conflicts by proposing realistic and achievable recommendations that 
would reduce or end ongoing conflicts, whilst at the same time creating conditions 
that would be conducive to sustainable development (Annan, 1998:1). 
 
In view of the above, the peace interventions in Sierra Leone and the DRC were 
chosen as case studies to determine the feasibility of successfully implementing the 
concept of DPMs in Africa.  These interventions were approached as peacekeeping 
operations that included simultaneous peacebuilding activities.  To this effect, the 
interventions were both conducted in accordance with the new approach to UN 
peace missions that was adopted in the early 1990‟s in which peacebuilding is 
brought “closer” to peacekeeping – thus effectively addressing the „reconstruction 
gap‟ which is so often presented as the cause or the reason for the relapse into 
violence in states that have been plagued by intra-state conflicts. 
 
With both interventions, the challenge for the UN, regional organisations and NGOs 
was how to transform the short-term presence of peacekeepers in these two countries 
into efforts essentially aimed at societal transformation.  As a result, the focus of the 
peacekeepers was to create an environment that would contribute to building 
sustainable peace, as opposed to merely providing security.  This approach brought 
security thinking and practice into close collaboration with development policies and 
initiatives. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the approach to and nature of the intervention in 
Sierra Leone, as well as to assess the nature of and impact of international and 
regional responses to the crises.  The analysis also addresses the course of events 
that led up to the interventions and includes an assessment of the experiences gained 
that could be used to inform future peace missions − specifically in terms of the 
feasibility and requirements for successfully implementing the concept of DPMs 
during UN peace initiatives on the African continent.  The focus of the analysis will 
be on the inter-relationship between UN peace initiatives in Africa and the concept 
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of DPMs.  This said, the conclusions and recommendations will thus have specific 
reference to the UN‟s peace initiatives in Africa, in as much as the concept of DPMs 
are concerned.  This said, it needs to be noted that conclusions on the peace 
initiatives of the AU in Burundi and Darfur, where the AU was the lead 
organisation, will most probably differ from UN peace initiatives, as the AU does 
not have the same level of access to peacebuilding resources.  In addition, 
authorisation for AU missions is most often based on different approaches and 
motivations than those of the UN. 
 
5.2. The background to the conflict in Sierra Leone 
 
The conflict in Sierra Leone resulted from a great variety of causes, which shaped 
the complex environment that fuelled the widespread violence that ravaged the 
country.  These include aspects such as the governmental corruption, the widespread 
corruption in the diamond industry, the deadly impact of Charles Taylor‟s influence 
in supporting the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the atrocities committed by the 
RUF against the peoples of Sierra Leone, the import of weapons from neighbouring 
countries, economic decline and wide-spread unemployment (Siler, 2004:xliv).   
 
Violence broke out in Sierra Leone in March 1991 when the Liberian warlord, 
Charles Taylor, provided weapons to a group of dissidents in Sierra Leone – 
allegedly in exchange for diamonds.  His motive was thus primarily based on 
economic motivation, or at least for economical and political reasons.  According to 
Macqueen (2002:224), the fundamental crisis in Sierra Leone was therefore not 
created by the disintegration of a central authority, as was the case in Liberia, but by 
the hopeless fragility of central authority in the face of the „warlord challenge‟.  In 
terms of the latter, Taylor argued that he launched the attacks to hit back at the 
government of Sierra Leone for allowing its territory to be used by Nigerian planes 
on bombing missions against his forces.  The violence continued for the next decade 
despite several regional attempts to broker a peace.  Despite efforts by the Nigerian-
led Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and a UN 
force, control could not be established over the rebels.  Members of the RUF 
continued with their reign of terror and were funded by the illegal trade in diamonds 
– known as blood diamonds (Macqueen, 2002:183).  Men, women and children were 
killed in a most brutal fashion, which reminded people of the genocide in Rwanda.  
Ultimately, the quest for political power by means of armed conflict, left this tiny 
West African country with a loss of 70 000 lives and thousands of amputees in the 
course of a decade (Abdulla, 2004:1).  In essence, Sierra Leone followed the classic 
pattern of current intra-state wars in that the most striking feature of these conflicts 
had been their impact on civilians, who had been both perpetrators and victims of 
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violence.  The conflict in Sierra Leone, as is the case in most African countries 
plagued by internal conflict, was also characterised by the total breakdown of state 
institutions, accompanied by vast human rights abuses and abject poverty. 
 
There are many reasons for the widespread violence that broke out in Sierra Leone.  
Members of all the major tribes in Sierra Leone took part in the civil war.  Sierra 
Leone has a population of 5,3 million people of which 60% are of Muslim faith and 
30% are Christians.  There are more than 17 tribes in Sierra Leone, of which the 
Temne and Mende tribes are pre-eminent – each comprising about 30% of the 
population.  When the conflict broke out, the Mende tribe was the dominant party in 
government (Malan et al, 2002:13).  Although the belligerent parties in the conflict 
contained members of all the major tribes in Sierra Leone, it would be wrong to 
classify the civil war in Sierra Leone as an ethnic conflict.  In this regard, it would 
be more correct to describe it as an “inter-generational conflict”, as it was primarily 
the unemployed and disaffected youth who had become increasingly alienated from 
an ageing and stagnant government who were at the forefront of the armed 
insurrection that took place in Sierra Leone.  Although the youth made up the 
majority of the belligerents, the whole population of Sierra Leone suffered as a 
result of the violence:  some 2,5 million people (nearly half the population) were 
made refugees or became internally displaced as a result of the violence, and an 
estimated 27 000 children were enlisted as combatants in the war which resulted in 
70 000 deaths and left 20 000 citizens maimed as a result of violent amputation 
(Malan et al, 2002:13).    
 
5.3. The road to war and external peace intervention 
 
The widespread conflict in Sierra Leone ensued when the Republic of Sierra Leone 
Armed Forces (RSLAF) by 1994/1995 “had become a bloated, ill-trained 
organisation, which had become very much part of Sierra Leone‟s problem”, was 
overrun by the RUF, led by Corporal Foday Sankoh (Douglas, 1999:178).  The RUF 
soon after began to seize diamond-mining properties, which was the main source of 
hard currency for the government.  By early 1995, the RUF had effectively laid 
siege to the capital city of Freetown (Abdullah, 1998:203).  While far from a 
disciplined force, the RUF was sufficiently effective to disrupt the national army, the 
Sierra Leone Army (SLA).  Badly trained, paid, equipped and led, the SLA was 
deeply demoralised and soon showed an alarming proclivity for fraternisation and 
even co-operation with its supposed enemy.  The term „sobel‟ (soldier) was coined 
to describe SLA troops who were happy to kill, maim and loot either independently 
or along with the RUF as the mood took them (Macqueen, 2002:183).  
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In the face of inaction by the UNSC, the government of Sierra Leone contracted the 
services of Executive Outcomes (EO), a South African-based private military 
company to defend the capital, Freetown.  EO was originally contracted to deploy 
160 of its personnel in Sierra Leone from May 1995 to March 1996.  After training 
company-sized contingents of the RSLAF, EO provided the leadership, helicopters 
and fire-support necessary prosecute a war against the RUF.  By the end of 1995, the 
siege of Freetown by the RUF had been lifted and the RUF headquarters at Makeni 
had been destroyed.  The Koindu diamond area and the Sierra Rutile area had been 
liberated and were again open for operations (Alao, 1998:50).    
 
After the siege had been lifted, peace talks between the government and 
representatives of the RUF were initiated on 22 February 1996.  Numerous peace 
agreements and cease-fires were negotiated over time, but widespread violence 
continued to plague the population of Sierra Leone despite all the efforts.  The peace 
talks were soon followed by, as it turned out, wholly premature elections, without 
following the usual prescribed UN pattern of ceasefire, peace agreement, 
disarmament, demobilisation and then election processes.  After two rounds of 
voting, and amidst gross intimidation of the electorate, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the 
Sierra Leone People‟s Party (SLPP) emerged as President in March 1996.  However, 
this experiment with democracy was abruptly ended on 25 May 1997 when 
Kabbah‟s government was violently overthrown by Major Johnny Paul Koromah in 
a typical palace coup d’etat (Malan et al, 2002:17).  The SLA faction of Koromah, 
invigorated by the prospect of plunder, provided a match for the Nigerians who 
continued to back the elected government.  However, ECOMOG had already left the 
country under the terms of the then irrelevant Abijan Agreement.  Almost 
immediately, the unpredictable Koromah announced his alignment with the 
„ideology‟ of the RUF, invited them to join him in „government‟ and inaugurated a 
reign of chaos and terror in the parts of the country over which he could claim 
control (Macqueen, 2002:185).  
 
These events were immediately condemned by a wide variety of international and 
regional organisations.  The former Organisation of African Unity (OAU) also 
condemned the coup and called for the immediate restoration of the constitutional 
order, urging the leaders of ECOWAS to take immediate action against the 
instigators (Ejime, 1997).  On 23 October 1997, ECOWAS and Koromah‟s junta 
reached agreement on a six-month peace plan for Sierra Leone in Conakry, Guinea.  
This agreement called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and for the 
supervision of the cease-fire agreement by ECOMOG and the UN military observers 
(Macqueen, 2002:186).  The Conakry agreements also provided for the effective 
disarmament and demobilisation of combatants as well as the restoration of the 
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constitutional order and the reinstatement of Tejan Kabbah as president and head of 
a more broadly based government on 28 May 1998.  The operational mandate of 
ECOWAS‟ military arm, ECOMOG was consequently extended from Liberia to 
Sierra Leone in order to prevent the total breakdown of law and order.  The 
Conakray agreement was not respected by Koromah and in February 1998, 
ECOMOG, in response to an attack by the junta forces, launched an attack that 
finally led to the collapse of the junta, as well as its expulsion from Freetown.  
ECOMOG subsequently expanded its force deployment in an attempt to secure the 
rest of the country and on 10 March 1998, President Kabbah formally returned to 
office (Macqueen, 2002:186).  However, socio-economic conditions continued to 
deteriorate and the UN eventually established the UN Observer Mission in Sierra 
Leone (UNOMSIL) alongside the regional ECOMOG force in June 1998. 
 
UNOMSIL, a relatively small peace force if compared to other UN missions, was 
deployed for an initial period of six months.  The aim of the mission was to promote 
national reconciliation and to provide assistance with the demobilisation of former 
combatants, in collaboration with ECOMOG (Macqueen, 2002:187).  The security 
situation in Sierra Leone made headlines when, despite the presence of UNOMSIL 
and the ECOMOG force, rebel forces sacked Freetown in January 1999 (UNSC, 
1999).  These events precipitated the negotiation of the Lome Agreement that was 
signed in July 1999.  However, little progress had been made towards the 
achievement of this aim when on 6 January 1999, members of the deposed Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council and the RUF overwhelmed the ECOMOG defences 
and swept into Freetown.  They subsequently went on a rampage, which resulted in 
the deaths of thousands of civilians, whilst even more civilians were dismembered 
and raped.  Ultimately, the fighting resulted in the deaths of about 5 000 people, 
whilst up to 150 000 people who were living in the Freetown area, were displaced 
when large numbers of public buildings and homes were also burnt to the ground 
(UNSC, 1999).   
 
At the time of these events, Nigeria, who had been the backbone of ECOMOG in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, could no longer sustain its regional commitments and 
subsequently informed the international community that they could no longer 
maintain its deployments in Sierra Leone.  The impending Nigerian withdrawal 
resulted in a frantic scramble among the other West African states to broker a peace 
agreement.  The SRSG initiated a series of diplomatic efforts aimed at opening up 
dialogue with the rebels (Malan et al, 2002:19).  Negotiations between the 
belligerent parties began in May 1999 and after coaxing from the UK and the USA, 
a controversial peace agreement was signed by President Kabbah and Corporal 
Sankoh and other members of the RUF on 7 July 1999 in Lome, Togo.  The Lome 
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Accord granted total amnesty to Corporal Sankoh and the members of the RUF, 
promised the reintegration of the RUF into the new Sierra Leonean army, assured 
the RUF several cabinet seats in the transitional government, and left the RUF in 
control of the diamond mines and invited Sankoh to participate in UN-sponsored 
elections.  In exchange for senior government positions for its commanders, as well 
as a blanket amnesty for atrocities committed during the war, the RUF pledged to 
disarm along with the pro-government CDF and other paramilitary units (Macqueen, 
2002:188).     
 
Ultimately, despite the obvious flaws in the Lome Agreement, the UN was obliged 
to back it up with a peacekeeping mission.  This resulted in the decision to deploy 
UNAMSIL as a peacekeeping force in Sierra Leone in October 1999 (UNSC,1999).  
 
5.4. UNAMSIL deployment 
 
UNAMSIL initially consisted of approximately 6 000 military personnel, of which 
260 were military observers from 30 countries.  Four ECOMOG battalions 
(comprising troops from Ghana, Guinea and Nigeria) were already in Sierra Leone 
and were „re-hatted‟ as UN peacekeepers. The latter was essential, in order to avoid 
a security vacuum during the period of mission build-up.  The remaining units of 
UNAMSIL would be provided from India, Bangladesh, Jordan and Zambia.  The 
force build-up progressed haphazardly and UN peacekeepers were often denied 
freedom of movement amidst frequent cease-fire violation and ambushes of both 
civilian, as well as UN personnel (Macqueen, 2002:189).  The maintenance of illegal 
roadblocks by elements of the RUF and CDF continued (Adebajo, 2007:2).  In 
response to these serious security concerns, the UNSC unanimously voted on 7 
February 2000 to strengthen UNAMSIL‟s mission in Sierra Leone in accordance 
with UN Resolution 1289, 2000.  This Resolution raised the maximum authorised 
force strength from 6 000 to 11 000, and also granted the mission and expanded 
mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter (UNSC, 2000).    
 
UNAMSIL was created on 22 October 1999 by the UNSC Resolution 1270.  The 
Mission was tasked to achieve, inter alia the following objectives (Molukanele et al, 
2004:42): 
 
 assisting the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to extend its 
authority, restore law and order and stabilise the situation progressively 
throughout the entire country; and 
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 assisting in the promotion of a political process that should lead to a 
renewed DDR programme and the holding, in due course, of free and fair 
elections. 
 
UNAMSIL, operating under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN, was mandated to 
(Molukanele et al, 2004:42): 
 
 assist with the implementation of the peace agreement; 
 assist the government in the DDR programme; 
 ensure the security and freedom of movement of UN personnel; 
 monitor adherence to the ceasefire of 18 May 1999; 
 facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance; 
 support the operation of UN civilian officials; and 
 provide support, when requested with regard to elections as constituted in 
the constitution of Sierra Leone. 
 
Later, under UNSC Resolution 1289, the mandate was expanded to (Molukanele et 
al, 2004:42): 
 
 to provide security at key government installations, intersections and 
airports; 
 to facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian aid on 
designated roadways; 
 to provide security at the DDR sites; 
 to co-ordinate with and assist Sierra Leone law enforcement bodies in 
carrying out their duties; and 
 to safeguard weapons and ammunition recovered from ex-combatants and 
assist in the disposal of some weapons and ammunition. 
 
However, UNAMSIL was neither sufficiently strong in size, nor properly configured 
and or equipped to pose a credible military deterrent to the rebels.  Although 
Resolution 1289 provided the legal framework for coercive action by UNAMSIL in 
pursuit of its disarmament mandate, it could not be translated into assertive and 
credible action on the ground.  Although the total number of disarmed combatants 
that passed through the five UNAMSIL-supervised DDR camps numbered about 
23 000 by April 2000, the ratio of collected arms to the number of ex-combatants 
who had given up arms, remained low (UNSC, 2000:186).  According to statistics 
provided by the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (NCDDR), only some 5 000 weapons had been handed in by Sierra 
Leonean belligerents who reportedly numbered about 45 000 by 15 April 2000 
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(Malan et al, 2000:23).  By May 2000, the mission was in crisis when four UN 
peacekeepers (Kenyan) were killed and about 500 UN peacekeepers were taken 
hostage by the RUF (Neethling, 2002:39).  The RUF took the Zambian contingent 
hostage, disarmed them and stole thirteen armoured personnel carriers (APCs).  A 
dead Zambian soldier was flayed and his skin nailed to a tree as part of the RUF‟s 
psychological terrorising (Prins, 2007:15).  The RUF then advanced on Freetown – 
using the captured Zambian APCs (Malan, et al, 2000:23).  This incident was 
unprecedented in terms of the UN‟s history and many scholars and observers reacted 
by fiercely attacking and blaming the UN-system as the reason for its occurrence.  It 
was only after the UN Force Commander vacated his post as a result of his 
frustrations with the UN‟s inability to act decisively, that the UN started to take 
action.   This incident contributed to the collapse of the coherence of the UN force 
and resulted in the highlighting of the issue that UN troops are often ill-equipped 
and ill-prepared for actual fighting or peace enforcement operations.  The then 
UNSG, Kofi Annan, appealed to UN members to come to the rescue (Prins, 
2007:15).  Parallel to new initiatives embarked upon by the UN, following the 
above-mentioned killing and hostage-taking of the peacekeepers, the UK deployed a 
Battalion of Special Forces and five warships at a critical juncture in an attempt to 
resolve the situation and to send the important message that UNAMSIL would not 
be abandoned in the face of a crisis.  The UK named this operation „Operation 
Palliser’, which, according to Prins (2007:15), ultimately rescued the UN force and 
the UN‟s reputation.  The UK also stepped up its effort to train the national army 
and police service. 
 
Malan et al (2002:23) point out that although the British forces maintained that their 
primary mission was to safeguard their citizens, the troops defended parts of 
Freetown and Lungi international airports and set up patrols on the streets of 
Freetown and the main highway leading to the capital (BBC, 2000).  In terms of 
credibility, the military force that was deployed by the UK was immediately 
perceived as professional and effective, and operated with a clear chain of command 
and political support (Hayes, 2000:1).  This was in stark contrast to what was 
demonstrated by the deployment of UNAMSIL at the time.  The UN‟s inability to 
distinguish between impartiality and neutrality nearly sank the UNAMSIL mission.  
As a result, it was the primary aim of the commander of the British Force, Brigadier 
(now Lieutenant-General) Richards to switch the UNAMSIL mindset into support 
for the electoral Kabbah government (Prins, 2007:17).  
 
The small, but decisive unilateral intervention by Britain raised some hard questions 
about UN peacekeeping in Africa at the beginning of the new century.  In this 
regard, Macqueen (2002:228) asks: “had nothing been learned from the failure of 
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earlier peace processes that the UN had been supposed to implement? And, at the 
operational level, why had UNAMSIL, a large force with a far-reaching mandate, 
been so supine in the face of challenges from ill-organised and untrained gangs of 
rebels?  Even in the strict minimalist terms of peacekeeping set out in the 
Hammarskjold-era, the right of self-defence was fully acknowledged.  Was the 
apparent impossibility of this operation so demoralising to its participants that even 
basic military instincts were dulled?” (Macqueen, 2002:228).  In contrast, while 
their goals were limited and not open-ended, the military intervention by the UK 
proved to be vital in restoring order in Sierra Leone in a limited period of time.  In 
failed-state emergencies, the lack of security greatly hampers the ability of NGOs to 
complete their humanitarian missions.  According to Jackson (2005:109), the NGOs 
in countries such as Sierra Leone must have the backing of military forces such as 
the British or Australian in the East Timor intervention of 1999 to succeed.  All 
parties to the conflict perceived these forces as reputable, professional and effective.  
Most UN peacekeeping forces lack these professional requisites.  The quality of the 
military forces is thereby crucial for NGO success.  
 
After successfully assisting the Jordanian and Indian Army elements of UNAMSIL 
to halt the advancing revels, Brigadier Richards designed a psychologically-led 
operation that relied heavily upon collaboration with the international assets of the 
Sierra Leonean Army to create such fear and uncertainty in the minds of targeted 
rebel commanders that they abandoned their positions and fled into the interior of 
Sierra Leone.  According to Prins (2007:20), Operation Palliser was completed 
within the span of a month and exemplified ways in which a commander with small, 
but highly capable joint services force create the conditions for economic and 
political confidence in the wider population, while at the same time applying poison 
that can destroy the enemy forces from within by breaking their morale and 
undermining their leadership elements.   
 
In addition to the deployment of UNAMSIL, political and economic pressure was 
applied on Liberia, thus weakening the rebels‟ access to assistance and sustainment 
of their war efforts.  In addition, Guinea also dealt the rebels a decisive military 
blow on the Sierra Leone-Guinea border (Guehenno, 2005:14).  The UN also 
mandated the expansion of the UN forces to one that was more robust and deployed 
a significantly stronger 17 500 force.  This was the strongest force that the UN had 
deployed in years.  At the same time, these events prompted the UN to re-assess its 
capacity to resolve conflict that resulted in the Brahimi Report in 2000 in which the 
strengthening of the UN‟s institutional capacity in terms of conflict resolution and 
peacekeeping was addressed at length.  In effect, the result of the analysis pointed to 
the fact that the UN required more funds and better equipped men and women – in 
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terms of equipment, as well as training (Neething, 2005:24).  The problems 
experienced by UN peacekeepers in Sierra Leone had clearly demonstrated the 
danger of sending a weak and inadequately trained peacekeeping force into a 
country where a fragile peace process prevailed.  It became very evident that the key 
to the successful prosecution of peace missions was the credibility of the 
intervention force.  According to Hayes (2000:1), this credibility encompasses much 
more than the simple military over-matching of the indigenous combatants, and 
must certainly not degenerate to an unacceptable use of violence.  It must be 
demonstrated and, more importantly, perceived as a credible force for good at the 
tactical, operational and strategic levels, both internationally and in the theatre of 
operations (Hayes, 2000:1). 
 
The UN force arrived in a piecemeal fashion and the available troop strength was 
too low to allow a widespread deployment.  Following the RUF offensive in May 
2000, the entire peace process reached an impasse.  The RUF‟s aggression against 
the peacekeepers, culminating in the widespread hostage taking in May 2000, made 
UNAMSIL realise that the compliance with peace accords and UNSC resolutions 
cannot be taken for granted, and that the peace force must be equipped with an 
effective deterrence capacity (Macqueen, 2002:194). 
 
The (Indian) UNAMSIL force commander, Major-General Vijay Jetley, left the 
mission in August 2000 after several confrontations with his Nigerian lieutenants.  
In addition to alleging that Nigeria was attempting to sabotage the UNAMSIL 
mission through collusion with the RUF, Major-General Jetley experienced some 
serious problems of a logistical nature, and was forthright in his criticism of the 
various national contingents that had been placed under his commend.  Following 
these events, India and Jordan announced that they would leave the mission in 
September and October 2000 respectively.  At his time, the conflict progressed to 
that of a regional operation, when an attack took place on Guinean soil by a group of 
dissidents who were supported by the RUF on 8 September 2000 (Pratt, 2001:9).  
The violence escalated and by January 2001, the Guinea Armed Forces were 
attacking dissidents and RUF members with artillery fire directed into Liberia.  This 
action elicited threats of retaliation from Charles Taylor.  ECOWAS was very 
concerned about the threat of the looming regional conflict and consequently 
deployed a force of 1 796 peacekeepers at the convergence of the borders of Guinea, 
Sierra Leone and Liberia (Malan et al, 2002:25).   
 
The UNAMSIL deployment remained painfully slow, due to constant troop 
rotations, the uneven quality of the various national contingents of the troop 
contributing countries, and continued logistical challenges and co-ordination 
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problems associated with the sheer massive size of the UNAMSIL deployment 
(Farah, 2000:A42).  Despite concerted efforts to overcome these challenges and to 
find a workable solution to reconcile the multiple interests involved in the Sierra 
Leone peace process, the numerous external policy conflicts essentially thwarted all 
efforts.  This resulted in widespread dissatisfaction among role-players, and 
generally demoralised the peacekeepers.   
 
After the departure of Major-General Vijay Jetley in August 2000, the new 
UNAMSIL Force Commander (Lieutenant-General Daniel Opande of Kenya) and 
Chief of Staff (Brigadier Alistair Duncan of the UK) arrived in theatre in November 
2000.  The new Force Commander and his Deputy immediately embarked on a 
programme of visits to the demoralised contingents of the respective troop 
contributing countries.  Following the departure of the previous Force Commander, 
the military elements of UNAMSIL, both in the headquarters, as well as in the field, 
had done little but administrative work.  The situation demanded a return to military 
basics, and the various planning process were immediately shifted into top gear.  
The UN headquarters in New York provided the strategic guidance and a very 
important task was force generation to get the mission up to its required strength, as 
well as to restore UNAMSIL‟s credibility in the theatre (Malan et al, 2002:27). 
 
The Abuja Ceasefire Agreement was signed on 10 November 2000, followed by the 
Abuja Ceasefire Review Agreement of 2 May 2002 (Abuja II).  This agreement 
constituted a breakthrough in the peace process, with the Government and the RUF 
agreeing to the disarmament of all combatants belonging to the RUF and the Civil 
Defence Forces, and both parties accepting the need for the government to restore its 
authority throughout the country (Macqueen, 2002:194). 
 
The general elections of 14 May 2002 represented a major step forward in Sierra 
Leone‟s quest for sustainable peace and development.  Sierra Leoneans turned out in 
large numbers to vote in peaceful elections and approximately 2,3 million voters 
registered to cast their ballots at about 5 000 polling stations.  The elections did not 
result in a change of government, but the active participation of members of the 
RUF signalled a commitment to both peace and the democratisation process.  One of 
the outstanding features of the 2002 elections was the level of public engagement 
and the overall peaceful nature of the campaign process.  By the end of 2004, 
UNAMSIL disarmed some 75 000 former combatants, facilitated significant 
improvements to infrastructure, expanded state authority and has almost rebuilt the 
national police force to its target size of 9 500 officers.  Although public confidence 
in the police and armed forces remained low, it was generally felt that the overall 
security situation in Sierra Leone had improved (Molukanele et al, 2004:42).  
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5.5. Results of the UNAMSIL intervention 
 
The intervention in Sierra Leone must be viewed against the more integrative and 
holistic approach to peacekeeping that has been accepted by the UN since the early 
1990‟s.  This relates to programmes that addressed humanitarian assistance to 
refugees and internally displaces persons, the consolidation of civil authority, the 
promotion of human rights and good governance, as well as the restoration of the 
legal system.  Significant contributions were made by the international community, 
(EU, UK and the USA), who invested and provided practical aid in several of these 
programmes.  For example: the USA‟s total humanitarian and emergency 
contribution in the 2002 fiscal year, including grants to the World Food Programme 
and other aid agencies, assistance to refugees, programmes to combat HIV/AIDS,  
and the reintegration of combatant and development programmes, amounted to $56 
million. This supports the broader understanding of the concept of peacebuilding, in 
that it requires ambitious (and expensive) long-term nation-building efforts by 
international actors in order to prevent a return to conflict (Neethling, 2005:83). 
 
The successful completion of the DDR processes of former combatants was 
appreciated as central to establishing peace and stability in Sierra Leone.  According 
to Malan et al (2002:10), the success of the whole intervention process in Sierra 
Leone therefore hinged on the degree to which warring factions could effectively be 
disarmed and reintegrated into new security structures.  The complexity of this 
process is compounded by the fact that, whilst disarmament and freedom of 
movement are primarily military concerns, the demobilisation and reintegration of 
former combatants into society falls in the realm of civilian concerns.  In addition, in 
a country where the formal economy hardly exists, it is very difficult to find 
employment for former combatants.  This again, is exacerbated by the fact that 
illegal diamond mining remains a lucrative source of income for former combatants 
on all sides who have relied on the war economy for extended periods of time.  
However, despite several challenges relating to the DDR process, UNAMSIL 
reported that 45 449 former combatants have handed over weapons to the authorities 
between 18 May 2001 and 6 January 2002.  On 7 January 2002, UNAMSIL declared 
that the disarmament of former fighters under the Sierra Leone government‟s DDR 
programme had formally ended (Malan et al, 2002:11). 
 
However, much remains to be done in terms of the „reintegration‟ of former 
combatants into the society and the economy of post-conflict Sierra Leone.  The UN 
relies on partners such as the World Bank to assist in completing DDR programmes 
(UNDG/ECHA Working Group, 2004:183–198).  Gueli et al (2006:18) argues that 
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as a result, DDR programmes may not be completed or may not begin at all, without 
the support of external funding.  Fore example, in June 2001, the World Bank‟s 
Multi-Donor Trust Fund for DDR in Sierra Leone received less than half of the 
funds estimated for reintegration programmes.  As a result, at the end of the 
reintegration programme in January 2002, more than a third of ex-combatants failed 
to receive any assistance.  Soon after, these ex-combatants began to pose security 
problems, mobilise for protests, migrate toward the diamond-producing areas, and to 
be recruited in these areas to fight in neighbouring Liberia (UNDG/ECHA Working 
Group, 2004:3).   
 
The problems experienced with the coordination of activities between the military 
and civilian components in terms of their respective roles pertaining to the DDR 
processes, also impacted on many other fields in terms of the peace process.  In this 
regard, the conversion of the RUF from a fighting force into a political party was 
identified as key to the attainment of lasting peace in Sierra Leone.  However, many 
scholars were and are still of the opinion that this conversion process was neglected 
as a result of the over-emphasis that was placed on the establishment and extension 
of civil political authority throughout Sierra Leone.  The issue of civilian control 
throughout the country was regarded as an all-important benchmark to be achieved 
before the staging of elections, and the extension of civil authority was at the centre 
of UNSC resolutions, as well as the mandate and mission statement of UNAMSIL.  
However, international assistance with this imperative continued to be primarily 
aimed at the restructuring of the military and the police, with little attention devoted 
to the broader aspects of civil administration such as health, education and social 
welfare.  It was argued that the transformation of the RUF into a political party is 
essential, if the political process was indeed deemed to take precedence over the 
military in the peace process.  In the event that this process was not successfully 
conducted, the RUF would have found itself marginalised from the overall political 
process and this could have resulted in renewed outbreaks of violence.        
 
The conflict in Sierra Leone was a result of poor governance, which ultimately 
caused the collapse of the formal economy of Sierra Leone, resulting in 
unemployment, poverty, poor education and a broken-down infrastructure.  In the 
light of the complexity and the extent of the conflict that broke out in Sierra Leone, 
it is clear that the UN actually had an insurmountable challenge to face in terms of 
attempting to keep the peace.  Despite all the difficulties, the UN finally did help to 
stabilise the security situation in Sierra Leone.  They managed to disarm and 
demobilise approximately 75 000 combatants − among which counted about 20 000 
child soldiers (Mulakazi, 2006:26).  The fact that peaceful elections were held in 
2002 was truly remarkable.  UNAMSIL completed its mandate on 31 December 
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2005.  Several benchmarks were used to measure UNAMSIL‟s success and these, 
among others, included security sector reform, the consolidation of state authority, 
the reintegration of ex-combatants and control over the diamond-mining industry 
(the so-called „blood diamonds‟) that was utilised to finance the belligerents 
(Mulakazi, 2006:26). 
 
However, despite these positive developments – the question remains: can this peace 
be sustained?  The establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) in 
Sierra Leone achieved much in addressing the social and psychological damage that 
had been experienced and has been cited as one of the most outstanding features 
from a peacebuilding perspective (Neethling, 2005:87).  The TRC in Sierra Leone 
was fashioned on similar commissions in Chile, Guatemala and South Africa.  The 
intention with the TRC was to investigate the causes, nature and extent of human 
rights violations that occurred in Sierra Leone, as well as to help restore the human 
dignity of victims, as well as promote national reconciliation.  In addition to the 
TRC, a Special UN Court for Sierra Leone was established to prosecute persons who 
bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian 
law in Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996.  This special court and the TRC both 
played a critical role in building institutions that the citizens could trust, however, 
justice remains one of the acute problems facing Sierra Leone, especially for rural 
residents (Malan et al, 2002:11).  To establish the judiciary in Sierra Leone would 
entail a process of judicial reform as an adjunct to the Special Court and the TRC.      
 
 A great challenge to the peace in Sierra Leone is that of pervasive poverty.  It has 
recently been classified as the world‟s poorest country.  Sierra Leone still faces the 
challenge of large numbers of unemployed youth, inadequate capacity in state 
institutions and extreme poverty levels with 68% of the population still living under 
the poverty line.  In terms of economic growth, Solomon Berewa, the Vice-President 
of Sierra Leone pointed out that, based on the successes achieved with the 
UNAMSIL deployment, the economy had been opened up and that macro-economic 
stability had been achieved.  He added that the programmes provided by the Bretton 
Woods Institutions had boosted the economy and that they had achieved an 
economic growth rate of over 7% (Berewa, 2006).  However, there is still very little 
foreign investment that is required to bolster the fledgling economy and the 
economy is still primarily structured on a gigantic informal economy.  Thousands of 
youths are unemployed – which is a threatening situation – given the large numbers 
of child solders that were part of the conflict.  This threat should be viewed against 
the worldwide phenomenon that there is a close relationship between a high number 
of youths between the ages of 15 to 29 years, and a high prevalence of violence or 
armed conflict.  In addition, the morale of most of the defence force members in 
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Sierra Leone was low – due to very low standards of living.  This is a very 
dangerous situation in that it is exactly the defence force that should be the guardian 
of the fragile peace (Neethling, 2005:25). 
 
Ultimately, the intervention in Sierra Leone has been dubbed a qualified success, 
due to the support of the international community, the UN and the leadership of 
UNAMSIL who stayed the course, despite several setbacks on the road to recovery.  
After the disastrous encounter with the RUF in May 2000, several changes were 
made and UNAMSIL was better led than at any other time since its inception.  
Analysts report that it was specifically the contributions of the Pakistani brigade and 
the Russian air wing that provided the mission with a powerful deterrent capacity 
(Neethling, 2002:43).  The UNSG commented that UNAMSIL played a meaningful 
role in helping Sierra Leone to move towards the 2002 election process and 
furthermore reported that the disarmament process and the deployment of 
UNAMSIL had created a relatively more secure environment in general, and had 
afforded the people of Sierra Leone the opportunity to move past conflict towards 
national reconciliation and recovery, as well as building sustainable institutions 
(UNDG/ECHA Working Group, 2004:11–12).    
 
 The importance of the intervention in Sierra Leone is to be found in the fact that the 
UN deployed about 14 000 peacekeepers to Sierra Leone in 2004 to a country with a 
population of 5,7 million.  In contrast, the UN had deployed only about 10 000 
peacekeepers to the DRC – a country that is territorially much larger Sierra Leone, 
but also a country with a population at least ten times as large as that of Sierra Leone 
(Bell, 2005:1).  Many scholars commented that the UN deployment in Sierra Leone 
heralded the „UN‟s return to Africa‟ after many of the key role-players in the West 
had withdrawn their attentions and resources from Africa in the aftermath of the 
disastrous interventions in Somalia and Rwanda during the early 1990‟s.  Overall, the 
UNAMSIL deployment achieved many successes, among which the all-important 
milestones achieved in regularising the diamond industry, which had fuelled the 
conflict for many years (Bell, 2005:1-2).  In November 2005, UNAMSIL hosted an 
International Music Festival to mark the „end of the successful UN mission in West 
Africa‟, which brought peace and stability to a country that had been engulfed in one 
of the most brutal wars in the international community (Bell, 2005:1).    
 
There are still many challenges to be overcome in Sierra Leone.  One of the primary 
areas for development is on the political terrain, because, although significant inroads 
have been made in terms of state authority throughout much of the country, the 
capacity of recently established security, administrative and judicial structures 
remains severely limited and suffers from shortfalls in logistics, infrastructure and 
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Supplementa 3, 2009. doi: 10.5787/0-0-75
 130    
qualified personnel ((UNDG/ECHA Working Group, 2004:6).  Many role-players 
have expressed the opinion that the post-conflict political situation in Sierra Leone is 
the same as what it was at the beginning of the war in 1991.  As a result, there are 
still many who fear that there could be a return to the status quo ante bellum that 
could foster renewed instability (UNDG/ECHA Working Group, 2004:10).  There are 
also similar concerns to the very effect that the success that was achieved with 
UNAMSIL‟s peacekeeping operations might have created unreasonable political and 
economic expectations that could in fact, develop into a new source of popular 
discontent.  
 
Despite many successes that were achieved by UNAMSIL in ensuring general 
security, several minor, but significant challenges persist in this area.  The RSLAF 
acknowledged that it was unprepared to assume responsibility for Sierra Leone‟s 
external security when UNAMSIL departed.  In terms of the reconstruction of 
infrastructure, many construction initiatives fell victim to building delays and 
significant budget shortfalls.  The RSLAF also suffered from a severely depleted 
transport fleet, as well as wholly insufficient communications equipment.  In order to 
address these shortages, the government had petitioned UNAMSIL to donate some of 
its equipment when it liquidated.  In addition to the lack of resources, the RSLAF 
also continually suffered from disciplinary and moral problems.  As a result, the 
UNAMSIL withdrawal process had to be approached with the utmost care, as a 
significant sector of the population had little confidence in the capacity of the RSLAF 
to continually secure the peace.  This problem was addressed by the deployment of a 
small UN follow-on force, intended as a short-term solution and backstop for the 
state security organs in Sierra Leone (Molukanele et al, 2004:43).    
 
In order to ensure sustained peace and development in Sierra Leone, it will require 
the continued international and regional support for the fostering of good governance 
practices and long-term economic development (Malan et al, 2002:12).  The UN must 
continue with its peacebuilding programmes in post-conflict Sierra Leone.  This 
realisation is based on experiences gained that proved that sustainable peace must be 
coupled to active developmental initiatives – the basis of the concept of DPMs.  
These initiatives are not short-term endeavours and require vast funds – funds that are 
not always readily available, as Africa is often regarded as of lesser strategic value.  
An important aspect contained in the Brahimi Report is the call for increased 
financial support, as well as renewed commitment on the part of UN member states.  
The report cited financial constraints as a factor that seriously impairs the UN‟s 
ability to conduct peace operations in a credible, professional manner.  However, 
despite the shortages of funds and resources, the UN and several developmental 
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organisations continue to do significant work in Sierra Leone, the DRC, Burundi, 
Liberia and others. 
 
5.6. From UNAMSIL to UNIOSIL 
 
 The United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) was established by 
the UNSC on 31 August 2005, after UNAMSIL completed its mandate on 31 
December 2005.  The UN established UNIOSIL through Resolution S/RES/1620 
(UNSC, 2005).  The UNIOSIL office comprises of the Executive Representative and 
five compartments targeting key areas of the mandate.  These compartments include: 
peace and governance, human rights and the rule of law, civilian police, military, and 
public information (UNSC, 2005).  These components were formed to assist the 
government of Sierra Leone to consolidate gains already made, as well as to assist in 
capacity-building for state departments and the designing and implementation of a 
national action plan for human rights (UNSC, 2005).  UNIOSIL is a good example of 
the adoption of the more integrated approach to peace missions that have been 
adopted by the UN in the last two decades.  This is evident in the appointment of the 
Executive Secretary-General‟s Representative as head of the UNDP country office 
(Mulakazi, 2006:26).   
 
 Significant results have been achieved in Sierra Leone since the establishment of 
UNIOSIL.  These include the establishment of stability, the expansion of commercial 
activities, progress with national reconciliation and the building of a new and 
professional police force.  With regard to an effective police force, UNIOSIL also 
instituted measures to track widespread corruption to avert situations that might derail 
the prevailing stability in the country. 
 
Reform of the justice sector has been slow and according to Mulakazi (2006:26), the 
structural weaknesses continue to pose a great challenge to the consolidation of 
peace.  However, the UN has achieved much in facilitating the training and 
deployment of magistrates in various districts.  This resulted in a reduction in the 
backlog of cases and the shortening of pre-trial detentions.  Some improvements in 
infrastructure have resulted in the building of courthouses and prisons (Mulakazi, 
2006:26). 
 
 Despite the many positive developments in Sierra Leone, the country still faces the 
challenge of very large numbers of unemployed youth, inadequate capacity in state 
institutions, extreme poverty levels with about 68% of the population living below 
the poverty line, coupled to an overall fragile security situation (World Bank, 2005).  
In addition, about 70% of Sierra Leone‟s population remain illiterate.  Illegal 
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diamond-mining, long the primary source of funds that fuelled the conflict, continues 
(although on a much smaller scale) and the intermittent encroachment of the armed 
forces of Guinea on land in the eastern and northern provinces of Sierra Leone pose a 
great danger to the security of the country (Mulakazi, 2006:27). 
 
The selling of „blood diamonds‟ by trans-national criminal networks to support the 
war economies of fighting factions in Sierra Leone, serves as a good example of the 
complexities that face peacekeepers.  Despite the deployment of the largest-ever UN 
force to Sierra Leone in March 2001, not one component of the force was 
responsible for monitoring the trade of conflict diamonds.  The selling of these 
„blood diamonds‟ continued, as UN peacekeepers were not mandated to act in this 
regard.  This situation only changed in September 2004, when the UNSC adopted a 
new resolution that authorised UN personnel to monitor and patrol diamond-mining 
areas (UNDG/ECHA Working Group, 2004:5). 
 
This outcome underscores the realisation that the mere monitoring of the activities 
of trans-national networks is insufficient to curb resource exploitation and trade.  It 
is quite clear that, in order to effectively curtail resource flows, monitoring and 
reporting activities should be supported by a commitment to effective enforcement 
mechanisms (Gueli et al, 2006c:16).  This will require not only improved 
intelligence, but also personnel with the technical expertise to target and capture 
those that support the functioning of trans-national criminal networks. 
 
Whilst it is of critical importance for the UN to be perceived as legitimate and 
credible, it is equally important to isolate and marginalise those that are keen on 
sustaining conflict and smuggling valuable resources (Kaldor, 1999:126).  This 
means that, where applicable, the UN may be required to revise its current deterrent 
posture in complex peace operations and act in a more forcible manner against those 
that have neither the political will nor the financial compulsion to end violent 
conflict.  Following the events that took place in the mid-1990‟s in Bosnia and 
Sierra Leone in which serious blows were delivered against UN forces by the 
protagonists in the respective countries, the international community was filled with 
enthusiasm for the possibility of finally giving the UN a muscular capacity to fulfil 
its Chapter VII roles in ways that the original drafters of the UN Charter had 
envisaged (Prins, 2007:7).  Gueli et al (2006c:17) argues that: “if the UN is in the 
business of solving conflict, it is fair to suggest that the UN should act appropriately 
(hence forcibly) against those who are involved in the business of war”.  Gueli et al 
(2006c:17) concludes that one of the most successful developments in terms of UN 
deployments is the realisation within the UN that early development work in 
peacekeeping operations can reduce the changes of countries returning to conflict.  
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In terms of initiating development work as soon as possible, integrating civil-
military resources at the earliest possible stages of a mission may seem plausible.  
However, civilian reconstruction specialists are notably absent in peace missions.  
This is in part due to the fact that a good number of UN-contributing states, 
especially the top-ten providers of peacekeepers, have not taken concrete and 
systematic steps to enhance or establish a cadre of civilians with reconstruction 
expertise.  The absence of a rapidly deployable civilian reconstruction capacity in 
peace missions has also proved ineffective, because the pace of reconstruction and 
development is typically slow (as non-military services are often filled by military 
peacekeepers who lack formal training in this regard).  To this end, a number of 
post-conflict societies have relapsed back into conflict (Gueli et al, 2006b:7). 
 
On 12 October 2006, Solomon Berewa, the Vice-President of Sierra Leone, stated in 
an address to the UN Peacebuilding Commission, that “there is now peace in the 
country, democratic elections have already been held with success and all that the 
country should now do is to get on with the normal business of development” 
(Berewa, 2006:26).  However, he also cautioned that the sustained development of a 
viable state is dependent on how effectively issues such as poverty and development 
will be addressed in Sierra Leone.  This observation clearly supports the notion 
proposed by the concept of DPMs, namely that the two issues of „security‟ and 
„development‟ are closely linked, and in order to prevent a country such as Sierra 
Leone from sliding back into conflict, the two issues should be addressed 
simultaneously and sustainable peace should be pursued by means of special and 
specific peacebuilding measures (De Coning, 2004:42).  This approach is in line 
with the general acceptance of the notion that peacebuilding is not an activity that is 
limited to the post-conflict stage of an intervention, but peacebuilding can also be 
preventative (UNDG/ECHA Working Group, 2004:3).  This supports the broader 
view that peacebuilding is essentially focused on removing or weakening the factors 
that sustain conflict and reinforcing factors that build peace (Hitchcock, 2004:38).   
In addition, coupled to the general consensus that peacebuilding efforts should 
already be attempted during the earliest indication of potential conflict, the term 
„peacebuilding‟ was gradually expanded to refer to integrated approaches to address 
violent conflict during all phases of the conflict cycle (Tschirgi, 2003:1).    
 
According to Gueli et al (2006c:16) peacebuilding efforts usually only start during 
the post-conflict phase of a peace-mission – that is following the signing of a cease-
fire or comprehensive peace agreement.  Moreover, many policy makers still insist 
that distinguishing between military and civilian activities in peace missions 
provides them with a clear line, delineating specific roles and responsibilities in 
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different stages of conflict.  This in effect, emphasises a linear or sequential 
approach to solving conflict situations and is in line with traditional approaches to 
solving military problems.  But, as previously indicated, the UN‟s record over the 
past few decades has largely dispelled such traditional ideas and practices: two 
enduring lessons that the UN has learnt through years of experience in responding to 
conflict is that speed and momentum do matter in peace missions, and that effective 
missions require integrated efforts – not separate tracks that do not converge.   
 
The fact that conflict in Africa routinely subsides and returns whilst peacekeepers 
are deployed, and that the reliance on peacekeeping is constantly increasing, suggest 
a case of what is termed in systems-thinking as the „shifting-the-burden archetype‟.  
This archetype reveals that an underlying problem (in this case war economy) 
generates systems (intractable conflict, resource exploitation) that demand attention.  
A short-term solution (peacekeeping) is used to correct the problem – with 
seemingly positive results (ceasefire agreements and peace agreements), but over 
time it becomes evident that this solution only ameliorates the symptom, while the 
underlying problem (lack of socio-economic development) is left unaltered.  In the 
long-term, the symptomatic problem resurfaces (in the return to conflict) and there is 
increased pressure for symptomatic responses (quick fixes).  Meanwhile, the 
underlying problem remains un-addressed, and the side-effects of the symptomatic 
response (sustaining war economies) make it harder to apply the fundamental 
solution (peacebuilding) (UN, 2005b:11). 
 
The UN‟s response to the conflict in Sierra Leone is a good example of the 
„shifting–the–burden structure‟.  Although UN peacekeepers have been deployed for 
several years since 1999, the underlying causes of the conflict have until now, not 
been sufficiently addressed (UN, 2005b:11).  The UN‟s initial response to the 
conflict in Sierra Leone resulted in a scenario of recurrent conflict where 
achievements were generally short-lived and unsustainable as many of the 
peacebuilding initiatives were not well-planned and coordinated.  Pressure to 
ameliorate these problems resulted in a gradual increase in the number of military 
peacekeepers, from 6 000 in October 1999 to 17 500 in March 2001 (UN, 2001:11).  
However, despite attempts to bolster the UN‟s peacekeeping capacity, widespread 
poverty, illiteracy, discrimination against women, corruption, lack of accountability 
and high levels of unemployment continue to contribute to the level of instability 
that is still prevalent in Sierra Leone (UN, 2005b:10). 
 
In an attempt to transform itself into an organisation that is indeed able to play a 
more coordinated role in peacebuilding activities in post-conflict societies, the UN 
established the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in December 2005 (Deller, 
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2006:8).  The PBC was established as an inter-governmental body which would 
convene representatives of the UN‟s major organs, financing institutions, troop 
contributors, the governments in question, as well as other role-players in order to 
improve on the coordination of activities and to effectively marshal resources for 
post-conflict peacebuilding activities.  Sierra Leone and Burundi were the first two 
cases that were selected for intervention by the PBC.  The PBC subsequently 
convened a meeting on 19 July 2006 during which government officials, 
representatives of the UN country teams, the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund made presentations on the status of the peacebuilding efforts in 
Burundi and Sierra Leone respectively (Deller, 2006:9).  The Sierra Leone meeting 
included Sierra Leone‟s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, 
Mr Momodu Koroma, who emphasised the progress that had been made in 
governmental programmes in governance reform, resource management and 
accountability, security sector reform including retraining programmes, and national 
reconciliation including the TRC.  Some the challenges that he identified, were 
youth unemployment, perceptions of corruption, weak infrastructure, implementing 
poverty reduction strategies and the Millennium Development Goals (Deller, 
2006:10).  During July 2006, the PBC organised a meeting between the Global 
Partnership for Prevention and Armed Conflict, the West African Network for 
Peacebuilding, the Network on Collaborative Peacebuilding and participants from 
civil society that represented thematic issues of concern, as well as government 
representatives.  Seven priority areas were identified in relation to the security 
situation in Sierra Leone (Deller, 2006:10): 
 
 implementation and dissemination of the TRC and the poverty reduction 
strategy documents; 
 building effective partnerships among government, civil society 
organisations, inter-governmental organisation and donors; 
 human resource development: skills training for the youth, and economic 
empowerment for women; 
 gender mainstreaming in peacebuilding; 
 strengthening of the capacity of national civil society organisations and 
public institutions; and 
 establishing a monitoring and evaluation mechanism.  
 
5.7. NGOs and the peace mission 
 
NGOs found it nearly impossible to fulfil their mission in Sierra Leone during the 
war of 1990, due to the lack of security (Pratt, 1999).   It was only after the UK 
intervened in the ongoing violence, that the security situation changed significantly 
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for the better.  According to Jackson (2005:110), this intervention should not be 
underestimated as it demonstrated that a robust and professional military force from 
a „lead nation‟ had the capacity to restore order.  “The deployment of UK forces 
rescued the UN mission and certainly played a significant part in averting a full-
scale humanitarian catastrophe in Sierra Leone” (Wilkinson, 2000:8).  When the 
crisis began to sharply worsen in the spring of 2000, many NGOs were outspoken in 
their support of British forces in Sierra Leone.  Oxfam, for instance, stated that: 
“Oxfam GB welcomes the decision to deploy British troops to Sierra Leone … it is 
difficult to imagine how UNAMSIL can succeed, with the required speed, without 
British troops being available to use force” (Oxfam International, 2000).  By every 
measure, the ability of NGOs to perform humanitarian and relief work, resettlement 
and repatriation of displaced persons, judicial reconciliation and the strengthening of 
civil society in Sierra Leone, only significantly improved when the decision was 
made by the UK to intervene with combat forces.  By 2002, the UNHCR announced 
that fifteen international NGOs, four local NGOs and two UN agencies would work 
together and coordinate their efforts to reintegrate refugees into society.  The United 
Nations Capital Development Fund began with critically needed micro-financing 
projects, and Medicins Sans Frontieres began to effectively operate again (UNHCR, 
2002).  With a secure work environment, major private NGOs such as Amnesty 
International assisted in the effort to revitalise the demolished Sierra Leonean 
judicial system, along with the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
to investigate and prosecute war crimes and the creation of the TRC to help create 
the conditions for national reconciliation.  Local and international NGOs also 
assisted with the successful effort to hold national elections in Sierra Leone on 14 
May 2002 (UNHCR, 2002). 
  
5.8. Experience gained from Sierra Leone 
 
The problems and limitations experienced by members of the UN in Sierra Leone 
did not come as a surprise.  The former UNSG, Kofi Annan, had already appointed a 
panel of experts to assess and articulate the shortcomings of the UN peacekeeping 
system in March 2000, later known as the Brahimi Report.  This investigation was 
embarked upon after the UNSG published two reports that focused on the UN‟s 
failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda in 1994, as well as an inability to protect the 
inhabitants of Srebrenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina) in 1995 (Neethling, 2002:41). 
 
One of the key findings contained in the Brahimi Report was that the UN was unable 
to perform the principal mission for which it was created, namely the maintenance 
of peace.  In addition to the identification of technical problems that hampered the 
organisational ability of the UN to perform tasks in the field of conflict prevention, 
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peacebuilding and peacekeeping, the Brahimi panellists, based on numerous 
occasions during the 1990s, found that no amount of good intentions could 
substitute for the fundamental ability to project a credible force.  The events in 
Sierra Leone and Bosnia highlighted the difficulties that the UN had experienced in 
establishing peacekeeping missions where there was not true peace to keep.  Hayes 
(2000: 3) points out that the deployment of a force under a Chapter VI self-defence 
mandate in such circumstances had been acknowledged as both unsuccessful and 
damaging to the credibility of the UN.  Many were of the opinion that the insertion 
of more troops into Sierra Leone would rescue the failing mission, but an increase in 
UN forces merely provided for a wider range of potential hostages.  Hayes (2000:3) 
emphasises that a change in mandate – without the commensurate upgrading of 
weaponry, training, and command and control to act upon it – raised false 
expectations and heightened the likelihood of a humiliation akin to Srebrenica or 
Rwanda.  Many scholars hold the opinion that it was the credibility of the force that 
explains the British success and UN difficulties in Sierra Leone.  Ultimately, the 
crisis in Sierra Leone initiated a serious call for change as well as a stronger 
commitment to the UN peacekeeping system on the part of member states. 
 
The experience of NGOs in Sierra Leone emphasises the links between effective 
military intervention and the NGOs‟ and other role-players‟ abilities to successfully 
provide humanitarian assistance.  What is clear, is that the nature and scope of 
security threats faced by NGOs has profoundly changed the manner in which 
humanitarian aid and human rights communities do their business – now and in the 
future.  In order for many NGOs to perform their missions, collaboration with 
military forces in helping them create a viable security environment is a given 
(Jackson, 2005:113).  To this effect, the concept of DPMs provides a practical 
solution for the synchronisation of military and civilian efforts.  The experience in 
Sierra Leone underlined the fact that military and civilian actors cannot act on 
separate tracks, but that the key to successful peace interventions is to be found in 
the effective coordination of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities.  In addition 
to the above, the events that transpired in Sierra Leone gave impetus to the growing 
international awareness that peacebuilding should be an essential part of any multi-
national peacekeeping undertaking in Africa (Neethling, 2005:92).  This implies that 
a long-term process is required and that it entails full-spectrum planning for peace 
enforcement and nation-building.  Nation-building will to a great extent, be 
dependent on the progress with the establishment of infrastructure.  Infrastructure is 
important – it provides the basis for human capital, the provision of state goods and 
services, and enables the creation and functioning of public and private institutions 
(Gueli, 2007:29).  Gueli (2007:29) points out that, without access to proper 
infrastructure and basic services, the disillusioned and the disempowered are more 
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likely to support „generous‟ warlords than internationally brokered peace 
agreements, which in some cases, tend to offer little but starvation and sometimes – 
a wage. 
 
It is imperative that challenges regarding the justice and local government sectors be 
effectively addressed in order to ensure sustainable peace and development for 
Sierra Leone.  The devolution of authority to district or town level remains a serious 
challenge and according to the UNSG, this devolution is necessary to reconnect the 
central government with rural communities and to promote socio-economic 
development and broader community participation.  It is also essential to develop a 
vibrant private sector in order to transform the economy and create employment 
opportunities.  In order to facilitate this, it is essential that the security sector be 
strengthened so that the armed forces can perform their tasks effectively.  The 
establishment of an effective judiciary is essential and special attention should be 
paid to the development of a culture that promotes respect for human rights (Ki-
moon, 2007a:7–9). 
 
In addition to the above, one of the most crucial aspects for achieving lasting peace 
and development is the requirement to effectively address the relationship between 
peace and development in the shortest time possible.  Collier (2006:9) explains that 
the only reliable way to create the conditions that can maintain peace and allow it to 
prosper, rather than to collapse back into the conflict trap, is to encourage economic 
growth.  The role of the military in such a tactic is to create and protect the 
conditions within which the developmental organisations and agents can perform 
their work.  This important requirement emphasises the notion that economic 
recovery cannot simply be dealt with in a post-conflict reconstruction phase.  
Solomon (2001:246) contends that: “economic reconstruction should be viewed as a 
conflict preventative measure and should occur in all phases”.  This emphasises the 
realisation that one cannot separate peacemaking from the processes of 
reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation.  Solomon (2001:247) argues that 
these processes should therefore be viewed as parallel processes that are 
complementary to one another, and if approached in a holistic manner, can 
contribute to sustainable peace.  The more holistic understanding of peace, dovetails 
with the work of Ohlsson (1995:5) who distinguished between two notions of peace 
– namely negative and positive peace.  Whereas negative peace exits where there is 
a mere absence of war, positive peace is more embracing and holistic, and also 
includes issues such as prospects for social development.  In terms of the latter, the 
concept of DPMs calls for the rapid build-up of civilian and military assets in peace 
missions, and at the same time, the force mix should contain a fair amount of 
capability to kick-start reconstruction and development.   
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According to DFA (2007:10), the peace process in Sierra Leone represents a 
successful case study for integrated peace missions.  The restoration of 
democratically elected government after elections in 2002 as well as in 2007, bears 
witness to strong national and international efforts to resolve the conflict.  In its 
quest to build a sustainable peace, Sierra Leone managed to overcome political as 
well as military challenges by involving key stakeholders such as political actors, 
civil society, rebel groups and ECOMOG, among others. 
 
Sierra Leone‟s constitution provides for the rule of law and the protection of human 
rights.  It empowers the parliament to enforce democratic accountability and 
oversight.  The partnerships between the government and the international donors 
refurbished the physical infrastructure of the courts throughout the country.  
Strategic departments such the police, correctional services and justice were 
strengthened to ensure a safe and secure environment in containing civil unrest, 
domestic violence and economic crimes.  Security sector reform in Sierra Leone also 
ultimately managed to bring security forces under civilian oversight (DFA, 
2007:11). 
 
Civil society played a central role in the establishment of democracy in Sierra Leone 
by embarking on a campaign for good governance.  It created awareness and 
consciousness among the citizens to maximise their participation in directing and 
shaping state affairs in peacebuilding.  This critical formation played a significant 
role in the re-establishment of multiparty democratic government.  There was also a 
robust campaign toward the education of the youth as long-term investment in 
capacity-building for the country‟s future development and the institutionalisation of 
good governance.  This would also contribute to the notion of local ownership of the 
country‟s progress. 
 
5.9. Conclusions 
 
On 7 May 2007, the UNSG, Ban Ki-moon, stated that Sierra Leone continued to 
make progress in the peace consolidation process.  The registration of voters for the 
July 2007 general elections commenced on 26 February 2007 and was completed on 
18 March 2007.  About 91% of eligible voters were registered.  The elections that 
followed, took place in a democratic manner.  Thus, general positive developments 
have strengthened the prospects for long-term peace.  However, the security 
situation in Sierra Leone remains fragile, as the high rates of unemployment and 
negative public perceptions about the lack and slow pace of improvement of the 
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living conditions of the overwhelming majority of the population, remain the key 
threats to the country‟s fragile stability (Ki-moon, 2007a:1-3). 
 
In light of the above, some questions remain: has the conflict finally ended in Sierra 
Leone? Is there a likelihood of a return to hostilities in the future?  Not being an 
ethnic conflict, Sierra Leone is at least not facing simmering tension between rival 
ethnic groups.  There is no victorious group seizing the spoils of losing groups 
suffering the consequences – both sides were the same family of Sierra Leoneans.  
However, there is a great difference between pacification and peace – absence of 
war is not the same as absence of pain, trauma and physical destruction.  These still 
haunt the psychological and geographical landscape.  One of the primary causes of 
the conflict, widespread unemployment of the younger generations of Sierra 
Leoneans that lead to their alienation from the rest of society, remains a serious 
challenge to long-term peace and prosperity. 
 
Ultimately, experience in Sierra Leone has yet again demonstrated that 
peacekeeping in Africa involves entry into volatile, high risk, anarchic 
environments, where copious quantities of weapons are available.  In addition, the 
destruction of the social cohesion and state infrastructures can remove the support 
mechanisms required to sustain life, which most often, results in humanitarian crisis.  
In these circumstances, it is essential that the peace force that is deployed in such 
complex emergencies be credible in the eyes of the population, the belligerents and 
the international community.  However, the military deployment ultimately forms 
only a part of the solution: there can be no credible military peace support operations 
force without the political backing of all the participating nations.  Peace support 
operations forces on their own cannot ensure lasting peace and development in 
countries where complex emergencies have to be addressed.  The relationship 
between security and development must be clearly understood by all parties 
concerned, and there must be a long-term commitment by all role-players to 
contribute to finding lasting peace. 
 
The relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding is effectively addressed 
by the concept of DPMs.  The intervention in Sierra Leone indicates that the 
effective application of the concept of DPMs can very effectively be used to 
establish the required conditions for sustainable peace and development.  In this 
regard, the PBC succeeded in gaining the support and cooperation of most of the key 
role-players – a factor that contributed significantly to the development of integrated 
peacebuilding strategies, as well as in terms of garnering support for peacebuilding 
activities.  The experience in Sierra Leone thus clearly shows that the concept of 
DPMs can be utilised or applied as a framework to provide feasible solutions in the 
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establishment of an environment that is conducive to sustainable long-term peace, 
reconstruction and development. 
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CHAPTER 6: PEACE MISSIONS IN THE AFRICAN 
CONTEXT: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The widespread conflict that resulted in the loss of millions of lives in the DRC 
during the latter part of the 1990‟s can be ascribed to several inter-connected 
elements that have shaped the nature of the conflict in the Great Lakes region for 
many decades.  These elements, according to Katshung (2007:117), include aspects 
such as competition over natural and economic resources, lack of security, ethnic 
chauvinism, as well as disruptive actions by belligerent groupings from 
neighbouring countries that were pursuing their respective interests.  This generally 
applies to all countries in the region, namely Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and the 
DRC.  In addition, these countries are afflicted by poor governance and political 
opportunism, which in turn leads to military action being used to resolve essentially 
social, political and economic problems (Cartier-Bresson, 2003:174). 
 
In order to develop realistic possibilities for conflict resolution and the establishment 
of sustainable lasting peace in the DRC, it is essential to effectively manage and 
address concerns regarding resources and security.  These two issues are wholly 
dependent on one another (the security-development nexus) and are key to 
reconciliation and reconstruction in the DRC, as well as the larger Great Lakes 
region (Katshung, 2007:118).  In the case of the DRC it is essential to keep in mind 
that the abundance of natural resources which facilitated the continued conflict in 
the first place, could also act as the key to establishing sustainable peace and 
security in the long-term, if the resources are managed and exploited to the benefit 
of all the inhabitants of the DRC, as well as for the economic development of the 
region as a whole. 
 
The establishment of lasting peace in the DRC depends on a few crucial aspects.  
The first is the rebuilding of state and governmental institutions and ensuring that 
the political transition is effectively translated from the highest political levels, to the 
restoration of peace at local or „grassroots‟ levels, i.e. the sovereignty of the 
transitional government should thus be established over the entire territory, and not 
be limited to major towns and cities such as Kinshasa (Rogier, 2004:255).  The 
second critical requirement is that of the re-building and re-structuring of a 
competitive and free market economy that will benefit not only the DRC, but also 
the region as a whole.  Bi-lateral relations between the DRC and its neighbours 
should thus be normalised.  This is especially important in the eastern DRC, as the 
DRC transitional government needs the co-operation or at least the abstention of 
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neighbouring states, in order to establish its authority over the full territory of the 
country (Rogier, 2004:267). 
 
The peace intervention in the DRC was chosen as a case study to determine the 
feasibility of successfully implementing the concept of DPMs in Africa, as the 
intervention addressed peacekeeping and peacebuilding issues and activities 
simultaneously.  This intervention was, as was the intervention in Sierra Leone, also 
conducted in accordance with the new approach to UN peace missions that was 
adopted in the early 1990‟s in which peacebuilding is brought „closer‟ to 
peacekeeping – thus effectively addressing the „reconstruction gap‟ which is so often 
presented as the cause or the reason for the relapse into violence in states that have 
been plagued by intra-state conflicts. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the approach to and nature of the intervention in 
the DRC, as well as to assess the nature of and impact of international and regional 
responses to the crises.  The analysis also addresses the course of events that led up 
to the respective interventions and include an analysis of the experiences gained 
from these interventions that could be used to inform future peace missions − 
specifically in terms of the feasibility and requirements for successfully 
implementing the concept of DPMs during peace interventions on the African 
continent.  
 
6.2. The background to the conflict in the DRC 
 
The conflict in the DRC should be understood in terms of the factors that shaped the 
environment in which widespread violence eventually broke out.  These factors 
include the transfer of conventional weapon systems, small arms and landmine-
systems from countries such as Bulgaria, the USA, UK, France, Zimbabwe and 
South Africa, the actions of the country‟s armed forces and rogue rebel groups, 
starvation and territorial displacement of the peoples of the DRC.  The problems 
were exacerbated by the invasion of regional African states and the problem of 
African and non-African mercenaries and private security firms operating in the 
DRC (Siler, 2004:xxix).  The violence that broke out in the DRC in 1996 had its 
roots in the civil war that broke out in Burundi in 1993, which was followed by the 
1994 Rwandan genocide between the Hutus and Tutsis.  Both these conflicts 
resulted in large numbers of refugees fleeing to neighbouring DRC.  However, even 
before the Rwandan conflict spread to the DRC, significant numbers of both the 
Tutsis and the Hutus had been residing in the DRC for a considerable period of time.  
Rwanda, citing the need not only to protect its own citizens from attack by the 
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Hutus, but also to protect the Tutsi Congolese, launched incursions into the eastern 
DRC in 1996 (Katshung, 2007:118).  
 
Large-scale violence broke out in the DRC in 1996 when the Rwandan-backed rebel 
group, the Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire 
(AFDL) and its leader, Laurent Kabila deposed the dying dictator, Mobutu Sese 
Seko, and established control over large parts of the country.  According to Marks et 
al (2007:68), the proximate cause of the war in the DRC, the third largest country on 
the African continent, was the result of the spillover effects of the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide, which had led to the displacement of millions of refugees in Zaire‟s eastern 
border region, as well as the reappearance and settling of the genocide perpetrators 
within those border areas.  He then concludes that it was ultimately the total collapse 
of the Zairian state mechanisms that triggered the outbreak of widespread violence in 
the DRC (Marks et al, 2007:68).  The violence had a devastating effect on the more 
than 50 million inhabitants and much of the country suffered from ongoing fighting 
among the belligerent groupings.  However, the genocide in Rwanda, the refugees 
and displaced people, as well as the presence of the genocide perpetrators only served 
as „triggers‟ that caused the underlying dissent and dissatisfaction with the 
government of Zaire to spill over into widespread violence.   
 
 The violence that broke out in 1996 is not a new phenomenon to the troubled state.  
Since the DRC (formerly known as Zaire) gained independence from Belgium on 30 
June 1960, it has been plagued by continued outbreaks of violence over a period of 
more than forty years.  According to Mangu (2004:31), “the DRC has reflected the 
full range of African problems, from colonial domination and exploitation to 
corruption, as well as authoritarian rule, ethnic conflicts, military regimes and 
mismanagement”.  The causes of the violence that broke out in the DRC during the 
period 1998 to 2000 were thus complex and not only confined to the borders of the 
DRC, as it not only involved belligerents from the DRC, but also involved armed 
forces from several other African countries.  This is why the DRC conflict has been 
called the first African „world war‟, because by 1999 it involved six or seven foreign 
states and a large number of rebel factions in the DRC itself.  There was at that time 
great risk that the conflict could escalate into a conventional inter-state African war 
(Mandrup-Jorgensen, 2007:48).  Fortunately, the conflict did not develop into a 
conventional war, and most of the violence was contained within the borders of the 
DRC.  The conflict ultimately resulted in the death of more than 3,3 million people, 
mostly from disease and hunger (Marks et al, 2007:68).  
 
 When the war broke out in the DRC in 1996, Rwanda and Uganda formed an alliance 
with the Congolese armed resistance movement under the leadership of Kabila.  This 
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„triple K‟-alliance (Kampala-Kinshasa-Kigali) dissolved in 1998 as a result of 
security concerns that were noted by Uganda and Rwanda (Mandrup-Jorgensen, 
2007:48).  On the one hand, Uganda claimed that it was compelled to stop insurgents 
from attacking Uganda through southern Sudan and the eastern DRC.  The Ugandan 
government specifically referred to the Lord‟s Resistance Army (LRA) and members 
of the Allied Democratic Forces in this regard.  On the other hand, Rwanda invoked 
the „right to self-defence‟ against the border-incursions into its territory by the DRC-
based Hutu militias.  In reaction to these growing hostilities, Angola, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe justified their military interventions in the DRC under the banner of 
attempting to secure the unity of a SADC member state.  Chad also provided a small 
number of troops at the request of the DRC government (Katshung, 2007:118).  
 
 6.3. The road to war 
 
 The former leader of the DRC, President Mobutu was supported by the West for 
many years.  This attitude was dictated by a formula that shaped USA and Western 
foreign policy towards Zaire for many years, namely that of „Mobutu or Chaos‟ 
(Schatzberg:1991).  As a result, the West essentially accepted the dictatorial nature of 
Mobutu‟s regime and in this regard, the USA and France facilitated Mobutu‟s 
attempts to hijack political change by maintaining that Mobutu, as president, was a 
legitimate part of the transition process, rather than an impediment to it (Mangu, 
2004:31).  It was only after Mobutu became terminally ill and unable to serve his 
Western patrons that the West resolved to find a successor for him.        
 
 Laurent-Desire Kabila was identified as the new leader and gained support for a 
rebellion against Mobutu.  Kabila had, for many years, been leading and orchestrating 
a rebellion against Mobutu from his stronghold in the South Kivu mountains.  Kabila 
was finally brought to power by a coalition of foreign troops, led by Rwanda and 
Uganda.  Armed forces from Angola, Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia also 
assisted in bringing Kabila to power.  This „First Congolese War‟ (1996–1997) thus 
originated as a foreign invasion of Zaire by its eastern neighbours – with the blessing 
of the Western countries (Mangu, 2004:31). 
 
 After seven months of a virtually unchallenged march through the then Zaire, 
Kabila‟s Alliance of Democratic Liberation Forces (AFDL), took over control of the 
government.  Kabila proclaimed himself as president and unilaterally renamed Zaire 
as the DRC.  After a year in power, Kabila requested that all the foreign troops return 
to their countries of origin.  However, Rwanda and Uganda refused to leave, and 
invaded the DRC on 2 August 1998 (Mangu, 2004:31).  
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 The Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) was created in August 1998 by some of 
Kabila‟s former comrades in the AFDL, who accused Kabila of authoritarianism, 
corruption, mismanagement, tribalism and nepotism.  Several foreign countries, 
primarily Rwanda and Uganda, backed this grouping.  Another opposition group, the 
Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) who also opposed Kabila‟s rule, later 
joined the RCD.  After some time, the RCD split into the RCD (Goma), the main 
rebel group, the RCD-National (RCD-N) and the RCD-Liberation Movement (RCD-
ML).  These new groupings were essentially born out of tensions and conflicting 
interest between Rwanda and Uganda.  Uganda had realised that Rwanda was in 
command of the RCD and it saw the need to encourage the creation of other 
groupings that could fall under Ugandan influence and control.  The conflict in the 
DRC also involved several other foreign rebel groups allegedly based in the DRC and 
launching attacks against their respective governments (Mangu, 2004:32).  It was 
evident that the causes of the conflict in the DRC were multi-dimensional with both 
regional and domestic aspects, which had become intermingled.  
 
At the climax of the conflict, at least seven other African states had deployed regular 
troops in the DRC.  These included Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Chad who lent 
support to President Kabila and on the other side, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi who 
backed the rebels.  The first group of countries motivated their participation in the 
conflict as assisting the government of the DRC against foreign aggression.  They 
argued that the intervention was justified in terms of international law on the use of 
forces as a type of „collective self-defence‟.  The other group, including Rwanda, 
Uganda and Chad motivated their presence in the DRC with the argument that the 
rebel groups were attacking them from within the DRC and that they were attempting 
to disarm them.  In addition, the presence of foreign troops included other 
motivations.  The DRC‟s lucrative natural resources, including gold, diamonds, 
timber, copper and coltan resources, also provided several states in the region – 
Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia − with an incentive for military intervention (Katshung, 
2007:118).  The clamour for these resources resulted in numerous conflicts between 
Rwandan and Ugandan troops in Kisangani and the Eastern Province of the DRC 
(Breytenbach et al, 1999:33).  According to Macqueen (2002:89), as was the case in 
other African conflicts of the late 1990s from Angola to Liberia, ideological issues, 
so far as they ever had any importance, were soon overshadowed by the pursuit of 
spoils in the form of portable and exploitable resources.  In the DRC, as elsewhere, 
diamonds became both the engine and an objective of the conflict and were sought as 
a prize by both the indigenous and the foreign forces involved in the war.  As a result 
of the complex and varied mix of motivations for partaking in the military 
intervention, the conflict in the DRC thus became Africa‟s most complex major 
conflict.   
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 Many of the role-players in the peace process in the DRC ascribe the causes for the 
conflict to the illegal exploitation as the main cause of the problems.  To this effect, 
the UN‟s Report of the Panel of Experts in the Illegal Exploitation of Natural 
Resources and other Forms of Wealth of the DRC (UN, 2001) makes it explicit that it 
is the exploitation of resources that fuelled conflict and perpetuated instability in the 
DRC.  This is also, according to Kabemba (2006:154) the perspective that informed 
the mediation process in the DRC. However, to merely place the blame for the 
violence in the DRC at the door of the abundance of resources, would exclude the 
pivotal role that the Congolese leadership had played in perpetuating the violence.  
This reasoning has left the Congolese leadership, to a great extent, indifferent to the 
suffering of their people, for they are able to claim that responsibility for the DRC‟s 
dismal condition lies with external actors who illegally exploit the resources of the 
country and perpetuate human rights abuses. Consequently, “the failure of the state is 
a product of external manipulation” (Kabemba, 2006:154).  Therefore, indirectly, this 
contention suggests that the causes for the conflict are external and that solutions to 
the conflict in the DRC should be based on effectively addressing these external 
causes.  If it is true that the undemocratic nature of politics in the DRC is an outcome 
of external manipulation, the individual leaders of the Congo would not have to take 
responsibility for poor leadership. 
 
 However, analysts of African politics point to mal-governance and the poverty of 
leadership as major factors that contributed to the manifest crisis of the continent 
since independence.  The assessment that the DRC is a prisoner of its abundant 
mineral resources is misleading and an over-simplification of the causes for the 
continued violence.  The fact that a country is rich in commodities does not mean it 
is bound to become a dysfunctional state that would sink into conflict and poverty.  
Kabemba  (2006:155) argues that the absence of democratic and good governance in 
the management of the state sustains the predatory nature of the state itself and this 
is the main problem in the DRC.  Former president, Mobutu, neglected to build state 
institutions, including the army and Rwanda and Uganda used the weakness of the 
state to overthrow him.  Almost 40% of national revenues accrued to Mobutu and 
his cronies, while the average Zairian earned less than $190 per annum.  Ultimately, 
Mobutu caused the country to become a dysfunctional state that was prone to 
conflict because of poor leadership.  The lack of state administrative and 
organisational capacity, in both the civilian and military fields, exacerbated the sad 
state of affairs.  Ultimately, it was the internal weaknesses that opened the windows 
for external actors to exploit the countries‟ resources in the manner that it occurred 
in the DRC.  Kabemba (2006:156) concludes: ”if war was an extension of politics 
(as described by 19th century German military theorist, Karl von Clausewitz), then in 
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the DRC, was is an extension of economics”.  It is clear that, unless the state is 
rebuilt in the DRC, that there is no hope for the future, despite the newly found 
nationalism that the Congolese have shown against all efforts to balkanise their 
country (Kabemba, 2006:156). 
 
In a bid to broker a peace in the DRC, the international community convened several 
round-table negotiation sessions and signed several peace agreements with the 
belligerents.  The UNSC made regular statements of concern, but primarily left the 
peacemaking with the regional agencies concerned, namely the former OAU and 
SADC.  The crisis and its timing were immensely challenging to the UN Secretariat 
and the UNSC.  The situation in the DRC was immensely complex from a 
peacekeeping point of view and there was clearly no peace to keep, therefore an 
inter-positionary force would have been irrelevant at that time.  Even an 
enforcement action would have presented the UNSC with a major conundrum as to 
what should be enforced (Macqueen, 2002:89).  However, after many discussions, 
the UNSC indicated its readiness to consider the active involvement of the UN, in 
co-ordination with the OAU to assist in the implementation of an effective cease-fire 
agreement in April 1999 (UN, 1999).  This decision by the UNSC was followed by 
the signing of several agreements by the relevant role-players.  The first significant 
peace agreements ended in the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and the 
holding of political negotiations, known as the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.   
 
6.4. Negotiations to end the violence and transition to a stable state 
 
The international community undertook many diplomatic initiatives in a bid to 
broker a peace in the DRC. A number of agreements were signed by the parties 
involved and approximately 23 initiatives, aimed at ending the hostilities and 
addressing the concerns of neighbouring countries, mainly Rwanda and Uganda, as 
the conflict in the DRC has regional dimensions (Dindelo, 2006:47).  The first, the 
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, was negotiated within the framework of the South 
African Development Community (SADC) and signed by the Heads of State of the 
DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe and Angola‟s Minister of Defence 
on 10 July 1999.  
 
The 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement resulted in agreements over two primary 
initiatives, namely the United Nations Organisation Mission to the Congo or Mission 
de la Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo (MONUC) and the Inter-Congolese 
Dialogue (Malan and Porto, 2004:v).  The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement primarily 
dealt with the ceasefire, the date of its entry into force, its meaning and implications 
for the parties to the Agreement and the security concerns for the DRC and its 
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neighbouring countries (Mangu, 2004:32).  Mangu (2004:32) also emphasises the 
fact that the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement addressed much more than the ceasefire 
itself, and that it included many aspects regarding post-conflict peacebuilding 
aspects as well.  The significance of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement can be found 
in the fact that regional states themselves, for the first time, agreed upon a 
framework for the region‟s political reconstruction in Sub-Saharan Africa (Wolpe, 
2000:27).  However, despite the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the 
Congolese failed to implement it.  President Laurent Kabila was assassinated by his 
own bodyguard in 2001, and as was the case with the Belgian and Mobutu 
governments before him (Kabemba, 2006:158). 
 
 During a meeting that took place in Gaborone, Botswana in August 2001, the 
Congolese parties agreed that Inter-Congolese Dialogue was set to take place in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in October 2001.  It finally took place at Sun City in South 
Africa, from February to April 2002 and in April 2003 (Mangu, 2004:33).  The 
purpose of the Dialogue was to establish an agreement on a power-sharing formula.  
The negotiations were to be all inclusive and under the supervision of Sir Ketumile 
Masire, the SADC-appointed mediator, but from 9 April 2002 they were partly taken 
over by former South African President, Thabo Mbeki.  The first phase of the Inter-
Congolese Dialogue finished on 18 April 2002, with a partial agreement signed by 
one of two major rebel movements, the MLC, and the Kabila government.  Despite 
the late intervention by President Mbeki, the Rwanda-backed Rassemblement 
Congolais pour la Democratie-Goma (RCD-Goma) and a coalition of civil society 
groups refused to sign this agreement, partly as a result of heavy pressure from the 
Kabila government, but also because of disagreements over the arrangements for 
power-sharing during the transitional phase (Mandrup-Jorgensen, 2007:49).    
 
 The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 1999 was followed by the Pretoria Agreement 
that was agreed upon in July 2002.  In accordance with this agreement, a programme 
and timetable for implementation was agreed upon and Rwandan delegates agreed to 
withdraw their troops from the DRC (Dindelo, 2006:47). The Pretoria Agreement 
was followed by the Luanda Agreement, which was signed in September 2002 
between the DRC and Uganda.  This agreement addressed the security concerns of 
neighbouring countries referred to in the Preamble and Article 2 of the 1999 Lusaka 
Agreement.  It stipulated the arrangements for the withdrawal of Ugandan forces 
from the DRC, establishing the Joint Pacification Committee on Ituri to govern the 
district with the assistance of MONUC and the acceptance by the DRC for Uganda to 
remain on the slopes of Mount Ruwenzori until the parties put in place security 
mechanisms guaranteeing Uganda‟s security.  The general situation in the DRC 
improved in 2002 when a large part of the foreign intervention ended when Rwanda, 
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Uganda and Angola withdrew their forces from the country.  The situation became 
politically more manageable for the UN, despite that fact that foreign influence, 
especially Rwandan, continued to be exercised through local factions (Macqueen, 
2002:232). 
 
 According to Kabemba (2006:158), little attention has been paid to the issue of 
justice in the DRC and this has exacerbated much of the violence that continued to 
flare up in parts of the DRC.  The mainstream justice system remained weak and 
corrupt and the establishment of a TRC was supposed to be the conduit for the 
development and implementation of effective transitional justice policies in the DRC, 
but this commission did not become operational.  The same can be said of the Anti-
Corruption Commission and Human Rights Commission.  These problems and 
setbacks limited the transitional government‟s ability to deal with past and increasing 
new human rights abuses (Kabemba, 2006:158). 
 
 In addition to the above, the human security situation in the DRC posed huge 
challenges of its own.  In August 2003, after months of clashes in the Ituri district in 
the Kivu and Maniema provinces, over 3,4 million persons were estimate to be 
displaced.  North Kivu and Ituri alone represented 2 million displaced people, whilst 
over 350 000 Congolese refugees fled to Congo-Brazzaville, Zambia or Tanzania and 
approximately 250 000 foreigners from six neighbouring countries had sought 
asylum in the DRC.  The transitional government and the international community 
had to find practical solutions to address the issues effectively (Malan and Porto, 
2004:6).  
 
The transitional government was a crucial tool to bridge the violent divide that has 
plagued the DRC, but its functioning was severely impeded by elements that have 
shown continued reluctance to give up power.  Rwanda and the DRC have often been 
antagonists (Swart, 2005:15).  There seemed to be a clear need for greater UN 
peacekeeping presence and greater commitment to disarm the Interahamwe militia, a 
Hutu paramilitary organisation that settled in the eastern DRC after the Rwandan 
genocide in 1994.  It was thus essential to diffuse the tensions between the Rwandan 
and DRC governments.  According to Bischoff (2005:10), the resources required to 
disarm the rebels would have had to come from outside Africa and the only way in 
which this could be attained, was to use the UN and the AU to maintain the 
international community‟s focus on the Great Lakes region as a whole, as well as on 
the geo-economic situation of the DRC in particular.  
 
 According to Mandrup-Jorgensen (2007:50), the DDR process in the DRC was 
identified by most of the parties as central to getting the DRC on the road to peace 
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and stability.  In a report by the UNSG (Annan, 2001:16), it was stated that DDR and 
the resettlement of armed groups would be key to moving towards lasting peace in 
the DRC.  The report stated that the main problems would be to remove any need for 
foreign troops to remain in the east of the country, immeasurably improve the 
security and quality of economic life for the area‟s inhabitants, and neutralise a 
dangerous source of conflict and instability in the region (Annan, 2001:16).  The 
DDR process in the DRC is very complex and it was estimated that it would involve 
300 000 combatants.  Progress with the DDR process was slower than initially 
anticipated and the fact that there has been continued instability in especially the 
eastern DRC has meant that the combatants have been reluctant to hand in their 
weapons (Mandrup-Jorgensen, 2007:51).  
 
Despite the signing of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement that was aimed at 
finally bringing peace to the DRC, the security situation deteriorated into an almost 
never-ending saga of delays in the implementation of crucial agreements, vicious 
incidents of conflict that borders on another outbreak of war, as well as continued 
tensions among key role-players who were supposed to lead the region into a new era 
of peace and prosperity (Mangu, 2004:36).  During 2004, two successive coups 
attempts occurred in the capital, Kinshasa, and the fall of Bukavu to renegade troops 
left most Congolese convinced that the transition process in the DRC was rapidly 
deteriorating.  Accusations that the transitional government had not managed to 
consolidate itself proved to be true (Swart, 2005:15). 
 
 Despite these impediments, progress was eventually made towards establishing a 
representative and democratically elected government for the DRC.  In December 
2005, the process of registering 25 million out of an eligible 28 million voters was 
completed.  A new constitution was also adopted after a national referendum.  In two 
rounds of elections that took place in July and October 2006, Congolese voters chose 
their leadership for the first time since independence in 1960.  The election was 
declared free and fair by all international electoral observer missions, including those 
from the USA, Europe and South Africa (Swing, 2007:2).    
 
 The election process was a very important milestone for the peace process in the 
DRC.  However, it is essential to bear in mind that that the election process was 
merely the start of a long-term process on the road to societal transformation.  
According to Kabemba (2006:153), many describe the current government in the 
DRC as „juridical fiction‟.  This is because the government had not extended its 
power base much further than beyond the borders of the capital, Kinshasa.  The 
question remains how to restore the DRC as a functioning state, given the extent of 
state destruction that has taken place, and the continued presence of opposing forces 
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Supplementa 3, 2009. doi: 10.5787/0-0-75
 152    
both inside and outside the DRC.  Kabemba (2006:153) points to the possibility that 
the government could fail in its attempts to establish an effective state (from the 
highest to the lowest levels), if it should perpetuate the kleptocratic patterns of the 
past.  This state of affairs could enable a governing elite to engage in the 
consumption of resources through illegal and corrupt means without accountability, 
without regard for social and human security issues, and without respect for human 
rights.  As a result, one of the greatest internal challenges in terms of the creation of 
an environment that would be conducive to societal transformation, is the 
legitimisation of institutions from the highest to the lowest („grassroots‟) 
governmental levels. 
 
Societal transformation will only be achieved in the DRC by inculcating respect for 
state institutions and the rule of law amongst the people of the DRC, as well as by 
effectively addressing human rights issues.  Transition and state building in the DRC 
should firstly be about people, and presupposes a move away from one period to a 
new one that is vastly different from the past.  A transition enables a society to 
proceed in a different way from the past, because of the injection of new ideas and 
appearance of new leadership with sound values.  While much of the negotiation 
processes regarding the DRC was indeed focused on introducing new ideas of 
negotiation and inclusiveness, it failed to effectively address accountability and to 
provide for the emplacement of a new political class that would be able to respond to 
the challenges of state building (Kabemba, 2006:156).  It concentrated on the 
requirements of the main belligerents, whose aim it was to protect their own 
individual interests by ensuring access to resources, rather than emphasising the 
requirements for the building of a new state.  The problem in the DRC since 
independence is not an argument about political ends, but rather a confusion as to the 
means to reach those ends.  In other words, even though belligerents, non-armed 
opposition and civil society have all taken part in the negotiations, it is still not clear 
how they intend to create a climate within which their efforts toward democracy will 
be sustained in the long term (Kabemba, 2006:159).  This supports the notion that, 
although it was essential to include the belligerents in finding lasting solutions to the 
conflict in the DRC, their inclusion should not have been the focus of the negotiation 
processes – too little emphasis was placed on the important issues of state-building.    
 
6.5. MONUC deployment 
 
The UN‟s first deployment to the Congo in 1960 was quick and militarily 
aggressive.  However, compared to the latter, the deployment of MONUC was 
initially slow and piecemeal and it took several years before the deployment was 
upgraded and restructured to the scale of a true Chapter VII mission.  MONUC was 
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established by the UNSC Resolution 1279 (30 November 1999) which transformed 
the UN Liaison Personnel in the DRC into a UN mission under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter with an appropriate mandate and responsibility (Molukanele et al, 
2004:44).  
 
MONUC was also established after the signing of the Lusaka Peace Agreement in 
Zambia between Angola, the DRC, Rwanda, Namibia, Uganda and Zimbabwe in 
July 1999.  The agreement included provision for (Molukanele et al, 2004:44):   
 
 the normalisation of the situation in the DRC; 
 the holding of a national dialogue; 
 addressing security concerns;  
 developing mechanism for the disarmament of armed groups; and 
 the establishment of the Joint Military Commission. 
 
Despite the signing of the Global and Inclusive Agreement of the Inter-Congolese 
Dialogue and the establishment of the Transitional Government, the initial progress 
of key provisions of the agreements were slow, particularly with regard to the 
legislative agenda, extension of state administration, military integration, DDR and 
preparations for elections.  The regional dimension of the conflict meant that former 
rebel groups continued to hold on to regional bases which impacted on the 
government‟s authority over the entire territory.  This situation placed MONUC 
personnel, as well as civilians under continual threat of attack.  Providing security 
for civilians in this tense situation remained a challenge. 
 
The UN deployed about 2 400 members in May 2000 in order to monitor the 
adherence to the Lusaka Agreement, as well as to investigate any violations of the 
ceasefire (UN, 2002:2).  Military observer teams were deployed to the entire length 
of the ceasefire line, which essentially split the country in half.  The ceasefire line 
effectively separated the government-controlled area in the west of the country from 
the resource-rich areas under the control of Ugandan and Rwandan forces in the 
eastern parts of the country (Annan, 1999c:3).  The UN‟s interposition in the DRC 
diminished the threat of government attack on the Uganda and Rwandan forces and 
the exploitation of resources was effectively left in the hands of the Ugandans and 
the Rwandans (UN, 2001:146). 
 
In September 2004, the UNSC strengthened MONUC with an additional 5 900 
soldiers and the force then reached 16 700, making it the largest UN mission with an 
estimated budget of $900 million.  Following the slow progress with the DDR 
process, many international role-players voiced their opinion that forcible 
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disarmament would be the only solution, as the Hutu rebels would never give up 
their weapons voluntarily.  This notion was not only supported by the South African 
government, but also by the AU PSC.  In a communiqué after the January 2005 
meeting in Gabon, the AU stated that it preferred forceful disarmament of the 
estimated 10 000 Hutu rebels operating in the eastern DRC, if needed by an AU 
force (Reuters, 2005).  However, in February 2005, in response to an attack on UN 
peacekeepers (nine of whom were killed), MONUC altered its strategy and attacked 
a militia compound in the northern Ituri province, killing an estimated 60 local 
militia members.  This has proved to be the turning point in the UN‟s approach to 
disarmament in the DRC, especially in the Ituri province (Mandrup-Jorgensen, 
2007:52).   
 
In essence, the MONUC deployment thus made it easier for Rwandan and Ugandan 
forces to smuggle raw materials out of the DRC and to re-export these commodities 
into the global market.  Unsurprisingly, Uganda exported ten times more gold ore in 
2001 than it ever did since its involvement in the conflict in 1998 (Renner, 2002:28).  
In the same year, Rwanda‟s coltan production (mostly of Congolese origin) soared 
from 147 tonnes in 1999 to 1 300 in 2001 (World Bank, 2005).  This implies that 
interposition by UN peacekeepers might even sustain the functioning of war 
economies.  Gueli et al (2006c:16) points out that other research conducted on 
determining the factors that may affect the recurrence of war also alludes to the fact 
that partitioning warring parties may lead to a greater likelihood of a new war 
occurring and shortening the duration of peace (Walter, 2002:20).  The UN‟s 
problem of being unable to break the link between commodities and conflict is 
further compounded by the lack of effective mechanisms to challenge transitional 
criminal networks.  
 
It is a well-know fact that trans-national criminal networks help warring parties to 
trade commodities with international buyers to acquire the supplies that are needed 
to sustain their war-efforts.  Yet, current UN mandates merely allow UN personnel 
to monitor and report on the smuggling of resources and the flow of arms and UN 
forces are not mandated to take decisive action, based on the information that they 
obtain by collecting information on trans-national criminal networks (Gueli et al, 
2006c:16). 
 
The illegal exploitation of the DRC‟s mineral resources remains a constant feature in 
the discussions about the war in general and especially in the eastern parts of the 
country (Katshung, 2007:119).  In reaction to the reports of pillaging of resources by 
the foreign forces, the UNSC mandated an independent panel to investigate these 
allegations.  In its reports, the UN Panel of Experts named senior Ugandan and 
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Rwandese armed forces officers and senior governments officials and their families 
who were allegedly responsible for the illegal exploitation of the DRC‟s natural 
resources.  In its final report in October 2003, the UN Panel of Experts largely 
documented the nexus of economic exploitation, arms trafficking and armed 
conflict, indicating that the illegal exploitation of resources remains one of the main 
sources of funding groups involved in perpetuating the conflict.  The Panel of 
Experts also listed companies based in Belgium, China, France, Germany, Israel, 
Spain, the UK and USA that were allegedly involved in the illegal arms trade in the 
DRC (UN, 2001:357).   
 
Regional actors who took part in the intervention in the DRC have been accused of 
„foreign adventurism‟ with regard to the Congolese territory, as well as its natural 
resources.  The argument is that, whilst the regional parties to the conflict might 
initially have been motivated by regional security concerns, their continued presence 
in the DRC can be attributed primarily by the economic gains derived from the DRC 
(Katshung, 2007:119).  In a report by the UNSC (2002), it was reported that criminal 
groups linked to the armies of Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe, as well as the 
government of the DRC, have benefited from the conflict.  This, according to 
Katshung (2007:120), is critical to the process, as these „groups‟ will not disband 
voluntarily as they have built up a „self-financing war economy‟ that is centred on 
mineral exploitation.  As a result, the initial rationale for the military intervention in 
the DRC by neighbouring states became self-enforcing, and the localised conflicts 
became regional.  As such, the conflict within and among the countries of the Great 
Lakes region requires regionally based and targeted solutions, along with the 
cooperation of other, relevant neighbouring states (Katshung, 2007:120). 
 
In terms of a new approach to UN Complex Peace Missions, one of the innovations 
that emerged out of the nexus between peacebuilding and robust peacekeeping 
during the MONUC operation is that of „collaborative offensive operations‟.  
MONUC operated alongside and in support of the integrated brigades of the Armed 
Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the FARDC), in offensive 
operations aimed at protecting civilians and forcefully disarming armed groups.  
Some of these collaborative operations had the desired effect in that larger numbers 
of the belligerents entered into the DDR process, if compared to earlier UN 
missions.  However, according to De Coning (2006:5), these operations have also 
raised various technical, budgetary and administrative challenges.  The most serious 
concerns related to the unintended consequences generated by these UN-directed 
and supported actions, including the impact of the predatory behaviour of some of 
the FARDC troops on members of the population where they have been deployed, 
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and the human rights abuses and internal displacements that have come about as a 
result.   
 
Another example of the trend towards greater synergy and cohesion across the 
traditional security and development divide is the way in which protection is 
emerging as a common theme for both the humanitarian and peacekeeping 
community.  As a result, several UN peace operations (Burundi, Haiti, Côte 
D‟Ivoire, the DRC, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan) have been mandated to protect 
civilians under imminent threat of violence (Holt, 2006:2).  Civilian protection has 
thus become one of the dominant themes of UN peace operations in the short-to-
medium term. 
 
6.6. Experience gained from the DRC 
 
It is widely accepted that a strong, sustainable, independent and diverse private 
sector and market economy should be established and developed in order to 
establish sustainable peace.  However, in many countries, the private sector only 
exists because of the opportunities presented and made available by government, 
thus making it difficult to operate a business outside the provisions of government.  
In the case of the DRC, there is no effective government system in which this 
private sector could function.  In addition, good commercial, financial and physical 
infrastructure is required for an independent and diverse private sector to emerge 
and this requirement remains absent in most African states (Gounden, 2005:12).  In 
this regard, the private sector in the DRC is not sustainable, independent or diverse.  
The commercial, financial and physical infrastructure is very weak in the DRC, thus 
making it very difficult for the private sector to operate effectively.  In addition, as a 
result of the ongoing conflict that had continued for several years, the regulatory 
environment is weak, making foreign direct investment a high-risk business.  This 
severely impedes on the potential investments and as a result, the opportunities to 
expand and strengthen the economy of the DRC are greatly reduced.  It is also 
important to bear in mind that the situation regarding the demand for the DRC‟s rich 
natural resources has changed significantly during the past few decades.  The 
exploitation of timber, copper, gold, coltan and uranium was historically driven by 
Western interests, but these resources have now become of limited strategic interest 
to the West and the DRC has largely become a country of small and medium size 
businesses with little global strategic value (Malan and Porto, 2004:5). 
 
Some analysts argue that this lack of strategic interest in the DRC‟s resources goes a 
long way in explaining why the international response to their illegal exploitation 
has failed to provide adequate answers to the problem.  However, while there might 
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be a lack of interest in the natural resources on the part of the West, these resources 
are still regarded as being of strategic value to the DRC and its neighbouring 
countries (Malan and Porto, 2004:5).   
 
Swing (2007:2) argues that that one of the most important lessons to be learned from 
the long peace process in the DRC is that process is all-important and that: “a 
credible, effective process is key to meeting peacekeeping challenges”.  He 
identifies five elements essential to a successful process (Swing, 2007:2):     
 
 An international legal framework.  In the case of the DRC, this includes inter 
alia, five major peace agreements since 1999, several other regional accords, 
more than 35 UNSC resolutions and 24 reports by the UNSG to the UNSC, 
the International Great Lakes Pact on Security, Stability, Peace and 
Development and very importantly, a mandate that is appropriate to the 
crisis.  
 Implementing mechanisms.  Several mechanisms were instituted in order to 
implement the peace agreements.  These include, MONUC, the International 
Committee to Accompany the Transition, the Tripartite Commission Plus, 
Joint Verification Commission and Joint Verification Teams, the Eminent 
Persons Group, etc.  
 Financial resources.  Commensurate with the mandate, some $5 billion was 
invested in the Congolese Peace Process and MONUC is (at the time of 
writing) funded at $1 billion per annum and funding for elections amounting 
to $495 million. 
 Regional support.  Although the conflict in the DRC was of an intra-state 
nature, it had significant regional ramifications.  Neighbouring countries 
could play an important role on the road to peace, for instance, by denying 
re-supply routes and safe havens to belligerents, and on leveraging pressure 
on belligerents to abandon military action in favour of negotiations.    
 Popular determination.  Most important to the success of the entire peace 
process, is the will of the people – to be free and to elect their leaders freely.  
According to Swing (2007:3), it is this popular thirst for change that was the 
main driving force in the Congolese electoral process.  He also points out 
that the elections in the DRC were the largest that the UN has ever 
supported: the largest country (the size of Western Europe); the largest 
electorate (25 million); and the largest challenge (no roads, no identity cards, 
no recent census, no multi-party elections in 40 years).  Swing points out 
that, in fact, the UN has never undertaken anything quite on the scale of the 
Congolese elections.  
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From the above, it is clear that the processes involved in modern peacekeeping 
operations are extremely complex and that each of the individual processes and 
systems are intricately linked to each other.  In order to effectively address all these 
inter-related process, it is essential to establish a common framework in terms of 
processes for all the role-players involved.  It is in this regard that the concept of 
DPMs offers, at planning level, a useful construct for integrated planning processes 
that facilitates peacekeeping, as well as peacebuilding processes.  The concept of 
DPMs, in terms of integrated planning processes, is based on the adoption of an 
integrated approach, based on effective co-operation between various states, 
government departments and civil society organisations.  The above-mentioned 
processes, as identified by Swing (2007:2), relate to a wide variety of issues that 
should be understood and implemented in terms of their respective inter-
relationships and this analysis is in line with the philosophy of the concept of DPMs, 
which is founded on the notion that peacebuilding should be brought „closer‟ to 
peacekeeping in a bid to minimise the chances of a return to violence in conflict-
ridden states.       
 
The experiences gained from the peace missions in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, the DRC 
and elsewhere clearly indicate that peacekeeping has moved beyond the traditional 
peacekeeping role of the UN, which was essentially limited to the monitoring of 
ceasefire agreements.  In addition, modern peace missions have underlined the 
growing importance of the role of regional organisations and alliances during peace 
missions.  The UN has become increasingly overburdened and as a result, regional 
organisations are increasingly being required to play their part in establishing 
sustainable peace and development in their respective regions.  This is especially 
true as far as post-conflict reconstruction processes are concerned.   
 
6.7. The role of regional organisations   
 
The UN Charter Article 52 embeds reliance upon regional organisations and 
agencies as a means of ensuring peace and security so long as those agencies‟ 
actions remain consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN.  In the light of 
the serious setbacks suffered by the UN in Somalia, Rwanda, Angola and Sierra 
Leone, certain parts of the international community became reluctant to assume the 
military and financial responsibilities associated with peacekeeping operations in 
Africa during the 1990s (Neethling, 2003:88).  This reluctance had a harsh impact 
upon Africa and it effectively compelled regional organisations in Africa to assume 
greater responsibilities in the peacekeeping domain.  Regional security organisations 
reacted to these challenges in a number of ways; some organisations have expanded, 
whilst others have ceased to exist.  As a result, African multi-lateral interventions 
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have developed a momentum of their own in the 1990s and have increasingly leaned 
towards some type of peace enforcement.  The former OAU, for instance, sanctioned 
the intervention in Liberia by ECOWAS.  This arguably set the trend for increasing 
acceptance of the role to be played by regional organisations, as did the ceding of 
UN authority in Bosnia to NATO. However, political and operational problems 
continue to impede on the successful execution of many of the operations launched 
by regional organisations.  Therefore, according to Neethling (2003:88), a key issue 
regarding peace missions in Africa is the need to achieve greater consistency and 
more cohesiveness with regard to third-party interventions in African conflicts.   
 
It is important to bear in mind that UN multi-lateral peace operations are best 
undertaken in close collaboration with regional and sub-regional organisations.  This 
was successfully demonstrated in the peace process in Haiti where the UN furnished 
the peacekeeping force and the Organisation of American States (OAS) provided the 
human rights mission personnel, with substantial UN financing.  In the same vein, as 
far as the DRC is concerned, the UN invested heavily in terms of personnel, aircraft 
and financing, but the process remained quintessentially African.  The principal 
regional partners, the AU, SADC and the South Africa played pivotal roles in the 
peace process.  
 
The role of regional partners in finding lasting solutions to intra-state conflicts that 
often boils over into neighbouring countries is crucial.  In the Great Lakes region, as 
in many African countries, the violent conflict has become the „normal‟ state of 
affairs.  Control of economic resources has therefore become an important factor in 
motivating and sustaining armed conflicts – often in what has become known as 
„war economies‟.  According to Katshung (2007:120), complex political economies, 
which often hide behind the outward symbols of statehood and national sovereignty, 
have been rooted in the pursuance of conflict.  The challenge therefore, is to 
transform regional and national political „parasite‟ economies that rely on violent 
conflict into healthy systems based on political participation, social and economic 
inclusion, respect for human rights and the rule of law. In terms of ensuring security, 
ignoring the tensions and misunderstandings about Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda and 
Uganda will have far-reaching implications for the stability and socio-economic 
development of the region as a whole, because resources will be diverted from 
human and economic development to warfare. 
 
The DRC and Great Lakes region is rich in the natural resources that are at stake for 
many actors in the conflict.  However, just as the natural resources could be the 
source of continued conflict, it also harbours the potential for post-conflict 
rehabilitation and development.  Countries should therefore limit the exploitation of 
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such resources for the purposes of merely funding conflict.  They should seek 
furthermore to identify and promote the means by which such resources can be 
safeguarded and managed in a way what will reduce conflict and ensure benefit to 
the population.  Furthermore, there is a need to develop institutions and frameworks 
for the integration and transformation of the informal economy to a formal economy, 
government by a reasonable rule of law, transparency and efficiency, without 
marginalising local and regional actors.  
 
Several initiatives have been embarked upon to address the conflict in the DRC.  
This includes the signing of the Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defence in 
the Great Lakes Region.  This protocol was signed during the Second International 
Conference of the Great Lakes Region in Nairobi during the period 14–15 December 
2006.  The countries who signed the protocol included Angola, Burundi, Central 
African Republic, the DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.  
At the heart of the Conference is the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in 
the Great Lakes Region that is the approbation, re-imaging and realisation of the 
Doctrine of Manifest Destiny in an African context (Church and Jowell, 2007:19).  
The protocol should be seen as working with the AU‟s Peace and Security 
Commission and supported by both the ASF effort and the Conflict Early Warning 
System.  The protocol is reinforced by seven projects (Church and Jowell, 2007:20):  
 
 joint security management  of common borders; 
 disarmament and repatriation of all armed groups in the eastern DRC; 
 disarmament of armed nomadic pastoralists and the promotion of 
sustainable development in specific areas; 
 development of border zones and promotion of human security; 
 de-mining in the Great Lakes region; 
 coordination of activities and reinforcements of capacities in the sub-
region to fight illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons; and 
 fighting trans-national crime and terrorism. 
 
In terms of governance and inter-state relations, the protocol provides for several 
democracy and good governance projects that include: 
 
 a regional centre for democracy, good governance, human rights and civic 
education; 
 a regional initiative for the prevention and the curbing of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, crimes against genocide, and for the fight against 
impunity; 
 a regional initiative against illegal exploitation of natural resources; and 
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 the establishment of a regional information and communication council. 
 
In terms of economic growth and infrastructure development protocols, provision 
has been made for economic development projects that address (Church and Jowell, 
2007:25): 
 
 the establishment of a regional micro-finance support facility; 
 trans-border development basins; 
 a regional project on food security; 
 the revival of an economic community of the Great Lakes countries and 
specialised institutions; and  
 regional mechanisms for certification of natural resources. 
 
From the above, it is clear that the various projects that form part of the planning 
processes of peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding should be 
integrated with the aim of mutually supporting each other, rather than viewing each 
project as a separate process with its own time lines and desired end states.  This 
approach is in line with the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of the 
concept of DPMs, as it supports a systems-thinking approach that essentially entails 
that the processes of peacekeeping and peacebuilding are executed simultaneously, 
rather than adopting a phased and linear approach to problem-solving.     
 
 6.8. Sustaining and building the peace in the DRC 
 
Many challenges must still be addressed in order to establish lasting peace in the 
DRC.  This includes the establishment of a capable, responsible army and civilian 
police force, justice reform, local elections and an end to impunity and corruption.  
The creation of a republican army in the DRC remains a sine qua non for long-term 
peace in the DRC as there is no way in which the DRC, as vast as it is, can survive 
without a strong and capable army to protect its borders (Kabemba, 2006:160).  
Progress to these issues is wholly dependent on the measure of support by UN 
member states to sustain their commitment in the DRC over a significantly long 
period.  This support is specifically important in responding to the immediate 
requirements of the „post-electoral‟ DRC.  However, most often, donors tend to 
reduce their support after successful elections – exactly the opposite of what is 
required to establish lasting peace.  Elections constitute the all-important bridge 
between peacekeeping and peacebuilding and continuity of support is vital (Swing, 
2007:4).   
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In terms of establishing sustainable peace and security in the DRC a „sustainment 
strategy‟ is more important than and „exit strategy‟.  In order to effect this change, 
the UN will have to change its approach to peace missions.  In this regard, Swing 
(2007:4) points out that the UK‟s ten-year commitment to help Sierra Leone to build 
a new army, reflects such a realistic appreciation of the importance of remaining 
engaged if peace is to become enduring.  A similar approach should thus be adopted 
in the DRC.   
 
The formal economy of the DRC and its vast natural resources must be developed in 
order to benefit its long-suffering people to ensure longer-term growth and stability.  
The DRC has an estimated 10% of the world‟s hydroelectric potential and more than 
50% of Africa‟s remaining rainforests, and it also has vast mineral resources (Swing, 
2007:4).  These resources must be efficiently exploited to serve as the building-
blocks for the establishment of a competitive market economy in the DRC.  
However, despite the abundance of natural resources, there is no infrastructure to 
maximise the exploitation thereof to ensure sustained development.  This 
reconstruction of the infrastructure in the DRC will entail, inter alia, the 
rehabilitation and building of infrastructure, including roads (145 000 km of roads of 
which no more than 2 500 km are asphalt); the reconstruction of the health system 
(40 % of health infrastructure has been destroyed in Masisi, north Kivu); the supply 
of clean water (only 45% of the people have access to safe drinking water, and in 
some rural areas, this is as low as 3%) and sanitation; and the provision of education 
(4 out of 10 children are not in school) and 400 000 displaced children have no 
access to education) (Kabemba, 2006:163).    
 
The DRC suffers from serious humanitarian security issues.  The displacement of 
masses of people prevents communities from engaging in stabilisation activities to 
feed themselves.  Oxfam International (2001) estimates that at least 37% of the 
population (approximately 18,5 million) have no access to any kind of formal 
healthcare, while 16 million people have critical food needs.  There are only 2 056 
doctors for a population of over 50 million – and of these, 930 are in Kinshasa.  
Severe malnutrition rates among children under five years old have reached 30% in 
some areas and the national maternal mortality rate is 1 837 per 100 000 live births, 
one of the worst in the world (Kabemba, 2006:163). 
 
Swing (2007:4) points out that in the light of the complex nature of multi-lateral 
peace missions, it is clear the changed nature of intra-state conflicts demands new 
skills – notably in terms of peacekeeping and nation-building capacity.  The 
decisions that have to be taken by peacekeepers in terms of peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding have become so intricate that it has given rise to the urgings of neo-
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conservative writers such as Edward Luttwak, that we should “give war a chance” to 
resolve intra-state conflicts, rather than engage in dangerous and expensive and 
ultimately futile peacekeeping efforts (Luttwak, 1999:36). Swing (2007:4) 
emphasises that, in terms of modern intra-state wars, the resources that are made 
available for a peace mission, should match the mandate and that a viable process is 
key to successful peacekeeping.  This requires, inter alia, an international legal 
framework, and implementing mechanism, and adequate finances and popular 
support.  Regional organisations have a pivotal role to play in establishing lasting 
peace and although conflicts share some generic characteristics, each mission is in 
fact sui generis.  Also, there should be a realisation that peacekeeping‟s „exit 
strategy‟ consists of electoral-legitimated state institutions and sufficient in-country 
post-electoral capacity to protect citizens and borders without UN peacekeepers.  
The post-electoral period is critical to durable peace, requiring sustained engagement 
and addressing the requirement that peacekeeping needs to be reflected 
commensurately in member states‟ budgets and the UN structure as a permanent 
global concern.    
 
The debate on the role of local, national and international actors in conflict 
resolution and post-conflict strategies in Africa will continue.  It is indisputable that, 
for any conflict resolution strategy to work, the various opposing forces must have 
confidence in the various mediation strategies and particularly those individuals and 
institutions that are involved in the security and development processes.  There is a 
new realisation in Africa that, while the role of external actors is indeed laudable, 
Africa will increasingly have to rely on its own initiatives and resources to provide 
long-term solutions to its problems within the frameworks of its sub-regional 
groupings, as well as the AU and the UN (Nhema and Zeleza, 2008:3). 
 
6.9. Conclusions 
 
In terms of finding lasting peace in the DRC, it is very evident that reconstruction 
and reconciliation initiatives should not be limited to the DRC alone, but that the 
problems should be addressed in the region as a whole, as the reconciliation process 
in one country, the DRC, is strongly linked to the status of human security in its 
neighbouring countries.  Therefore, any durable solution to the issue of insecurity in 
the DRC, must have a regional character – emphasising a systems-thinking approach 
to peace mission problem solving-techniques – which is at the heart of the DPMs 
concept. 
 
Although there are a great number of challenges to be addressed in order to establish 
long-term peace in the DRC, one of the greatest is to establish respect for the rule of 
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law.  In this regard, not only the DRC, but also all the countries in the Great Lakes 
region should work to establish effective judiciaries for the rule of law.  This implies 
the promotion of the concept of democratic governance and respect for human 
rights, as well as creating effective and independent courts and tribunals.  
Furthermore, in order to build sustainable peace, countries in the region should also 
work on political cohabitation and border security.  In this regard, in order to 
improve border security, it is essential that the human resource capacity of the 
security sector in every country in the region should be enhanced.  Ultimately, it is 
essential that the countries in the region promote peaceful coexistence among 
themselves by respecting the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of their 
neighbours. 
 
It is evident from the intervention in the DRC, as was the case in Sierra Leone, that 
peacekeeping in the 21st century differs vastly from the guidelines and prescriptions 
of the 1950s.  The experience of intervention in the brutal and ever-shifting anarchy 
in many parts in Africa, emphasises the fact that the traditional ideas pertaining to 
peacekeeping as a formalised interposition between opposing states, was a thing of 
the past.  Modern peacekeepers are expected to constantly consider the interests and 
intentions of actors in a far broader international region than in the physical area of 
operations in which they are expected to operate.  The complexities and implications 
of decisions that have to be taken by peacekeepers have become so immense that it 
has given rise to the urgings of neo-conservative writers such as Edward Luttwak, 
that we should “give war a chance” to resolve intra-state conflicts, rather than 
engage in dangerous and expensive and ultimately futile peacekeeping efforts 
(Luttwak, 1999:36). 
 
However, despite all its shortcomings and the fact that peacekeeping might not have 
solved all the problems of Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone or the DRC, it is difficult 
to argue convincingly that it has aggravated them.  Between the opposite points of 
action and non-action, there is a space in which lives have been saved, aid has been 
distributed and peacemaking opportunities have been facilitated and implemented 
(Macqueen, 2002:233).  At worst, the interventions have proved that these countries 
have not been totally isolated and abandoned by the international community and 
that the actions were launched on the part of people who would otherwise be wholly 
bereft of any psychological or material support.   
 
What is evident, from the peacekeeping efforts in the DRC and Sierra Leone is that 
military activities can prove ineffective if continued for too long and if not 
complemented with real economic growth and upliftment (Gueli, 2007:28).  The 
concept of DPMs therefore attempts to provide a workable solution to this dilemma 
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in that it attempts to couple peacekeeping activities to development activities, 
namely baseline infrastructure, water, transport and governmental institutions.  
However, the notion of incorporating the establishment of infrastructure into what 
was previously understood as the „military peacekeeping space‟ has significant 
implications on how the military component of peace operations should 
conceptualise, plan and implement their contributions to the overall mission.  On a 
conceptual level, it requires an understanding of the importance of utilising 
development as both a „pre-war‟ and „post-war‟ strategy that aims at both the 
prevention and cure of the underlying causes of the conflict (Gueli, 2007:28).  This 
is the essence of the philosophical baseline of the concept of DPMs – that peace 
missions should not only be focused on the process of peacekeeping, but that it 
should indeed be fused with peacebuilding processes as well.  On a planning level, it 
implies synergising infrastructure and development planning with military planning 
– essentially „integrated planning‟, which is at the basis of the current UN Integrated 
Mission Planning Process. 
 
The concept of DPMs thus provides a framework that could replace existing ad hoc 
institutions for and approaches to peace missions by providing governments with a 
permanent capacity that is endowed with sufficient authority to bring all the relevant 
public and private entities (including the military) together in order to effectively 
address all the issues and challenges related to complex peace missions – before, 
during and after crises arise.  The DPMs approach is focused on fusing security and 
development efforts throughout the course of a mission and on addressing the 
security-development nexus in an inter-related and contextually relevant way.  In the 
case of the peace mission in the DRC, it was evident from the start that the military 
component involved, could not ensure lasting peace and development.  The solutions 
that were presented during the various peace negotiations, were always based on an 
integrative approach – aimed at not only addressing short-term problems relating to 
the conflict, but aimed at finding long-term solutions that would ensure sustained 
peace and development.  The military activities in the DRC were always coupled to 
development initiatives that would complement real economic growth and 
upliftment.  Peacekeeping activities in the DRC were always coupled to 
peacebuilding activities.  This approach is in accordance with the philosophical 
essence of the concept of DPMs in that peacekeeping activities are coupled to 
developmental activities.   
 
The experience in the DRC thus proved that the concept of DPMs can indeed 
provide decision-makers and role-players with a more holistic planning approach to 
solving intra-state conflicts, and that, if applied effectively, could provide innovative 
solutions to ensure lasting peace and development.  However, the experience in the 
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DRC also emphasised the fact that several issues pertaining to the operationalisation 
of DPMs should be addressed, especially in regard to political will, funds and 
resource-capacity, before the concept of DPMs can be successfully applied.  
Furthermore, it is essential that each peace mission be approached in a unique and 
individual manner, as DPMs do not provide us with a „winning recipe‟ or „one-size-
fits-all‟ solution to intra-state wars.  However, the concept of DPMs does provide a 
useful construct for planning integrated complex peace missions. 
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CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1. Summary 
 
The purpose of this study was to theoretically establish and practically assess 
whether the concept of DPMs is indeed a useful construct to pursue sustainable 
levels of human security through a combination of intervention action, 
reconstruction and development initiatives.  To facilitate this study, the following 
research question was formulated: Is the concept of DPMs practical and feasible in 
the African context? 
 
The concept of DPMs is premised on the problem statement that many (traditional) 
peacekeeping interventions in the past were unable to work towards sustainable 
political and economic development.  To this end, DPMs are aimed at providing a 
practical and feasible alternative that could be successfully implemented in the 
African context.   
 
In order to assess the feasibility of the DPMs concept, the study was conceptually 
demarcated or redundant to the inter-relationship between DPMs and the security-
development nexus in terms of sustainable political and economic development.  
The study was furthermore geographically confined to the intervention in Kosovo as 
an international case study, and the cases of Sierra Leone and the DRC respectively 
in terms of peace missions in Africa.  As far as the temporal demarcation is 
concerned, the study was confined to peace missions and military interventions since 
January 1990 until June 2008.  Some pertinent factors that predate 1990, such as the 
background to the conflicts as discussed in the respective case studies, have been 
included since these factors have direct bearing on the nature of peace missions and 
how the relevant missions have evolved. 
 
The study was executed in a historical-descriptive and analytical manner, based on a 
literature study and analysis of factual data sources.  The concept and principles of 
DPM‟s, as presented by Gueli et al, was applied as departure point for the research 
and the components of the analytical framework were deductively linked.  Case 
studies that are relevant to the topic were analysed as part of the assessment.  The 
primary unit of analysis was countries in which peace missions have been conducted 
since 1990 and in which the peacekeeping mandates included peacebuilding 
initiatives.  The level of analysis was predominantly state-centric, although other 
relevant international, continental and regional factors and role-players were also 
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Supplementa 3, 2009. doi: 10.5787/0-0-75
 168    
considered.  Primary sources utilised were mostly policy documents from the UN, 
the AU and the CSIR. 
 
The significance of the study is that the conclusions reached could be used to inform 
government officials, military personnel as well as humanitarian organisations and 
civilian organisations involved in peace missions in the African continent.  The 
answers to the research question provide possible answers to address the complex 
issues pertaining to peace missions in Africa.  The research also addressed the 
relationship between the political needs/demands and the military role, and provided 
indications as to how DPMs can be utilised during peace missions to achieve desired 
objectives and end states in order to facilitate sustained development and security on 
the African continent.   
 
In view of the above, the study commenced by analysing the evolution of the concept 
of „human security‟.  The term „human security‟ was initially focused on 
development, but recent history has prompted a broader, more holistic understanding 
of the concept.  The research revealed how the initial concept of human security was 
primarily focused on development and covered seven aspects, including economic, 
food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security, but that it 
shifted to focus also on the human costs of violent conflict.  The research indicated 
how security of the individual is therefore no longer defined exclusively within the 
realms of states and national security.  In this context, individuals and communities 
are considered not only as bystanders and collateral victims of conflict, but as core 
participants in protection strategies and post-conflict peacebuilding.  The research 
also focused on the concept of human security as defined by the Commission on 
Human Security as the protection of the fundamental freedoms that are the essence of 
life and which includes protecting people from severe and pervasive threats and 
situations, as well as creating the political, social, environmental, economic, military 
and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks for survival, 
livelihood and dignity.   
 
The research also focused on the security-development nexus.  The link between 
security and development is highlighted by the continued violent conflict in many of 
the world‟s poorest states, and it has become widely accepted that contemporary 
armed conflicts require sustained efforts that address not only the military dimensions 
of conflicts, but also the political, humanitarian, economic and social dimensions of 
conflicts.  In general, there has been, for some years, a growing concern with the 
necessity of linking security and development in order to achieve meaningful and 
lasting peace. However, it was only in the late 1990‟s that a clear and more 
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„politicised‟ agenda emerged, which bore the promise of and integration between 
development and security policy. 
 
The study further evaluated the inter-relationship between the current understanding 
of the concept of peacebuilding and the newly defined concept of DPMs. The 
research revealed how the concept of DPMs was presented as a practical or functional 
South African concept to effectively address human security and development in 
Africa.  The concept of DPMs is in line with the contemporary approach to UN 
Complex Peace Missions, which are in effect peacebuilding operations, in that they 
have mandates that combine security, political, humanitarian, development and 
human rights dimensions in the post-conflict phase.  The research further revealed 
that the concept of DPMs proposes ways for policy-makers to plan and organise for 
civil-military operations that bridge the traditional „gap‟ between peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding and to mainstream developmental principles into conflict prevention 
and resolution.  In response to the limited successes achieved with the traditional 
approach to UN peace missions in Africa, DPMs are presented as an alternative 
(African) solution or paradigm that aims to ensure that future peace operations on the 
continent are implemented in an effective and sustainable manner.  This ultimately 
implies that the planning processes of peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and 
peacebuilding should be integrated with the aim of mutually supporting each other, 
rather than viewing each concept as an intermediate end state that is implemented in a 
phased and linear fashion.  It ultimately implies the adoption of a systems-thinking 
approach to address the inter-related problems experienced by war-torn states during 
complex emergencies by executing the processes of peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
simultaneously. The research proved that the cornerstone of the DPMs approach is to 
replace existing ad hoc institutions and approaches in governments with a permanent 
capacity endowed with sufficient authority to bring all relevant public and private 
entities (including the military) on board and under control when a crises emerges.  
This would facilitate a greater depth of planning and coordination between the 
military and civilian components of a mission. 
 
The study then moved its focus to three case studies, in which the peace missions in 
Kosovo, Sierra Leone and the DRC were analysed in terms of how the concept of 
DPMs was operationalised during the peace interventions: 
 
 The research pertaining to the intervention in Kosovo emphasised the fact 
that the significance of the military component‟s role in the peace process 
in Kosovo is to be found in the fact that the reconstruction phase 
commenced immediately after Operation Allied Force was concluded and 
the fact that the military component (KFOR) and the civilian component 
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(UNMIK) were deployed simultaneously and that these components 
worked in unison in order to set the scene for sustained peace and 
development – thus effectively implementing the key success factors of 
DPMs by effectively addressing the reconstruction gap that often leads to a 
resumption of conflict if peacebuilding activities are not rolled-out in time. 
Ultimately, the peace process in Kosovo clearly shows that international 
peacekeeping has moved beyond the traditional peacekeeping role of the 
UN.  It also bears testimony to the growing importance of regional 
organisations and alliances in international peace initiatives in the post-
Cold War era.  Most importantly, the research indicated that complex 
emergencies require multi-faceted responses and it implies acceptance of 
the fact that the military is but one of the participants in any particular 
peace process.  As a result, it proved that, in addition to the essential roles 
to be performed by international and regional security organisations, 
international and local NGOs have tasks to perform that are as important as 
those performed by the military component during humanitarian 
interventions.  Furthermore, the intervention in Kosovo bears testimony to 
the realisation that modern peace missions require an integrated systems-
approach in order to effectively address the inter-related issues that caused 
the conflict in the first place, and that the capability and the willingness to 
act need to be matched with adequate instruments.  Most importantly, the 
peace process in Kosovo emphasises the fact that complex peace missions 
call for the rapid and simultaneous deployment of peacekeeping, as well as 
peacebuilding components. 
 
 The research on the peace mission in Sierra Leone demonstrated that 
peacekeeping in Africa involves entry into volatile, high risk, anarchic 
environments, where copious quantities of weapons are available.  The 
peace mission in Sierra Leone clearly indicated that a robust approach to 
peace missions is required in modern complex emergencies.  In addition to 
the collapse of security mechanisms, the destruction of the social cohesion 
and state infrastructures can remove the support mechanisms required to 
sustain life, which most often, results in humanitarian crisis.  In these 
circumstances, it is essential that the peace force that is deployed in such 
complex emergencies has credibility in the eyes of the population, the 
belligerents and the international community.  However, the military 
deployment ultimately forms only a part of the solution: there can be no 
credible military peace support operations force without the political 
backing of all the participating nations, as well as the commitment to long-
term sustainable reconstruction and development. 
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 The research on the peace mission in the DRC indicated that traditional 
intervention approaches fall short in countries where complex emergencies 
are the order of the day.  It is evident from the intervention in the DRC, as 
was the case in Sierra Leone, that peacekeeping in the 21st century differs 
vastly from the guidelines and prescriptions of the 1950s.  The experience 
of intervention in the brutal and ever-shifting anarchy of those parts in 
Africa in the 1990s and 2000s, the ideas of peacekeeping as a formalised 
interposition between opposing states appear to belong to a distant 
historical era. The relationship between security and development must be 
clearly understood by all parties concerned, and ultimately, there must be a 
long-term commitment by all role-players to contribute to finding lasting 
peace.  What is evident from the peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo, the DRC 
and Sierra Leone is that military activities can prove ineffective if 
continued for too long and if not complemented with real economic growth 
and upliftment.  The research indicated how the concept of DPMs offers a 
workable solution to this dilemma in that it attempts to couple 
peacekeeping activities to development activities, namely baseline 
infrastructure, water, transport and governmental institutions.  However, 
the research also revealed that the notion of incorporating the establishment 
of infrastructure into what was previously understood as the „military 
peacekeeping space‟ has significant implications on how the military 
component of peace operations should conceptualise, plan and implement 
their contributions to the overall mission.  On a conceptual level, it requires 
an understanding of the importance of utilising development as both a „pre-
war‟ and „post-war‟ strategy that aims at both the prevention and cure of 
the underlying causes of the conflict.  Finally, the research proved that, on a 
planning level, it implies synergising infrastructure and development 
planning with military planning – essentially „integrated planning‟ which is 
at the basis of the current UN Integrated Mission Planning Process. 
 
The fact that the study is based on only three case studies poses some problems for 
the purpose of making generalised conclusions in regard to the application of the 
concept of DPMs, but the reason for the limited number of case studies is based on 
the fact that they represent the first few cases in which peacekeeping mandates 
combined security, political, humanitarian, development and human rights 
dimensions with the intention of combining peacekeeping activities with 
peacebuilding initiatives.  
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7.2. Conclusions 
 
In relation to the research question, three subsidiary questions were posed: 
 
 How appropriate is the concept of DPMs specifically to the African 
context? 
 Are there generic or common elements that will be applicable to all peace 
missions in the international community in general and Africa in 
particular? 
 Can the implementation of DPMs provide innovative solutions to the 
challenges of human security, the security-development nexus and 
peacebuilding on the continent? 
 
The following conclusions can finally be articulated in the context of the research 
question and subsidiary questions. 
 
How appropriate is the concept of DPMs specifically to the African context? 
 
The concept of DPMs was presented to the South African Parliament in 2004 as a 
„home-grown‟ solution to promote long-term sustainable security and development 
on the African continent.  The research conducted indicated that the concept is in 
fact, not unique to South Africa, but that it follows the current international approach 
to peace missions in that the mandates of most of these interventions include and 
address peacekeeping, as well as peacebuilding activities.  Importantly, the concept 
of DPMs emphasises the notion that the prevention of conflict begins and ends with 
the promotion of human security and human development. 
 
Most or many of the conflicts on the African continent can ultimately be ascribed to 
the struggle to gain control over resources, coupled to the absence of good 
governance, effective institutions and sustainable development initiatives.  The 
concept of DPMs is aimed at directly addressing the causes of the many intra-state 
wars in Africa, by not only providing short-term peace and security, but also 
providing long-term solutions to the conflict by establishing the foundations for 
sustainable peace and development.  In terms of conflicts in Africa, DPMs are aimed 
at bringing peacekeeping closer to development – all in a bid to minimise the 
chances of a return to violence – a phenomenon very prevalent in Africa, where 
peace mission only have a 50% chance of success.  History has proved that in more 
than 60% of interventions, belligerents return to the use of violence within five years 
after the peacekeepers have left the country.  DPMs aim at providing a strategy to 
quickly make the transition from the military‟s peacemaking and peacekeeping 
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mission to the longer-term peacebuilding mission of IGOs and NGOs.  DPMs 
therefore offers a useful framework for the process of providing critical 
humanitarian assistance and reconstruction capabilities immediately after military 
operations so that security can dynamically reinforce and influence the effectiveness 
of development (i.e. the one activity must be applied without loosing sight of the 
other).  On a continent where individual states, as well as regional organisations, 
have limited resources for sustained development, especially in countries that were 
plagued by intra-state wars for decades, the concept of DPMs thus offers a useful 
framework for more effective peace interventions.  However, in order for the 
concept to be effectively operationalised, very large amounts of funds and resources 
will have to be made available – and in the case of Africa, this implies employing 
donor support from developed countries.  History has shown that the developed 
world is, in fact, more willing to provide funds and resources, rather than 
peacekeepers, to peace missions in Africa.  However, the success of DPMs in Africa 
will ultimately remain dependent on the participation of and cooperation by the 
participants to the conflict.  Furthermore, the concept of DPMs is a useful construct 
in the facilitation and operationalisation of the concepts of the African Renaissance 
and NEPAD, which are based on the need for lasting peace and sustainable 
development on the African continent. 
 
Are there generic or common elements that will be applicable to all peace missions 
in the international community in general and Africa in particular? 
 
The concept of DPMs is based on the integration of the planning processes of peace 
enforcement, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding, with the aim of mutually supporting 
each other, rather than viewing each concept as an intermediate end state that is 
implemented in a phased and sequential fashion.  The concept of DPMs is presented 
as a theoretical framework to effectively address the challenges that are related to 
human security, by adopting an integrated approach, based on effective co-operation 
between various states, government departments and civil society organisations as 
required.  The new policy frameworks on the African continent consider his type of 
approach as essential, and despite some practical impediments, there is general and 
growing appreciation of the linkages between security, co-operation and 
development as suggested by the human security paradigm followed by most of the 
role-players involved in peace missions.  It ultimately implies the adoption of a 
systems-thinking approach to address the inter-related problems experienced by war-
torn states during complex emergencies by executing the processes of peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding simultaneously.  This implies and supports the internationally 
accepted approach to peace missions that is based on the notion that security can no 
longer be regarded as a precursor for development, and that there is a need to 
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efficiently link security and development as twin imperatives through integrated 
policies and programmes from the start of peace operations, as security can only 
achieve permanent benefit if early and well-placed socio-economic resources are 
implemented within reasonable time.  This more integrated approach in the planning 
of peace missions has been formalised in the UN IMPP, as well as in the AU‟s Draft 
Policy for Integrated Mission Planning.  This implies that the concept of DPMs is 
not only relevant to peace missions in Africa, but that it is applicable to all peace 
missions, as it provides a holistic framework for laying the foundations for 
sustainable peace and development.   
 
It is not possible to determine exact time scales for the duration of developmental 
assistance and peacebuilding as building blocks for DPMs, as the duration of 
development initiatives will depend on the nature of each individual crisis.  
However, experience has shown that the window between military action and 
development work, the „reconstruction gap‟, is very narrow and that the first few 
weeks after a ceasefire agreement are perhaps the most critical period for 
establishing a sustainable peace and the credibility of the peacekeepers. 
 
Of utmost importance, is the fact that the various stake-holders and role players 
involved in a mission, must plan and work together under a common strategic 
framework to ensure that combined security and developmental efforts are started as 
soon as possible, and that these efforts form part of a larger framework for long-term 
developments and reconstruction.  In this regard, regional organisations have a vital 
role to play, as they provide a sort of nexus between the UN and the AU, IGOs and 
NGOs, as well as the respective civil society organisations involved in peace 
missions.  Although many of the objectives and end states of the peace missions in 
the three case studies have not been achieved as yet, the integration of peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding activities can be described as qualified successes as the conflict 
situations in all three cases have not deteriorated to the same levels as to what they 
were prior to the peace missions.    
 
Can the implementation of DPMs provide innovative solutions to the challenges of 
human security, the security-development nexus and peacebuilding on the 
continent? 
 
The DPMs approach is to replace existing ad hoc institutions and approaches in 
government with a permanent capacity endowed with sufficient authority to bring all 
relevant public and private entities (including the military) on board and under 
control when a crisis emerges, with a view to facilitating a greater depth of planning 
and coordination between the military and civilian components of a mission.  The 
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DPMs approach is focused on fusing security and development efforts throughout 
the course of a mission and on addressing the security-development nexus in an 
inter-related and contextually relevant way. 
 
However, the concept of DPMs should not be viewed in terms of a set procedure 
that can be used as a panacea or type of „universal band aid‟ for all intra-state wars.  
There is no „one-size-fits-all‟ or „winning recipe‟ solution to peace missions.  
Furthermore, the active involvement of civil society in peace missions and post-
conflict activities is a crucial component for the development of democracies, and is 
one of the most essential elements for making the transition from conflict into the 
post-conflict state and consolidating peaceful politics. Weak or failed states should 
take time to consolidate and build their own institutions and gain legitimacy in the 
eyes of their constituents, rather than rushing the process by accepting and 
implementing the continuing largely Western dictated formulas for functional and 
open societies.  The aim should therefore be to analyse the environment in which the 
peace mission is to take place in great sociological detail in seeking to get as near as 
possible to the viewpoints of local actors, especially in terms of what the local role-
players understand about and could expect from the peacekeepers in their midst. 
 
It can therefore be concluded that the concept of DPMs does indeed provide a more 
holistic approach to solving intra-state conflicts, and that, if applied appropriately, 
could provide innovative solutions towards ensuring lasting peace and development.  
However, several issues pertaining to the operasionalisation of developmental peace 
missions should be addressed, especially in regard to political will, funds and 
resource-capacity, before the concept of DPMs can successfully be applied in Africa 
and elsewhere.  DPMs, in terms of its conceptual basis, is indeed a feasible ideal for 
peace missions, as it is based on and in line with the approved current UN and AU 
integrated planning processes.  However, in terms of its practical utility in Africa – it 
currently remains an ambitious construct − especially given the limited capacity and 
resources of the AU and regional organisations.  In the final analysis, the success of 
DPMs will be determined by the will and commitment of all the relevant role-
players involved in finding a lasting solution to intra-state conflicts − the concept 
itself cannot provide sustainable peace and development. 
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